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EGYPT

IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY



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EGYPT

IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY

OR

MEHEMET ALI AND HIS SUCCESSORS UNTIL THE BRITISH OCCUPATION IN 1882

BY

D. A. CAMERON

LONDON

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1898

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SHORT CHRONOLOGY OF EVENTS.

1769.—Birth of Mehemet Ali at Kàvala in Macedonia.

1798.—Napoleon Bonaparte lands at Alexandria, July 2nd. Defeats Murad Bey and the Mamelukes at Embabeh, near the Pyramids, July 21st, and enters Cairo. Nelson annihilates the French fleet at Abukeer, August 1st. The sultan declares war against the French.

1799.—Napoleon invades Syria, February; and besieges Acre, March 20th. Kléber defeats the Turks at Mount Tabor, April. Napoleon abandons the siege of Acre, May 17th, and returns to Cairo; defeats the Capoudan Pasha's army at Abukeer, July 25th; and escapes to France, August 22nd, where he becomes First Consul by the *coup d'état* of Brumaire.

1800.—Sir Sidney Smith tries to make a convention at El-Areesh with Kléber for the French evacuation. This is repudiated by the British Government. Kléber defeats the Turks at Heliopolis, March, but is assassinated in Cairo, June 14th.

1801.—Sir Ralph Abercrombie lands at Abukeer, March 8th, and repulses Menou on the 21st. Dies of his wounds, and is succeeded by Hutchinson. Béliard surrenders at Cairo, June 25th, and

Menou at Alexandria, September 2nd. The French evacuate Egypt, the English remaining in occupation till 1801. Khusrev Pasha makes Mehemet Ali captain of his guards.

1803.—The Mamelukes under Osman Bardisy defeat the Albanians. Tahir Pasha deposes Khusrev, but is slain. Mehemet Ali, as senior colonel of the Albanians, joins the Mamelukes.

1804.—Mehemet Ali revolts against the Mamelukes, and declares his loyalty to the Porte. Khurshid is appointed pasha.

1805.—Pillage of Cairo by Turks and Albanians. The sheikhs proclaim Mehemet Ali as pasha, and Khurshid is besieged in the citadel.

1806.—The Porte acknowledges Mehemet Ali as pasha, April.

1807.—Admiral Duckworth's failure at Constantinople, February. General Mackenzie Frazer lands with 4000 British troops at Alexandria. Disaster at Rosetta under Wauchope, and surrender at El-Hamàd, April 20th. Armistice of Damanhour, and evacuation of Egypt by the British in September. Sultan Selim III. is deposed by the Janissaries in favour of Mustafa IV.

1808.—Mustafa and Selim are murdered, and Mahmoud II. becomes sultan. Mehemet Ali begins to confiscate all the lands of Egypt for himself as sole proprietor. Is ordered by the Porte to conquer the Wahhàbis in Arabia, and begins to build a fleet at Suez.

1811.—Massacre of the Mamelukes in Cairo citadel, March 1st. Departure of Toussoun with an army to Arabia. Defeat of the Wahhàbis, and recapture of Medina and Mecca.

1813.—Mehemet Ali goes to Mecca and carries on the war. His regent, Lazoghlu, completes the confiscation of all lands in Egypt, and sends reinforcements to Jeddah. Death of the great Wahhàbi leader Saoud, who is succeeded by Abdullah. Victories of Mehemet Ali, who, however, returns to Cairo on learning that the Porte is trying to depose him.

1815.—Mehemet Ali fails to form a new army, and is nearly assassinated. Return of Toussoun. Mr. Salt succeeds Colonel Missett as consul-general.

1816.—Ibrahim, having driven the Mamelukes into Nubia, is sent to finish the Wahhàbi war. Mehemet Ali begins his system of commercial monopolies.

1818.—Ibrahim captures the last Wahhàbi stronghold of Deràya, and ends the war. Abdullah is put to death at Stamboul.

1819.—Excavation of the Mahmoudieh canal.

1820.—Subjugation of the oasis of Siwa. First Soudan expedition under Ismail, who, after a battle at Korti, captures Berber, Shendy, and Sennaar. Is burnt at Shendy, 1822. Khartoum is founded, 1823.

1822.—Cultivation of Jumel's (Maho) cotton in the Delta. Mehemet Ali begins to erect factories, which, however, are abandoned after having cost enormous sums. Reckless destruction of numerous

ancient monuments, which are pillaged for their stone or lime.

Creation of the new army under the Frenchman Sève, Suleiman Pasha. Beginning of the Greek Revolution. Execution of Ali Pasha of Yanina. Mehemet Ali sends troops to Crete, of which island he is appointed Governor.

1824.—Mehemet Ali is appointed Governor of the Morea. Ibrahim is sent with 17,000 troops, and lands at Navarino.

1826.—Having conquered the Morea, Ibrahim joins the grand-vizier Reshid Mehemet in besieging Missolonghi, which falls in April. Reshid captures Athens. Guerilla warfare in the Morea. First Treaty of London, July.

1827.—Sir Edward Codrington, after warning Ibrahim not to carry off the Greeks as slaves, enters Navarino harbour with the combined squadrons of France, Russia, and England, and destroys the Turco-Egyptian fleet, October 20th.

1828.—Codrington, threatening Alexandria, makes a convention with Mehemet Ali for the evacuation of the Morea, and Ibrahim returns to Egypt, October. A French garrison occupies Greece. Consul John Barker is appointed Consul-General in Egypt.

1829.—The treaty of Adrianople recognizes Greek independence.

1830.—French engineers, De Cerisy, Besson, Mougel, begin to build a fleet and arsenal for Mehemet Ali at Alexandria. Clot Bey organizes the school of medicine at Kasr-el-Aini.

1831.—Ibrahim invades Syria. Mehemet Ali is outlawed by the Porte, November.

1832.—Ibrahim captures Acre, May 27th; enters Damascus, and defeats Mehemet at Homs, July 8th; passes through Aleppo, and defeats Hussein at Beilan, July 29th; invades Asia Minor, and occupies Konia, where he defeats the grand-vizier Reshid Mehemet, December 21st.

1833.—Convention of Kutaya, May 6th, annulling the deposition of Mehemet Ali, and reinstating him as Pasha of Egypt, with the possession of Syria and Adana. Treaty of Hunkiar Skélési between Russia and Turkey, June. Colonel Campbell succeeds Mr. Barker as consul-general at Alexandria.

1834.—All Syria revolts against the Egyptian tyranny. Mehemet Ali rescues Ibrahim in Palestine, and the country is gradually disarmed and terrorized.

1835.—The plague in Egypt (see Kinglake's "Eôthen").

1838.—Terrible impoverishment of Egypt, owing to the expense of the Syrian occupation. Mehemet Ali insists upon his independence being recognized. England refuses. He pays a visit to Sennaar. Dr. Bowring's mission to Egypt.

1839.—Ibrahim defeats the Turks at Nezib, June 24th. Death of Sultan Mahmoud, June 30th, and accession of Abdul-Mejid. Khusrev grand-vizier. Admiral Feyzi Pasha surrenders the Turkish fleet to Mehemet Ali at Alexandria, July.

1840.—Colonel Hodges succeeds Campbell as consul-general. Second treaty of London, July 15th.

British and Austrian operations in Syria. Defeat of Ibrahim in the Lebanon. Bombardment of Acre, November 3rd. Ibrahim evacuates Damascus, and retreats to Gaza. Sir Charles Napier makes a convention with Mehemet Ali at Alexandria.

1841.—Final evacuation of Syria by Ibrahim, February. The firman of June 1st confers the hereditary Pashalik of Egypt on Mehemet Ali.

1842.—Cattle plague and locusts in the Delta. Deplorable state of the country.

1845.—Waghorn succeeds in bringing the Bombay mail to London in 30 days by the overland route. Ibrahim goes to Europe.

1846.—Ibrahim's cordial reception in England. Mehemet Ali goes to pay homage at Stamboul.

1847.—Mehemet Ali lays the foundation-stone of the Barrage, and renders assistance to French and English engineers for the survey of the Suez Canal.

1848.—Imbecility of Mehemet Ali. Regency of Ibrahim, July, till his death, on November 10th. Abbas Regent.

1849.—Death of Mehemet Ali, August 2nd. Accession of Abbas I.

1854.—Death of Abbas, and accession of his uncle Said.


1863.—Death of Said Pasha, and accession of Ismail.

1869.—Inauguration of the Suez Canal.

1879.—Deposition of Ismail, June, and accession of Mehemet Tewfik.

1882.—Battle of Tell-el-Kebir, September 13th. British occupation.

THE DYNASTY OF MEHEMET ALI, PASHA OF EGYPT.



I. *Mehemet Ali* (1769–1849). Pasha of Egypt, 1805–1849.

Ibrahim, eldest son of the above (1789–1848). Was for a few months regent in 1848, during his father's last illness.

Toussoun (1796–1816). Distinguished himself in the earlier part of the Wahhàbi War, 1811–1815.

Ismail (1798–1822). Conquered the Soudan in 1820. Burnt at Shendy.

Tewhida, married Moharrem Bey, who commanded the Egyptian squadron at Navarino.

Nazli, married Mohammed Bey Defterdar.
Said (1823–1863). Pasha of Egypt, 1854–1863.
Abdul-Halim, generally known as Halim Pasha (1831–1894).
Mehemet Ali the Younger, b. 1836.
Abbas (1813–1854). Commanded a division during the war in Syria. On the death of Ibrahim, became regent as the eldest male of the family, and succeeded to the pashalik on the death of Mehemet Ali, in August, 1849, thus preceding his uncle Said.
Ismail (1830–1895). Son of Ibrahim. Became Pasha of Egypt in 1863, and was named "khedive" in 1867. Was deposed by the sultan in 1879, and banished. Died at Constantinople, 1895.
Mehemet Tewfik (1853–1892). Succeeded his father, 1879. Married his cousin, Princess Amina, grand-daughter of Abbas.
Abbas Hilmi II. Born 1874. Succeeded his father, Mehemet Tewfik, January 7th, 1892.

II. The children of Ibrahim Pasha, son of Mehemet Ali, are—
Ahmed, *Ismail Khedive*, and Mustafa Fazil. Of these Ahmed, the eldest, while heir to the pashalik, was accidentally drowned at the ferry of Kafr-el-Zayat, 1858, so that his younger brother, Ismail, succeeded Said Pasha in 1863.
His children married their cousins, children of Ismail Pasha, viz. Ibrahim married Zeinab;

Ahmed married Jameela; and Ain-el-Hayat married Hussein Kamil.

III. The children of *Ismail Pasha, Khedive,* are—

Mehemet Tewfik, Khedive, already mentioned.

Hussein Kamil Pasha, who married Princess Ain-el-Hayat, daughter of his uncle Ahmed.

Hassan Pasha, married Khadija, daughter of Mehemet Ali the Younger.

Mahmoud Hamdi Pasha, married Princess Zeinab, daughter of El-Hami Pasha.

Princess Tewhida, married Mansour Pasha.

Princess Fatma, married Toussoun, son of Said Pasha.

Princess Jameela, married Ahmed Pasha, son of Ahmed (II).

IV. The children of *Mehemet Tewfik Pasha, Khedive,* by Princess Amina are—

Abbas Hilmi Pasha, Khedive, married Ikbal Hanum, 1894.

Mehemet Ali Pasha, heir-presumptive.

Princess Khadija, married Said Pasha, son of Abdul-Halim.

Princess Niamet-ullah, married Jameel Pasha, son of Toussoun.

ERRATA.

Page viii, line 3.—*For* 1801 *read* 1803.

,, 243, line 5 from bottom of page.—*For* not *read* only.

,, 278.—*For* Ibrahim (Sheikh) / Ibrahim Pasha } *read* Ibrahim Bey.

,, 279.—*For* Napier, Lord, *read* Napier, Admiral Sir Charles.

For Oswald, Admiral, *read* Oswald, Major.

EGYPT

IN THE

NINETEENTH CENTURY.

CHAPTER I.

INTRODUCTION.

In the hands of a competent writer the story of Egypt in the nineteenth century might be made as entertaining as a masterpiece of fiction, so great and noble are some of the characters with whom we have to deal, so picturesque and strange the scenery of three continents on which we have to gaze. A lavish profusion of incident awaits our choice—of wars and conquests, of races and religions, of dynasties and revolutions, of chivalry and commerce—the whole clustering round the death of a past epoch and the birth of a new. To do justice to such a theme one requires a certain amount of training in Oriental languages, familiarity with the manners and customs of the East; one should have

lived not only in Egypt, but also, if possible, on the shores of the Bosphorus, in Asia Minor, Syria, Arabia, and the Soudan; in a word, the writer must first have confidence in the accuracy of his knowledge himself ere he can hope to persuade his readers to trust to his guidance.

Egypt is, as it were, the centre of our circle; and in order to understand its present condition we must know a little of many things—of its former history, of the Turkish empire, of European commerce, and of English enterprise in India. Now, as all these subjects cannot be done justice to in a small volume, the success of the writer will largely depend on his guessing the happy medium of his reader's information, on availing himself of that average, and applying it at the right moment and in the proper way.

Our narrative begins a hundred years ago. Towards the end of the eighteenth century the Ottoman empire seemed to be on the verge of ruin, owing to the weakness of the Central Government at Constantinople. In 1774 a turning-point had been reached, and the humiliating treaty of Kainardji imposed by Russia had revealed the fact that Turkey, far from being any more an object of terror to Christian Europe, was scarcely capable of defending its own extensive frontiers. Further disasters followed in rapid succession until, while the French Revolution was at its height, many of

the richest provinces were in open revolt, and the sultan himself had become a State prisoner at the mercy of his Janissary guards in the capital.

The causes of this anarchy are not far to seek, and may be briefly summarized. In the first place, it is impossible to appreciate the true character of the modern Turkish empire without studying the influence exerted upon its youth by its Christian predecessor, inasmuch as the Turks, by their usurpation of the Bosphorus, became imperceptibly and in spite of themselves more "Byzantine" in political sentiment than they would care to acknowledge at the present day. They inherited that old jealousy between the empires of the East and West, between the Catholic and Orthodox Churches which had abandoned Constantinople to its fate; and so deep was this hatred, that the opinion of the majority of the Greeks during the siege may be summed up in the exclamation of one of their leaders: "Better the turban of the Turk in our city than the tiara of the Pope." This rivalry was further envenomed by the Crusading enmity of the West, all the more bitter because it now stood on the defensive against Turkish aggression; and thus the elements of secular and religious antipathy united to form an impassable barrier which, to some extent, exists in our own generation.

The fall of Constantinople found the Continent preparing for the struggle of the Reformation, and the strength of Christianity was soon to be wasted by Catholics and Protestants alike. If the successive waves of Islamic invasion, Saracen Arab, or Turkish Seljuk, and Ottoman, had met with a decent and enlightened form of our common religion, the fate of the Levant might have been very different. But it was the curse of those fierce and barbarous invaders to meet with races whose ideas of gospel teaching seemed to be limited to the veneration of images, eikons, and relics, who believed in the efficacy of indulgences, and trembled at the reality of a Dante's hell. The Moslems, on the other hand, thought themselves to be the final avatar of a chosen people, and their views of Christianity were based, and crystallized once and for ever, on the corrupted forms of that faith which they contemptuously tolerated among the servile populations whom they had subjugated. Their military success had been so extraordinary and overwhelming that, from their standpoint in the Middle Ages, they naturally imputed it to the inherent superiority of their Oriental civilization and creed. Both sides abhorred one another, and so the political and spiritual cleavage grew wider from the very first. This is, perhaps, the secret of what we call Moslem "fanaticism"—their feeling of humiliation

after triumph, of impotence after supremacy, despair against the irrevocable judgment of our modern civilization. Elated by their early triumph, they disdained to study the causes of our progress, they preferred to stand still while we passed them in the race; and the indulgent reader, in noting their faults, may pity as well as condemn.

Another cause of decline deserves attention, if only as a curious paradox. Although it suffered at the hands of the Turks, the native Christian population was by no means annihilated. Greek officials were retained, and foreign merchants were encouraged to reside at the ports. From generation to generation thousands of Greek lads were impressed into the Moslem service and faith, being carefully trained as Janissaries, that is, "new soldiers," or as clerks in the civil administration. It was this abundant supply of Hellenic intellect, combined with the animal ferocity of the Turkish hordes, which rendered the rapid rise and progress of the Ottoman empire one of the marvels of European history. For two hundred years after the fall of Constantinople the earlier sultans, assisted by their Greek advisers, had pushed their frontiers to the gates of Vienna, and made their corsairs the terror of the Mediterranean. Their state policy of recruiting Greek boys, of welcoming Italian renegades, had been a brilliant success, supplying

the dominant power with a series of able viziers, generals, and minor officials. There was less fanaticism, and a national career was offered to a portion of their Christian subject races. This policy fell into disuse, and as the sceptre lapsed into the hands of feebler successors, Turkey was gradually deprived of the source whence it had drawn its intellectual nourishment. The later sultans foolishly preferred to bring their palace recruits from Circassia, with the result that the Christian colonies, instead of becoming more and more identified with their rulers, gradually formed separate interests of their own, and began to look to Europe for sympathy and protection.

A later cause of decay may be found in the wars of the eighteenth century. Like mediæval Europe, the Ottomans had a military feudal system of their own, which was for a time highly successful by reason of the disorganization of the Continental Powers. But a change came over the scene when the idea of standing armies was introduced after the Thirty Years' War. Disciplined forces, trained by generals who had served under Louis XIV., the emperor, or Frederick the Great, began to hold the Turkish rabble in check, and then to drive them back to the Danube, while the ships of Spain and France, of Holland and England, though often hostile to one another, readily united to render mutual aid

against the Moslem pirates who infested the Mediterranean. It was not till the beginning of this century that Sultan Mahmoud II. dared to insist upon elementary "discipline" among the Janissaries and Bashi-Bozuks, or to organize a fleet upon European models. A revolution ensued which all but cost him his empire and his life; so that for our purpose of study it is important to bear in mind that at the close of the eighteenth century Turkey had no "army" worthy of the name.

Decay was further hastened by another cause, perhaps the most fatal of all, and, strange to say, not entirely within the power of the Turks to prevent. The discovery of the Cape route by the Portuguese, only a generation after the capture of Constantinople, had been slowly but surely contributing to the impoverishment of the Levant by turning aside the great volume of Indian trade to the Atlantic Ocean. The Turks could no longer easily obtain the sinews of war by levying customs on Oriental produce in the harbours of Egypt and Syria. The current of wealth which used to flow through their Asiatic and African dominions had been diverted from them into a distant channel; and while western Europe steadily advanced in civilization, religion, politics, and commerce, Turkey, left behind in the race, was growing poorer, and saw itself hampered by obsolete Byzantine institutions, mediæval theories of

government, its Moslem faith, its lack of industry, and its loss of trade. The sultan, beaten in the field, no longer feared as an invader, sank in importance as the value of his Levantine markets diminished, and as the transit of maritime commerce was transferred from the Mediterranean to the English Channel. The political tide had turned, the treaty of Kainardji may be said to have created the modern "Eastern Question," and a certain antagonism began to arise between the Powers as to the ultimate disposal of Constantinople.

Such is a brief review of some of the causes which led to the state of anarchy in Turkey when Mehemet Ali, afterwards the famous Pasha of Egypt, entered upon his public career as a soldier of fortune in 1798; and it next remains to study the course of events which brought him from his home in Macedonia to the banks of the Nile. When we understand how it was that he came to Egypt and gained a foothold there, we shall be able to appreciate the genius which he displayed in establishing a dynasty at Cairo amid the general decay of the Ottoman empire. Egypt was suddenly to become the stage of great events, and Mehemet Ali was destined to play a leading part upon it for nearly half a century.

What was the condition of that country a hundred years ago?

CHAPTER II.

THE MAMELUKES OF EGYPT.

AMONG the Turkish provinces in open revolt against the sultan, none was so important as the Mameluke principality of Egypt.

Originally conquered from the Christians by the Arabs in 641, it had remained subject to the caliphs of Damascus or Bagdad till the tenth century, when it passed for a time under the sceptre of the Fatimy rulers of Tunis. In 1170, however, a new system of government began, originated by the famous Saladin, a Kurdish general in the service of the King of Syria. Sent by the latter to Egypt on a mission, Saladin eventually became master of the country, and, under the nominal suzerainty of the helpless ruler of Bagdad, overran Syria, and held his own against the Crusaders. After his death, in 1193, his dynasty lasted till 1250, when it was superseded by the military sect or brotherhood of the Mamelukes, who continued to flourish in Egypt till the invasion of Napoleon in 1798.

The word "mameluke," or "mamlook" in Arabic, means a chattel, a male slave; but is usually restricted to signify a white slave, particularly a white slave purchased as a recruit for the army.

The system of slave-recruiting appears to have begun during the decline of Bagdad, and to have spread through Syria to Egypt; but, whatever its origin, it first attracts notice under the rule of Saladin, who thoroughly organized his Mameluke corps into an army of occupation. It was this standing army which enabled him and his successors to fight the Crusaders, and finally to drive them out of the Holy Land, in spite of the resistance of those whom we may call their Christian compeers, the Knights of the Temple and the Hospitallers of St. John. Moreover, when once the system had been developed, it had to be continued as a measure of self-preservation, for, without constant recruits, the foreign Mameluke garrison would have naturally dwindled away, and been extinguished.

Sold by his parents, or stolen from his village in the Caucasus, and brought to Cairo by the dealer, who sold him again to a Mameluke chieftain, the young recruit thenceforth had lost his country and his home; he had become a member of a military caste which despised the fellaheen, or peasants, and abhorred the idea of marriage, or of family, as fatal to his profession of a

soldier. On the other hand, the highest career was open to his talents. Saladin himself, and his generals, and most of the sultans and their generals, had been slaves in their youth. The crown was seized by the strongest Bey, and, though a son and grandson might succeed to the throne, a dynasty rarely continued beyond the third generation without being broken by a fresh usurper. Slavery was merely a name, a form of honourable military service for life; the Mameluke was bound apprentice to a warlike and aristocratic guild, he took the vows as an adopted child of his master's household regiment. War was incessant, and troops were ever on the march between the Nile and Euphrates, between Aleppo and Mecca. The Mamelukes may be likened to the ancient warrior caste of India, and the real slaves were the Egyptian peasantry and working-classes.

Let us picture a complete military oligarchy dominant for six hundred years, a pack of foreign wolves ruling over millions of sheep with perfect impunity, while Europe was intent on its own affairs—its Middle Ages, its Renaissance, Reformation, maritime discoveries, civil wars, its struggle of nationalities, and its balance of power. What would be the virtues and vices of such an army responsible to none but itself? The sultan, or commander-in-chief, had his generals, the general

had his colonels, and the colonel his captains; and each of these minor officers had his company and squadron of troops at the disposal of his superior who had bought him and freed him, and to whom he owed allegiance. Emulation, therefore, spurred on the recruit, the man-at-arms, to win promotion and wealth in the wars, to rise in the hierarchy, and to form a household of his own. As a reward, he might be given a Circassian wife later on, but it was loss of caste to marry a native woman; it was disgrace, and even death, to malinger or desert his corps and to settle down as a civilian. Strange to say, their offspring rarely survived, at least after the first generation; and, in spite of the steady annual supply of Circassian men and women for six hundred years, there has never been a colony of pure Circassian race domiciled in Egypt. It is essential, therefore, to remember that the Mamelukes were not a nation, but only a standing army of foreigners, having no interests in common with the native races of Egypt and Syria. And yet it continued to flourish, until, in 1798, Napoleon had to face as magnificent a force of Mameluke chivalry as ever opposed Richard Cœur de Lion in Palestine six hundred years before.

At a later period of their history another name was attached to them—that of the "Ghozz"—owing to a large number of their recruits having been drawn

from a so-called tribe in the Caucasus, of which nothing more is known. During the first half of this century, after Mehemet Ali had exterminated the Mamelukes off the face of the earth, the native Egyptians, mindful of their former bondage, would speak of a certain event as having taken place in the days of the "Ghozz"—a synonym for all that was worst in the records of military domination.

The history of the Mamelukes is a curious one, and falls into two periods: the first extends from 1250 to 1517, during which the senior general or sultan was an independent monarch; and the second, dating from the Ottoman conquest of 1517, stretches down to the year 1811, when the last Mamelukes perished at the hands of Mehemet Ali. In the former period we enter upon the richest and best period of Saracenic art and architecture. "The Mamelukes," says Mr. Lane Poole, in his popular work on "Cairo," "offer the most singular contrasts of any series of princes in the world. A band of lawless adventurers, slaves in origin, butchers by choice, turbulent, bloodthirsty, and too often treacherous, these slave-kings had a keen appreciation for the arts, which would have done credit to the most civilized ruler that ever sat on a constitutional throne. They show in their buildings, their decoration, their dress, and their furniture, a taste and refinement

which it would be hard to parallel in western countries even in the present æsthetic age.

"It is one of the most singular facts in Eastern history that, wherever these rude Tartars penetrated, there they inspired a fresh and vivid enthusiasm for art. It was Tartar Ibn-Tûlûn who built the first example of the true Saracenic mosque at Cairo; it was the line of Mameluke sultans—all Turkish or Circassian slaves—who filled Cairo with the most beautiful and abundant monuments that any city can show."

Now, as the natural wealth of Egypt was limited to its agriculture, whence was it that the Mameluke sultans found the money for their magnificence and luxury? The answer is that, as masters of both Egypt and Syria, they held the ports and caravan routes between Europe and her Indian trade, and levied customs dues on every bale of Oriental produce which arrived from the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea for transfer to the harbours between Alexandria and Alexandretta and for transhipment to Venice. Until the discovery of the Cape route in 1498, and its subsequent development, they enjoyed the monopoly of the entire volume of Indian trade with the Levant, and Venice, by her commercial capitulations with them, was their sole agent on the Continent. Genoa

and other Italian republics traded in the north, at Smyrna, Byzantium, and Trebizond; but Venice threw in her lot with Egypt.

Let us try and estimate what this monopoly meant. An Arab merchant like Sindbad the Sailor (for the "Thousand and One Nights" was written at Cairo during this period, though they refer to the earliest prosperity of Bagdad) buys £10,000 worth of raw silk, nutmegs, pepper, indigo, cloves, and mace in Persia, or at Calicut, and lands them at Basra or Suez. The sea route up the Persian Gulf would be shorter than the voyage up the Red Sea; but the caravan road from Basra to Aleppo would be more perilous than the short journey across Egypt. At landing, the customs would amount to some £4000, and the goods would then be worth, say, £20,000. A second Arab merchant on the Mediterranean coast would sell the consignment for £30,000 to the Venetian, who would have to pay another £5000 customs dues before he could clear his cargo. Thus, whether in customs or in tolls, or in presents to local governors and escorts, a quarter of the £35,000 paid by the Venetian would go to the Mameluke sultan and aristocracy merely for the privilege of transit. Arrived at Venice, the produce might fetch any price from £50,000 to £100,000, according to the market.

This is no exaggeration, because we find it stated in Sir George Birdwood's "Report on the Old Records of the India Office," that, so late as 1620, the East India Company imported in one year 200,000 lbs. of indigo from Agra, bought at 14*d.* per lb., and sold in London at 5*s.* Now, as the deputy-governor of the East India Company at that date estimated the cost of transit by the old overland route at nearly thrice that by the new sea route, the same indigo brought by Egypt and Venice would have sold in Europe for 15*s.* These figures deal only with the direct profits received by the Mamelukes on the transit; but we must also bear in mind that the wealth of the Arab merchants was at their mercy, and that they freely availed themselves of forced loans and pillage. The Governments of both Cairo and Venice were perhaps the most tyrannical that have existed; nevertheless, they continued to prosper because the golden stream of Oriental trade passed through that south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean which was under their joint control by land and sea.

Then a maritime discovery was made, the result of which was slowly but surely to injure Venice, and also more rapidly to reduce Egypt to such a condition of insignificance and decay as to afford us the best proof that the entire prosperity of the Mameluke sultans and

most of the glory of the Queen of the Adriatic had been due to the Indian trade of the Levant. It was jealousy of the exclusive privileges enjoyed by Venice which aroused the Genoese Columbus to seek a westward route to the Indies beyond the control of doge or Saracen. It was this same spirit of commercial rivalry, strengthened by scientific conviction that Africa could be turned from the south, which spurred on the Portuguese to double the Cape of Storms, and to face the perils of Mozambique and the Indian Ocean.

The landing of Vasco da Gama at Calicut in May, 1498, and his triumphal return to Lisbon, mark an important epoch of commercial history. Venice realized the danger of the crisis, and made an effort to face it. "The Sultan of Egypt," says Sir G. Birdwood, "secretly abetted by the King of Calicut and the Venetians, appeared in the Indian seas to dispute the sovereignty of the Portuguese in the East. The Venetians supplied the timber for building the Mameluke ships, carrying it with great difficulty from Alexandria to Suez; and the fleet, when ready, sailed for India, and, falling in with a Portuguese squadron off the coast of Bombay, defeated it, Lorenzo da Almeyda, the viceroy's son, being slain in the action. Their defeat raised a spirit of opposition to the Portuguese throughout Western India; but the viceroy

collecting another fleet, totally dispersed the Egyptians off Diu in February, 1509."

This engagement, one of the most decisive naval victories on record, secured the Atlantic route at the expense of Egypt and Venice in the Mediterranean. A few years later (1517) the Ottoman sultan, Selim I., having chased the Mamelukes out of Syria, routed them near Cairo, and annexed both countries to the Turkish dominions.

With the close of the Middle Ages and the opening of modern history, we also enter upon the second period of the Mamelukes in Egypt, now under Ottoman sway. The currents of maritime enterprise are turned westward to America, southward round the Cape; traffic in the Mediterranean begins to lessen, and whatever remains of it is diverted to Constantinople away from Alexandria. The Ottoman sultans, having taken Egypt, are doing their best to reduce it commercially, and for that purpose single out Venice as their chief opponent by sea. Naval wars begin, and we read of great battles and sieges—Cyprus, Rhodes, Malta, Lepanto, and the Morea; while Moslem corsairs and renegade Greek pirates infest not only the Archipelago, but, as the Sallee rovers mentioned in "Robinson Crusoe," watch the straits of Gibraltar. Thus, in proportion as the caravan trade through Asia falls off, so does the

Mediterranean become more perilous to the European merchant.

Looking back upon this period, we can only regard the struggle between Turk and Christian as a civil war ruinous to their common interests. Had the Ottoman sultans been wise, they would have abandoned their wars beyond the Danube, and devoted themselves to the Persian Gulf and the Red Sea; they would have formed alliances with Venice, built ships at Basra and Suez, invaded Bombay, and by contesting the Atlantic monopoly of Portuguese, Dutch and English, have deferred the evil day of their commercial impoverishment. They held the inner strategic lines of communication with India, but were too ignorant to avail themselves of it.

The effect of their mistaken policy is visible in Egypt for the next three hundred years. Saracenic art in Cairo, says Herz Bey, "took wings and departed; the Ottomans brought no real inspiration; ornament suffered an eclipse; the rich decoration of former mosques gave place to a simple and cheap manner significant of artistic and pecuniary poverty; and, with certain exceptions in copying the Arab style, all contemporary Turkish work was generally beneath contempt."

Ichabod, the glory had departed from Egypt! Pecuniary poverty was the cause of this decay, for the

Mameluke intellect and taste for magnificence still remained. Alexandria lost its importance, Suez was deserted, the land lay commercially dead for three centuries.

The Turkish administration was nominally in the hands of a pasha sent from Constantinople, and a careful computation reveals the fact that about a hundred of these governors succeeded one another in the course of two hundred and eighty years, many of them having been changed annually. The Mameluke sultanate was abolished, and Egypt was divided into twenty-four districts, each under a bey, the object of the Porte being to hold them all in check by encouraging rivalry and disunion. For a time this system was not altogether a failure, but as Mameluke recruiting freely continued, and as the prestige of the sultan began to wane, so likewise did the influence of the pasha diminish at Cairo. The Mameluke beys chose a leader whom they called the "Sheikh-el-Beled," or Chief of the Land, and to gain this office strife and combat too often embittered the race. In the latter half of the eighteenth century, while Clive and Warren Hastings were winning an empire for us in Hindustan, Turkey being then at war with Russia, the famous Ali Bey, as sheikh, reduced the Turkish garrison at Cairo, and sent the pasha back to the Porte. Victorious in Syria and Arabia, he was

recognized as Caliph at Mecca, but, after a brilliant reign, was betrayed and put to death. Later on we shall see how Mehemet Ali tried to follow in his footsteps, and, as Pasha of Egypt, strove to establish an independent empire over the same expanse of territory on the two continents.

At the death of Ali, Murad and Ibrahim divided the sheikhdom between them, and a few years of comparative peace ensued, owing to the helplessness of the sultan. There was a lull before the storm, and then suddenly the news of Bonaparte's landing burst like a thunder-clap upon the Mameluke beys in their Castle of Indolence at Cairo. Steeped in ignorance of modern Europe, Murad ridiculed the idea of Franks daring to invade Egypt. The last occasion had been in the thirteenth century, when Louis IX. had been defeated and captured at Mansourah. He sent for the Tuscan consul, Rossetti, and asked him the meaning of this irruption. He likened the French veterans to donkey-boys, and told Rossetti to give them some pence and send them away in peace, as he had no desire to hurt them. In vain did the consul try to explain who Bonaparte was, and how the hero of Arcola had defeated Austria on the plains of Lombardy. Murad knew nothing of geography; he regarded all Europeans as servile Levantines; he was confident in the power of his

10,000 Mameluke cavalry and 30,000 irregular infantry, his negroes and his Bedouins. The precious days were wasted; and Napoleon, after occupying Alexandria, was allowed to lead his exhausted troops across the desert to Damanhour and to reach the Nile without having to fight for water. Defeated in a first battle at Shubrakhit, Murad hurried back to Cairo, and collected the bulk of his forces at the village of Embabeh, within view of the Pyramids. No attempt was made to harass the French, to deprive them of rest and sleep, to devastate the narrow slip of vegetation over which they marched. There was no need to give them battle on the further bank of the Nile. Murad had only to withdraw his forces to the nearer side under the walls of the capital, and to compel Napoleon to cross a broad and rapid river under every disadvantage to the French. All these opportunities he threw away in pride or in ignorance, and played into the invader's hands. On July 21st, 1798, the Mameluke chivalry had fought and lost their last great battle; half of them fled into Upper Egypt, half into Syria, leaving Napoleon free to enter Cairo in triumph.

For six hundred years they had flourished on the banks of the Nile, and now, although beaten and dispersed, one more chance was to be given them. French and English would both abandon the field, leaving

nothing but a small Turkish garrison and an Albanian contingent behind. What their fate proved to be the reader will learn in due course when we reach the days of Mehemet Ali's rise to power; but our next step is to try to understand the true nature of Napoleon's expedition from an English and Continental point of view.

CHAPTER III.

NAPOLEON'S EXPEDITION TO EGYPT, 1798–1801.

THE victories of Napoleon Bonaparte in Italy had led to the treaty of Campo Formio and the extinction of that famous republic of Venice which, during the Middle Ages and before the discovery of the Cape route, had monopolized the Indian trade by means of her commercial alliance with Egypt.

On his triumphal return to Paris, the question arose as to what employment could be found for the most successful general whom the wars of the Revolution had produced. The Directory feared Napoleon, and were anxious to get rid of him at any price. On the other hand, the young Corsican, though ambitious to assume the dictatorship, had the wisdom to admit that "the pear was not yet ripe enough" for him to pluck from the tree of liberty. His own veterans were distant and scattered; the army of the Rhine, more numerous and equally well disciplined, had its different favourites—Moreau, Jourdan, and others—men not in reputation

inferior to himself, and extremely jealous of his renown. The moment was unfavourable for a *coup d'état* such as he accomplished two years later.

At this period (1797) the French Government, on the whole victorious by land, found itself unable to reap the full benefit of its military enterprise owing to the pecuniary assistance rendered by Pitt to the states of Germany. It is true that our subsidies up to that time amounted to only some five millions sterling, but they were immensely exaggerated by the French, who chafed under our naval domination. The essential point, therefore, was to discover some means of effectively weakening England, either by invasion across the Channel or by attacking her sources of wealth abroad. After a careful survey of the problem, Napoleon decided that a direct invasion was then quite impossible, and, in the course of conversation with the foreign secretary, Talleyrand, he accepted or proposed a plan for a descent upon Egypt, where, according to Bourrienne, he might gain a territory capable of supplying France with an equivalent for the loss of her West Indian colonies and the means of weakening England in her Eastern trade and empire.

The idea was not a new one, for it had been suggested by Leibnitz to Louis XIV. when the latter wished to ruin the commercial power of Holland in the previous

century. The principle involved was the revival of the old mediæval Egyptian trade with the East, which had been destroyed by the Cape route; and the fact that Egypt was a part of the Turkish dominions, that the Porte had acknowledged the French Republic and was at peace with it in spite of diplomatic pressure from the other powers, formed no obstacle in the eyes of the directors, of Talleyrand, or Napoleon.

Fouché says that Napoleon's "brilliant ostracism to Egypt" was conceived by Talleyrand, who found the old idea amongst the dust of the bureau, and converted it into an affair of State. The conqueror of Italy at first entered into the plan with the greatest ardour; but, soon cooling—whether he perceived the snare, or whether he still aimed at supreme power—he drew back. But it was too late. It was vain for him to struggle and to raise obstacles; and when he saw himself reduced to the alternative of a disgrace or of remaining at the head of an army which might revolutionize the East, he deferred his designs upon Paris, and set sail with the flower of the French troops upon an expedition which was called "the left wing of the army for the invasion of England."

The force numbered some 40,000 veterans of his Italian campaign, including 3000 cavalry (for the most part without horses), five batteries of field artillery, and

a battalion of engineers. Among his principal officers, some of whom were destined to be famous under the empire, were Berthier, Murat, Lannes, Davoust, Kléber, Désaix, Savary, Marmont, Junot, and Bessières. He also took with him a hundred civilian savants, under the presidency of Monge; and it was this body of men who compiled the memorable *Description de l'Egypte* on their return to France.

The fleet of transports consisted of more than 300 vessels of all sizes, convoyed by a squadron of three first-rates, ten seventy-fours, and eight frigates, the whole being commanded by Admiral Brueys, assisted by Villeneuve and Ganteaume. This great armada was definitely ordered by the French Government on March 10th, 1798; it sailed from Toulon and other ports of France and Italy on May 19th. Malta surrendered without a blow on June 10th; and, leaving that island on the 19th, the expedition arrived off Alexandria on July 1st. Three weeks later Napoleon had won the battle of the Pyramids and put the Mamelukes to flight.

Meanwhile, England had not been idle, either in India or with its fleet in the Mediterranean, after the victory of Cape St. Vincent. The Governor-General, Lord Wellesley, came from Calcutta to Madras, and prepared for a final campaign against Tippoo Sahib, the

Sultan of Mysore. That potentate tried to gain time by negotiations, because he had received a letter from Napoleon in Egypt informing him that the French "had arrived on the borders of the Red Sea with an innumerable and invincible army full of the desire to deliver him from the iron yoke of the English." Lord Wellesley, however, would not be denied, and Seringapatam was carried by storm, and Tippoo was slain on May 4th, 1799, a few days before Napoleon abandoned the siege of Acre.

It remains to follow the movements of the British squadron in the Mediterranean. Sent by Lord St. Vincent in search of the French, Nelson was baffled by a storm off Sardinia, and lost touch of the enemy, who escaped to Malta. His instructions were that the French would probably sail westward past Gibraltar for Ireland, and he was to do his best to take, sink, burn, or destroy their armament, remaining upon this service so long as he could obtain provisions.

Nelson, however, had his own opinions, and on June 15th, from near Naples, wrote his conviction that the French were bound eastward, and added: "If they pass Sicily, I shall believe they are going on their scheme to possess Alexandria and getting troops to India, a plan concerted with Tippoo Sahib, by no means so difficult as might be imagined."

Thus the credit of his chase to Egypt, and of his victory at Abukeer, is entirely Nelson's own. His squadron consisted of thirteen seventy-fours, and one frigate; and there can be no doubt that it was this want of frigates as scouts which prevented him from finding and destroying the enemy at sea. On June 20th he narrowly missed them off the south of Sicily, just after they had left Malta. On the night of the 24th he seems to have passed them only a few leagues distant off the coast of Crete, and hurrying to Alexandria, where he arrived three days before them, he proceeded to the coasts of Syria and Asia Minor, and returned to Syracuse for provisions. Thence he started again on July 25th, and on August 1st sighted the French squadron, anchored off the shoals of Abukeer.

The memorable battle which ensued that night was "not a victory, but a conquest," for, while it destroyed the enemy at sea, it also cut off Napoleon's communications with France at an early stage of his enterprise. Once our naval supremacy was asserted, the French expedition was bound to be a failure. As Tennyson writes in his sonnet on Bonaparte—

"He thought to quell the stubborn hearts of oak,
Madman!—to chain with chains, and bind with bands
That island queen who sways the floods and lands
From Ind to Ind, but in fair daylight woke,

When from her wooden walls,—lit by sure hands,—
With thunders, and with lightnings, and with smoke,—
Peal after peal, the British battle broke,
Lulling the brine against the Coptic sands."

If Abukeer had been an indecisive engagement, Napoleon, with a portion of his fleet, might have captured Acre, and then passed on to Damascus and Aleppo, to the Euphrates and the Persian Gulf. There he could have collected sailing craft; a few regiments might have been landed in India, and aid have been given to the handful of French officers who were already with the Mahrattas prior to Wellington's victory at Assaye in 1803. As Nelson wrote in June, 1798, the invasion of India through Egypt was by no means very difficult. He alone made it impossible six weeks later, by one of the most decisive battles of history. The want of frigates during his first chase rendered him half mad with impatience, and his failure to find the enemy at sea was the fault of the senior admiral, and not due to his own want of vigilance. But if he *had* caught the French off Crete on June 24th! He would have singled out their flagship, *l'Orient*, with Napoleon on board, and overpowered it as at Abukeer. The French squadron was inferior in quality, and Brueys dreaded our approach. The transports, crowded with helpless soldiers, would have been sunk or scattered; Napoleon, if he had escaped, would have

returned to France a beaten man. Could we have had a French empire, with its Austerlitz, Peninsular War, and Waterloo, just the same? Certainly there would have been no need for Mehemet Ali to leave his native village and embark as a volunteer for the purpose of driving the French out of Egypt. What we (not Nelson) failed to do, owing to a want of frigates, was to prevent the Egyptian question from being reopened by Napoleon's landing at Alexandria, the birth of French rivalry at Cairo. The departure of that expedition from Toulon is as important a date in the history of maritime enterprise as the arrival of Da Gama in India just three hundred years before. It is true that Napoleon's dreams of restoring Alexander's empire came to nought, that he abandoned the attempt and fled. Yet was he right in the main—namely, *the discovery of efficient means for the relative weakening of England by depriving her of the Indian monopoly, and compelling her to share the profits of transit with her rivals in the Mediterranean.* He struck a hard blow at our maritime supremacy when he pointed out that the best and shortest road to the East lay through Egypt, and that when this inner strategic road was adopted, England, isolated at the extreme north-west of the Continent, laboured under a great disadvantage in reaching the south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean, whether in peace or in war.

Hitherto this point seems to have been neglected, and undue attention paid to the legend of Acre. Of late years, however, the critical analysis to which his reign has been subjected has shown his errors of judgment, as well as his numerous successes. He all but failed at Marengo and at Eylau; his war in Spain was a persistent blunder; he broke down at Moscow, at Dresden, and on the eve of Waterloo. With regard to Acre, therefore, it is necessary to distinguish between what he might have achieved but for our naval supremacy, and what he actually did achieve during his short stay in the East. His invasion reveals him as a young man in a hurry to establish a reputation in Paris by means of a brilliant success abroad, while profoundly ignorant of the conservative, the anti-Jacobin nature of Oriental manners and customs. One day he said to his secretary during the siege of Acre—

"Bourrienne, if I succeed I shall find in this town Jezzar Pasha's treasure, and arms for 300,000 men. I will march to Damascus and Aleppo. The populace will join me as their deliverer, and I will overturn the Turkish empire, and found in the East a new and grand empire which shall fix my name in the records of posterity. Perhaps I shall return to Paris by way of Vienna, after having annihilated the House of Austria."

So much for Napoleon's dream. The sordid reality

is somewhat as follows: Of the 40,000 Frenchmen landed at Alexandria in July, 1798, perhaps some 35,000 were fit for duty by the end of that year, and, after providing for his garrisons, he could take only 12,000 men for his war in Syria in February, 1799. His losses in four months were quite 5000, so that he returned beaten to Cairo in June with 7000. All told, including sailors from the fleet and civilians, 32,000 Frenchmen evacuated Egypt in 1801, and of this total 10,000 were sick and wounded.

Jezzar's *treasure* is too vague a term to admit of serious refutation, but it is reasonable to suppose that at the last extremity it would have been placed on board ship. It is also absurd to talk of 300,000 *stand of arms* when Sir Sidney Smith had to supply stores from his two vessels, and when the capture of a part of the French flotilla proved of vital importance to the defence. Kléber incurred Napoleon's enmity by declaring that the French had besieged Acre *à la turque*, while it was defended *à la française;* yet such appears to have been the truth. Napoleon had been so successful over Mamelukes and Turks in the open field and at Jaffa, that he seemed to expect the wall of Acre to fall down flat at the sound of his trumpets. The reality was very different. There were eight assaults and twelve sorties, and English blue-jackets and French grenadiers

fought hand to hand along the broken ramparts till, after a sixty days' siege, he abandoned his trenches and retreated to Egypt.

But even if Acre had fallen, it would have been untenable against our ships; it could not have served as the base for further operations beyond the Lebanon; its garrison would have to be deducted from his available force of 7000 men. No troops could come from France, and few could be spared from Egypt. No Moslems had joined him in Cairo. He could not believe that they would do so in Syria after his massacres in the south. They had plenty of time to flock to him, yet they kept aloof, preferring their tyrant Jezzar to the infidel invader. He ignored the fact that Syria was already in open revolt against the sultan, and practically independent, with nothing to gain from French domination. Why did he turn aside to Acre instead of following the main road to Damascus—a city easy to be taken by a bombardment from the heights? Perhaps it was because he was not heart-whole in his desire to plunge into the interior, because his eyes were still turned to Paris and the Directory.

At St. Helena he used to say that Smith had marred his career by repulsing him at Acre. It is better to suppose that Smith's defence rendered that great career possible in Europe, for it obliged the future emperor

to abandon his wild scheme in time, and to return to France for the *coup d'état* of Brumaire. Later on we shall see how different were the circumstances of the capture of Acre by Ibrahim Pasha in 1832; how the whole country first rose to welcome him, and how, when it revolted, and Acre was bombarded by Napier, the Egyptians were obliged to evacuate as quickly as the French had done in 1799.

In Egypt, where he had a free hand, he left little behind him but a record of massacre, debauchery, and plunder. His atheist, Jacobin troops were scarcely better than the Mamelukes or Turkish Bashi-Bozuks, who pillaged the bazars and outraged the harems of peaceable Moslems. When the inhabitants of Cairo revolted he smote them with cannon, and turned the University Mosque of El-Azhar into a shambles running with human blood. Two years later, when they rose a second time, it taxed all the genius of Kléber to reduce the town after a siege of a month. In 1801, when the evacuation finally took place under our escort, the French marched out amidst the curses of the natives, and many stragglers were cut to pieces. On its own intrinsic merits the military expedition was a fiasco, and its one redeeming point is the scientific work of a group of savants who studied the antiquities and resources of the land.

But the evil effects of that enterprise are still to be seen in the envenomed state of our relations with France. Trafalgar and Waterloo may be forgiven, but never the French evacuation of Egypt in 1801. Its pernicious influence, moreover, may be traced throughout the reign of Mehemet Ali, whom our rivals claimed as the true disciple of Napoleon, the captor of Acre, the founder of that new Arab empire of which his master might have dreamed. The fascination of the Napoleonic legend on the pasha's mind is an important factor which appears again and again, for it was the means which spurred him to success, and a mirage that led him to his final humiliation. His French admirers connected the two names, and made England believe that Mehemet Ali was the *protégé* of France; with the inevitable result—his reduction to impotence by the power that had humbled Napoleon.

CHAPTER IV.

MEHEMET ALI—EARLY LIFE.

We have seen that the true object of the French expedition was to try and weaken England in India. As soon, therefore, as the Directory received news of Napoleon's entry into Cairo, it published a long manifesto in defence of its action. All the blame was laid on the Mamelukes, who, it said, having thrown off the yoke of the Porte, had for the last thirty years been ill-treating French consuls and citizens in Egypt. The Directory denied any quarrel with Turkey, its historic ally, it was only chastising the Mamelukes who were in the pay of the English; so that, in attacking the Mamelukes, it was really fighting the English, and restoring the authority of the sultan!

Such was the argument adopted by the Directory at Paris, and by Napoleon at Cairo; but as it deceived nobody, the Porte formed an alliance with England and Russia, and declared war on France without delay. Alarmed at this news, the French general took the

initiative, collected every man he could spare from his garrisons in Egypt, and set out for Syria with the intention of capturing the fort of Acre, and of defeating the Turkish army, which he heard was being sent against him. Whatever he might say to Bourrienne about conquering a new and grand Oriental empire, and returning to Paris by way of Constantinople and Vienna, Napoleon was in a desperate strait; Acre remained impregnable, and, although he routed the Turks at Mount Tabor, his forces had dwindled to 7000 men. He hastily beat a retreat, and arrived at Cairo in June. A few days later news reached him of the landing of another Turkish army at Abukeer. He instantly marched for the coast, won a brilliant victory, drove the Turks into the sea, and in the following month escaped to France, where before the end of the year he had seized the dictatorship.

It is at this juncture that we first meet with Mehemet Ali, who was a volunteer, or Bashi-Bozuk, in the Turkish army defeated by Napoleon at Abukeer.

Very little is known concerning the early life of the famous pasha, and it is better not to repeat stories which are devoid of the slightest foundation. He was a native of Kàvala, a small seaport on the frontier between Thrace and Macedonia, not far from the site of Philippi. He was born in 1769, in the same year

as Wellington and Napoleon, both of whom had the greatest influence on his subsequent career. His father appears to have been an Aga, or respectable yeoman of the district, who left him an orphan to the care of an uncle Toussoun; and, on the latter's death, the boy was adopted by the Chorbaji, or village mayor, who reared him to manhood, and gave him a daughter in marriage. This guardian being a man of importance, we may believe the tradition that Mehemet Ali was employed in the parochial government, and that he distinguished himself as a tax-collector and rural gendarme among the lawless population of the vicinity. It is also probable that he was interested in the tobacco trade, one of the chief industries of that part of Macedonia; but beyond these few statements the story of his life until the age of thirty is a blank, as would naturally be the case if we remember the humbleness of his birth and the isolation of his native town.

He was an Albanian, one of that race of turbulent mountaineers whose ancestors conquered the East under Alexander, who settled in Egypt under Ptolemy, and threatened Rome under Pyrrhus. Divided into numerous highland clans, some of them Christian, but most of them Mohammedan, these descendants of the ancient Greeks prided themselves on their local independence, and passed their lives in a constant state of tribal

vendetta and miscellaneous pillage. While Mehemet Ali was a lad a great leader had arisen, the famous Ali Pasha of Tebelen, a national hero, who for nearly forty years set the Turks at defiance, till his treacherous murder in 1822. The Porte was then powerless against him; everywhere the provinces were in revolt—Egypt, Syria, Anatolia, Roumania. Jezzar Pasha was independent at Acre, and scores of Deré Beys, or lords of the valleys, imitating his example, occupied fortresses in their respective districts, where they ruled as princes. Civil government had come to a standstill, the army was a rabble, the sultan a prisoner, the Porte a group of viziers, in power to-day, in disgrace to-morrow, living ever in fear of the bowstring or the poisoned cup of coffee. Such was the general state of anarchy which Mehemet Ali saw and heard of in his native town during his youth and early manhood. The entire Moslem population of the empire was intensely loyal to the person of the sultan, the dynasty of Osman, the head of their faith; but it drew a distinction between their sovereign and his pashas at the Porte. The latter were of no account in public estimation, mere palace favourites, who had somehow succeeded in the scramble for power, but who might at any moment be disowned and flung aside. The sultan was like the king in chess, helpless, but indispensable. The idea of a republic

was practically unknown, and had never penetrated among the great mass of the people. All these revolts consisted of the struggles between the pashas of the capital and their colleagues in the provinces. New men were ever pressing upwards from below; politics was an exciting game, and everything depended on good luck, on audacity and unscrupulous deceit.

So in the year 1798, at the age of thirty, we find Mehemet Ali in his native village. He was the father of three sons, Ibrahim, Toussoun, and Ismail. His tobacco business did not seem to offer much prospect of an easy livelihood, and we may well believe that he was anxious for a change from the cramped arena of Kàvala. Suddenly his career underwent a complete transformation by reason of Napoleon's invasion of Egypt. Early in 1799 the sultan's proclamation was distributed throughout the empire, calling upon loyal Moslems to unite and to drive out the French invaders. A vizieral letter also came to the Chorbaji of Kàvala, instructing him to raise a volunteer force of Bashi-Bozuks, and to send it to join the fleet of the Capoudan, which was to convoy an expedition to Abukeer. The mayor obeyed by impressing some three hundred desperadoes of the district, and, having given the colonelcy to his son, with Mehemet Ali as second in command, he despatched this contingent by sea to the

Dardanelles, whence they joined the main body of the fleet at Rhodes.

With that invincible dilatoriness which has been the cause of so many of their disasters, the Turks lost invaluable time while Napoleon was lying baffled before Acre. But eventually the convoy sailed for Egypt in June. Napoleon hurried up from Cairo, reprimanded Marmont for not having prevented the disembarkation, and in the terrible massacre which ensued, when thousands of panic-stricken Moslems were driven into the sea, Mehemet Ali, among others, only escaped drowning by being hauled into the gig of Sir Sidney Smith in person. A few days later he and the survivors of the routed army were on their way back to the Dardanelles in the Capoudan's fleet. Then began a series of negotiations between Smith and Kléber (whom Napoleon had left in command) for the honourable evacuation of the country by the French. These came to nought; so that when Abercrombie arrived in 1801 and the Capoudan returned to assist him, Mehemet Ali was able to land a second time under the favourable auspices of our alliance. The French had given him his baptism of fire, the English had pulled him out of the water, and furnished the opportunity for his reappearance in Egypt. Such are the circumstances which led to the situation of March, 1801. The expedition of Napoleon, the battle

of the Nile, the intervention of Smith at Acre, and the arrival of the Capoudan with a large contingent of Albanian Bashi-Bozuks,—all these facts united to give Mehemet Ali a footing in the land which he was destined to conquer.

CHAPTER V.

ABERCROMBIE'S EXPEDITION.

CHIVALROUS Sir Sidney Smith had unconsciously been acting as the instrument of destiny both for Europe and the East. In June, 1799, Napoleon had done his best to drown Mehemet Ali at Abukeer, and would have succeeded but for the English sailors of the *Tiger*.

On the next day Sir Sidney, by the gift of some newspapers, tempted his opponent to return to France. Before the end of the year Napoleon was dictator in Paris; before the end of six years an obscure Albanian, who had clung to the side of the commodore's boat, had made himself master of Cairo.

Again, in December, 1799, Smith, supported by his brother Spencer, our ambassador at the Porte, took upon himself as minister plenipotentiary, to draw up a convention with Kléber for the evacuation of Egypt by the French with all the honours of war, and the safe convoy of the garrison to France at the expense of the Turks. If this proposal had been ratified, Mehemet

Ali might not have returned to Egypt. The grand vizier's army was already there, the Capoudan's fleet and Albanian contingent would not have been needed, the circumstances, means, and opportunities would have been quite different. But this sensible convention of El-Areesh was repudiated by our Government, and Kléber, furious at what he held to be our breach of faith, retaliated by inflicting a crushing defeat on the grand vizier at Heliopolis in March, 1800. A little later, and this great man fell a victim to a Moslem assassin in the Ezbekieh, after which (luckily for us) the chief command devolved upon the incompetent Menou.

The British Government, having disowned Smith, decided, after a year's deliberation, to drive out the French by force of arms, and sent Sir Ralph Abercrombie to Egypt on the understanding that he would be aided by a Turkish fleet at Abukeer and by an advance of a Turkish army from Syria. This allied movement was a success, and the French were forced to evacuate on the same honourable terms as those offered by Smith to Kléber, except that, instead of Turkey, it was we who convoyed them at our expense in British ships. The fact is that Smith, during his long cruise on the coast, had enjoyed ample leisure to study the problem. Unlike the Cabinet at home, he knew his

own mind with regard to Egypt. He saw the hopelessness of the situation on shore, and felt that, in the interests of England, the first point was to bring about an evacuation of the French. Now, this was the conclusion at which Hutchinson arrived when, at the head of 10,000 British troops, and aided by two Turkish armies, he persuaded some 30,000 French troops to leave the country with all the honours of war. The British expedition of 1801 is properly regarded as a successful military achievement, but, after yielding full praise to Abercrombie and to our men who repulsed an equal force of French veterans at Alexandria, we should also congratulate ourselves on the incompetence of Menou, and on the good fortune which gave us such leaders as Hutchinson and Smith.

And here a parallel deserves a moment's notice. Napoleon bitterly reproached Marmont, Governor of Alexandria, for having allowed the landing of 8000 Turks in 1799. But Marmont had very few men, while Napoleon greatly outnumbered the enemy whom he drove into the sea a few days later. Again, at St. Helena he used to say that not an Englishman should have been permitted to land in 1801, and there can be little doubt that, if Kléber had been in command, Abukeer would have been the predecessor of Corunna.

What happened was this. Early in March, 1801, Abercrombie arrived off the coast, but, owing to bad weather, could not disembark till the 8th. Menou had at least some 20,000 seasoned French veterans at his disposal against 15,000 British. Although warned by Friant, Governor of Alexandria, he wasted a week in Cairo, and did not reach the coast till we had made good our landing, in spite of a desperate resistance by Friant, who had only 1500 men. Having lost 600 of our force, Abercrombie spent a few days on the shore, and then, on the 13th, encountered Friant and Lanusse a few miles nearer to Alexandria. He had to storm the French position, and the enemy retired with a loss of 500 out of 5000 as against our loss of 1100 out of 10,000.

Alarmed at these Pyrrhic victories, and seeing that he must again attack Lanusse in the new lines thrown up at Ramleh, Sir Ralph anxiously awaited the arrival of the capoudan's fleet. If he was to lose two men for every Frenchman in each engagement, and gain nothing but a barren victory in holding a few miles of desert, the sooner he re-embarked the better. Indeed, so precarious was his position, so desperate the case, that he intended an assault by night, never hoping that an attack would be made on him.* But

* Sir R. T. Wilson, "History of the British Expedition to Egypt,"

Menou came up on the 19th and, in spite of Lanusse and other brigadiers who implored him to stand on the defensive, he flung 10,000 Frenchmen upon the same number of British, and met with the defeat which he deserved. After a few hours' sternly contested battle in the midst of our camp, the enemy fell back to the lines which they need never have left. On the ground they abandoned about 1700 killed and wounded, and, including prisoners, their total loss was not less than 4000. On our side the casualties amounted to 1500, among whom must be reckoned Sir Ralph Abercrombie and Sir John Moore; the latter recovered, but the former succumbed to a wound in the thigh. On the death of the beloved Abercrombie, Sir John Hely Hutchinson succeeded to the command, and, as the capoudan pasha had arrived with about 4000 Turks and 1000 Albanians, a first step was taken by attacking Rosetta and Fort St. Julien, which surrendered on April 19th. Hutchinson also, at the instance of his engineers, reluctantly decided to cut the sea-dyke of Lake Maadieh or Abukeer with the inner embankment which separated

p. 40. The battalions engaged were the Coldstreams and Third Guards, Marines, 1st, 2nd, 8th, 13th, 18th, 23rd, 27th, 28th, 30th, 40th, 42nd, 44th, 50th, 54th, 58th, 79th, 89th, 90th, 92nd Infantry, the 11th, 12th, 26th Light Dragoons, with volunteer corps known as Stuart's, De Rolles', Dillon's, and Corsican Rangers.

it from the low bed of ancient Mareotis. The result was that the latter was flooded for many square miles, and Alexandria was isolated from the Delta.

Leaving General Eyre Coote with 6000 men to watch Menou, who had retired into that town, Hutchinson proceeded to Rosetta, and began his march upon Cairo with 5000 British and 4000 Ottomans.* On May 9th he met a French brigade under Lagrange at Rahmanieh, and dislodged it after a serious skirmish. Colonel Stewart, with the 89th and some of the 12th Dragoons, was acting with the capoudan's force on the east bank of the Nile, and his attention was attracted to the gallant conduct of Mehemet Ali, who, at the head of his Kàvala contingent, distinguished himself in a charge of cavalry. The latter's brother-in-law had returned home after the Turkish defeat at Abukeer, leaving him in command of their Bashi-Bozuks, and for this achievement against the French, Mehemet Ali received promotion from the capoudan. It is interesting to note that the future ruler of the country began his career under our friendly auspices. This was the first time we had fought side by side with

* The following battalions marched on Cairo: 1st, 2nd, 8th, 18th, 30th, 40th, 50th, 58th, 79th, 89th, 90th, 92nd Corsicans, and 500 dragoons. The 28th and 42nd joined later on. The 86th also arrived from Suez in time to take part in the surrender of the capital.

the Turks, and the phrase of "Bono-Johnny," afterwards so familar in the Crimea, originated among our soldiers on the march to Cairo in 1801.

Advancing slowly past Kafr Zayàt, Hutchinson and the capoudan reached El-kam, and learnt that the vizier Yusuf, with a rabble army of 15,000 so-called "regulars" and as many lawless Bashi-Bozuks, was approaching Benha, after an indecisive action with the French at Khanka. On May 24th the three leaders met at Baràsheem some fifteen miles north of the modern Barrage, and the political situation began to develop itself in a manner little calculated to reassure our general. Cut off from his base, with only 5000 troops on whom he could rely, Hutchinson had to assert the prestige of England in a hotbed of Oriental intrigue; nevertheless he played the leading part in all the negotiations, and, by his self-control and firmness, brought a perilous enterprise to a triumphant conclusion.

The Turkish officials were as follows: First came Yusuf Pasha, the sadr-àzam, or grand vizier, an able man, but advanced in years. His presence practically signified that of the "Sublime Porte" in his person, so that the supreme government had been transferred to Baràsheem from Stamboul, and Hutchinson may be regarded as our ambassador extraordinary accredited

to the itinerant divan of the sultan. Second was the reyis efendi, or foreign minister, who had been an *attaché* in London, but made no concealment of his French proclivities. The third person was Hussein, the capoudan, or admiral, a former playmate, and now a brother-in-law of his sovereign. An implacable rival of the vizier, whom later on he succeeded in office, Hussein was highly intelligent, and prided himself on the superior discipline of his forces landed from the fleet, whom he carefully kept apart from the rest of the Turkish rabble. Like the vizier, he too had begun his career as a Georgian slave at the palace; so that in Egypt, among the Mameluke beys, and at Stamboul, among the pashas round the throne, the Georgian race was in the ascendant; and one of the curiosities of the reign of Mehemet Ali is that, after having destroyed the Georgian Mamelukes in Cairo, the great struggle of his life was with the infamous Khusrev, a Georgian slave whom the capoudan left as pasha in 1801, and who rose to be capoudan and grand vizier in his turn.

Hussein and Yusuf being rivals, Hutchinson, as mediator, controlled them both. But what gave him the mastery of the situation was the adherence of the Mameluke beys who threw themselves under his protection. As the chief landowners, a word from

them made the fellaheen peasants supply us with abundant provisions on the one hand, and cut off supplies from the French on the other. Thus, if it is going too far to say that we owed our military triumph to the Mamelukes, it is quite true that their alliance ensured the daily comfort of our men, guaranteed repose at night, and rendered the campaign a success in commissariat and open communications between Cairo and Alexandria. The French directory had said that the Mamelukes were in our pay. The Mamelukes were now aiding us against the French, and hoped for our protection against the Turks. Our officers and men were enraptured with the martial bearing of their light cavalry, their arms and appointments, the mediæval nature of their military households, which had warred against Cœur de Lion and Edward I. in the crusades; they contrasted them with the Janissaries and Kurds and other miscellaneous Bashi-Bozuks who formed the rabble army of the Turks, and they returned to England declaring that the Mamelukes were the finest fellows to be met with in the East, and that we ought to support them in Egypt. Later on we shall see what this prejudice entailed.

Such was the political situation while Hutchinson held his levées at Baràsheem in June, 1801. He soon

decided that he must revive the abandoned convention of El-Areesh between Smith and Kléber, and offer the French a chance of peaceful evacuation. In this he was supported by the vizier Yusuf, who showed great anxiety to end the campaign, lest his army should disband itself if delayed from the promised loot of the capital. Indeed, from accounts given by European officers on the Ottoman staff, the state of the sultan's armies must have been deplorable. On one occasion in Syria the vizier asserted that he had 35,000 men, while a German officer challenged him to produce more than 8000. A parade was ordered, but such a volley of musketry flew about the pasha's tent that the proposed census was abandoned from fear of provoking a mutiny among the senior Albanian officers. If a bey started on a campaign with his regiment of a thousand men, he continued to draw pay and rations for that number during the war, however many might have fallen; and it was unwise for a general who had passed through the same routine to introduce reforms at the expense of his subordinates, especially as the pay was always in arrears and as the army lived on plunder.

Again, there was a capitation grant of a few pence for every head of a slain enemy which was brought in, counted, and flung upon the pile before the general's tent. This system not only prevented a vigorous

pursuit if the army were victorious (for each regiment was then gathering in its crops of heads), but it also led to the common abuse of men decapitating their fallen comrades, and mixing up Turkish heads with those of genuine enemies for the sake of a trifling profit.

Moreover, the camp resembled an itinerant fair on a large scale, devoid of arrangement or discipline. Criers would go round every evening, bawling out that on the morrow his highness the grand vizier would advance to such and such a place, and that all who chose might start as soon as they pleased. The result was that a Turkish army on the march became a caravan stretching over leagues of country, unable to concentrate or manœuvre with success in the face of an enemy. These facts should be remembered when we consider the defeat of the viziers not only by the French, but also by Ibrahim Pasha in Syria a generation later. There was no lack of courage. The ancestors of these Bashi-Bozuks had threatened Vienna a century before, and their descendants were to prove their worth at Plevna a century after; but in this middle period the sultan had no army worthy of the name.

Hutchinson's proposal being accepted by Yusuf and Hussein, the Mamelukes also consented, because they wished to hasten the departure of both English and

French, and, with the consequent diminution of the Turkish army, to attempt to regain their former supremacy in the land. Thus by the middle of June the allies had surrounded the capital, the British main body being posted on the site now occupied by Ghizeh Palace gardens, with the Mamelukes and half the Turks, all watching the French fortified post of Ghizeh; while a small brigade under Stewart, with the capoudan and the rest of the Turks, stretched from the other bank of the river towards Koubbeh; a British naval flotilla was also moored off Shubra and Boulak. Thus the French garrison, cut off from the north, could only escape into the desert or into Upper Egypt. We had not long to wait for a surrender. Deserted by Napoleon, deprived of Kléber, disheartened by the incompetence of Menou, General Béliard cogently argued that only some 8000 out of a garrison of 13,000 remained fit for duty, that the natives were in revolt, and that the plague was raging. A reverse might lead to a massacre within the walls, while his provisions would soon be exhausted. After a week's siege (June 21st–28th), a convention was signed, and the French, having concentrated at Ghizeh (July 15th), marched out with all the honours of war. Then a procession, the like of which is not often to be met with in military annals, was formed at Embabeh, the scene of Napoleon's

victory of the Pyramids won three summers before. "*Soldats!*" he had cried, "*songez que du haut de ces monuments quarante siècles vous contemplent!*" And now these same veterans of his were being escorted by our Scotch regiments to the tune of "Highland Laddie." First came a part of the capoudan's men; then Sir John Moore with 3000 British troops; then the French garrison; while the English cavalry and Mamelukes closed the rear. The Nile was covered with boats, the French using hundreds for their sick, their *savants*, their baggage and plunder, the leading boat being adorned with a black flag, for it carried the embalmed remains of the noble-hearted Kléber. This extraordinary exodus, thanks to Moore's wisdom, reached Rosetta in safety, where the French were embarked and sent to France. Some reinforcements had meanwhile arrived, and Hutchinson vigorously pushed on the siege of Alexandria. Here again, after a fight at Marabout, Menou followed the example of Béliard, and received the same terms; and thus by the end of September more than 30,000 French troops had been got rid of out of Egypt.* Well did Hutchinson, Moore, Coote, and

* The troops engaged at Marabout (August 22nd-26th) were the Guards, 20th, 24th, 25th, 26th, 27th, 44th, 54th "Ancient Irish," and some cavalry. On the surrender of Alexandria (September 2nd), Hutchinson had some 14,000 men, including the troops returned from Cairo, as well as the 20th, 24th, 25th, 26th, the Rifles, and Chasseurs Britanniques recently arrived.

Baird deserve the highest praise for their six months' campaign. Perhaps, after all, this outlay was not in vain, and it was better that the convention of El-Areesh had not been ratified in 1799. Abercrombie's expedition proved that our young recruits could repulse Napoleon's veterans in close conflict, and "Remember Egypt" became a rallying-cry with more than one regiment in the Peninsular. But the effort bore other fruit. It gave an opportunity for emphasizing the connection between Egypt and India by the despatch of a force of 6000 men under Sir David Baird from Calcutta, Bombay, and the Cape.* The success of this experiment has led to its repetition in 1878 at the time of the treaty of San Stefano; in 1882 at Tell-el-Kebir; and at Suakin in 1885 and 1896.

Hutchinson returned to England, where he received a well-earned peerage, and a garrison under Lord Cavan remained in the Delta till the treaty of Amiens in 1802 led to its withdrawal a year later.

* Of Sir D. Baird's force about 3000 were natives and 3000 British, including the 10th, 61st, 80th, 86th, and 88th, with the 8th Light Dragoons. Of these only the 86th (350 men) landed at Suez early enough to be present at the siege of Cairo. The remainder landed at Kosseir, descended the Nile, reached Cairo on August 7th, and Rosetta on the 31st. Baird and his staff were present at the surrender of Alexandria. The Mamelukes supplied them with provisions gratis in Upper Egypt, but the vizier made them pay for all they had received! See *passim*, Captain Walsh's "Journal" and Wilson's "History," 1803.

CHAPTER VI.

THE RISE OF MEHEMET ALI, 1801–1807.

HUTCHINSON, having done his duty, could return home with a quiet conscience, but neither he nor any observant member of his staff failed to be struck by the implacable hatred existing between the two Moslem parties left behind. The Turks wished to restore their pashalik after thirty years' abeyance, and the Mamelukes hoped to revive their supremacy, as it was prior to Napoleon's invasion. The struggle began by the capoudan installing his slave Khusrev as governor in July, 1801. This man was one of the most remarkable viziers to be met with in Turkish annals, and, if he failed in Egypt, that failure was not due to lack of brains and courage, but to his having to begin a long civil war with an empty treasury, worthless Ottoman troops, mutinous Albanians, and a superior force of Mamelukes opposed to him. Just as in France for the advent of Napoleon, so in Egypt the ground had to be prepared for Mehemet

Ali, and many pretenders had to come and go, to rise and sink, ere the latter could spring to the front as final winner of the prize.

Outside of Cairo the Mamelukes were masters of the provinces, and as agriculture was the chief source of revenue, the fight became one for the possession of the land. For this purpose Khusrev sent Tahir, the chief of the Albanian division, to reduce them to submission. He was utterly beaten, and Osman Bardisy, the Mameluke leader, came down from Upper Egypt and swept the Delta as far as the sea. Khusrev then sent a Turkish force, and joined to it a regiment of Albanians under Mehemet Ali, who was a favourite at court, a tufenkji-bashi, or chief musketeer of the citadel guard.

Osman, however, routed the Turks before Mehemet Ali could render assistance, and Khusrev, alarmed at this second defeat, laid the blame on the Albanians in general and upon our hero in particular. Summoned before a court-martial, Mehemet Ali refused to go, and from that day began the historic enmity between these two men which was to rend Turkey in twain some thirty years later. Khusrev's animosity led Tahir to revolt and to demand arrears of pay. He besieged the citadel where Mehemet Ali still had friends who opened the gates to him. Khusrev fled

to Damietta, and Tahir proclaimed himself "kayim-makàm," or deputy-governor, pending the decision of the Porte. These events occurred just after our evacuation in May, 1803, and thus the military power began to pass into the hands of the Albanians. Tahir's reign, however, was of short duration. Before a month was over two of his officers demanded the pay of their men. A dispute ensued, and, after a brief conflict, Tahir was slain, and his head was thrown out of the window by the assassins. The Mameluke chief, Ibrahim Bey, asserted later on that this had been brought about by Mehemet Ali, who had incited the two officers to revolt. The accusation is plausible, because Tahir's own clansmen at once arrested the murderers, and thus cleared the way for Mehemet Ali, who came next in rank. At any rate, the fact remains that the latter was now in chief command of some 5000 turbulent Albanians, and, therefore, a personage to be taken into account. He had, no doubt, many rivals among his brother-officers, but he never lost his position, in spite of several mutinies fomented against him.

At this juncture Ahmed, Pasha of Yembo, passing through Cairo, begged Mehemet Ali to restore order. Before anything could be done the victorious Mamelukes arrived and blockaded the town. Having no

mercy to expect from the Porte, Mehemet Ali boldly allied his Albanians with the enemy, and, in concert with Ibrahim, amnestied the mutineers, put the two senior colonels to death, and arrested Ahmed Pasha as an interloper.

Being now a rebel, he started with Bardisy against Khusrev, whom they captured at Damietta and brought as a prisoner to Cairo. Then a firman arrived from Stamboul, disgracing Tahir and naming Ahmed as governor. No notice being taken of this imperial order, a second was sent in favour of Ali Gezayirli, who landed at Alexandria, where Khurshid was commandant. The rebel leaders marched against him, and, in their absence, Khusrev escaped, only to be ignominiously recaptured. It is said that, in dropping from a window in the citadel, he injured one of his feet, and that he never forgave Mehemet Ali this humiliation.

Gezayirli, meanwhile, set out for Cairo, but was taken by Bardisy at Damanhour, and soon afterwards put to death. Scarcely, however, had he disappeared when a new and more powerful candidate arrived in the person of Mohamed Bey Elfy, the ablest of the Mameluke leaders. It may be remembered that we had laid ourselves under an obligation to the beys in the campaign of 1801, and it is probable that our

officers, on returning to London, had sung the praises of what they mistook for a gallant Moslem chivalry worthy of our protection. Elfy accompanied them, and, whatever hopes may have been held out to him by Addington's ministry, he was sent back in a British man-of-war, thus identifying our policy with the Mameluke *régime*. Elfy seems to have understood the true nature of the crisis, and wished to unite the beys under our protection. He was recommended to the care of our consul at Alexandria, Colonel Missett, an officer of Hutchinson's army; and our ambassador at Constantinople also advised the Porte to come to an arrangement with the Mamelukes. Success, therefore, depended on Elfy's joining Ibrahim and Bardisy, in order to win them over to his views. But Mehemet Ali was too quick for him. A flying column of Albanians intercepted Elfy near Menouf, and drove him into the desert, while all the latter's gifts and valuables brought from London were exposed for sale by the victors.

Here we see Bardisy's fatal mistake. He failed to recognize that there was no pardon for the Mameluke sect, and that their best course was to unite and exterminate the new Albanian element, which held the balance between them and the Porte. The Turks had closed the slave caravan route from the Caucasus, so

that the actual Mameluke force was a last garrison at bay. He was stronger than Mehemet Ali, and might have expelled him, but he preferred to nurse his jealousy for Elfy and to assume a hollow friendship for the Albanian leader, who, seeing that their alliance could not last, looked about for a policy of his own. If the Albanians were driven out of Cairo, they would soon be cut to pieces in the provinces; but if Mehemet Ali could expel the Mamelukes, the Porte might relent towards him, for it had resolved on the destruction of that sect.

First, therefore, he played for safety, and then developed a clever game, sound and simple to look back on, but original and dangerous at the time. He set up as a demagogue, a tribune of the people, artfully representing to the notables that not he but Bardisy was responsible for the general misgovernment. He won over the chief of the native aristocracy, Seyyid Omar Mukram, and through him the others. He insinuated that he was a stranger whose heart bled for Egypt; he conjured the sheikhs to distinguish between his Albanians, whom he kept in order, and the lawless Janissaries, the Mamelukes, and Kurdish "delis," or "mad" soldiers, who pillaged the shops and outraged the harems of peaceful merchants. He patrolled the streets, and played the *rôle* of chief constable to

perfection, lamenting his impotence, and hinting how much better things might be if he had the control of them.

And Mehemet Ali was right! For he was the real Saladin, bringing fresh blood and new Mameluke recruits from Albania to replace the worn-out system of the "Ghozz." Like a true leader of men, he saw his error in joining the beys; he must act through the Porte, and force himself on its recognition as the one man indispensable for Egypt.

Suddenly, without a sign which might have betrayed him, he struck a swift blow, chased Bardisy and Ibrahim out of Cairo, and took possession of the city in the name of the sultan. A new firman had just arrived appointing Khurshid, governor of Alexandria, as Pasha of Egypt. Mehemet Ali sent this document to the sheikhs of the mosques, gaining their confidence by a display of loyalty, while he defended the walls against the beys, who were encamped across the river. He did more than this. As Khurshid could not yet arrive, Mehemet Ali, with profuse expressions of regret for past misconduct, led Khusrev out of prison, and asked the people to accept him as pasha till the other appeared. Tahir's Albanians, however, refused, and a few days later, Mehemet Ali assured Khusrev that, as he could not guarantee his safety, the only course was to go to

Rosetta, and thence to Stamboul, and lay the whole truth before the Porte. This was done, and Khusrev escaped from Egypt, destined to become grand vizier and to live till the Crimean war.

Arriving at Cairo in May, 1804, Khurshid soon picked up the reins of power, and began a definite policy of action, which consisted in keeping the Albanians out of the capital and employing them against the Mamelukes. Vigorous war was carried on, with varying fortune to the two sides, but with ceaseless misery to the peasants. Roving bands of marauders, like packs of wolves and jackals, were doubling to and fro across the Delta or up and down the valley of the Nile. What escaped their rapine fell to the native brigands, who grew so numerous that villages and fields were abandoned and small crops were raised. Khurshid had decided on a war of exhaustion of Mamelukes and Albanians alike, hoping to obtain a new garrison of Turks on whom he could rely. But unfortunately the Porte spoiled his plans by untimely interference. It sent him a detachment of 500 cavalry, starving and in rags, with arrears of pay due for service in Syria, and in order to pay these Bashi-Bozuks, he had to raise funds from the merchants and reveal his poverty. Then came a firman to Mehemet Ali and other Albanian chiefs, reminding them of their rebellion against Khusrev, and bidding

them return to their country, where all would be forgiven them. A mutiny ensued, and some retired laden with booty, while Mehemet Ali told Khurshid that he must resign his command in Upper Egypt and prepare to depart. The latter, however, could not spare all the Albanians at once, and persuaded him to attack the Mamelukes in the Fayoum. Mehemet Ali obeyed, and marched on the town of Minia; but, while victory was still uncertain, another large contingent of Bashi-Bozuks came from Syria, a ragged horde of ruffians, who looked forward to the plunder of Cairo after their privations in the desert. No sooner did the Albanian army at Minia hear of this, than fearing to be caught in a trap between the Mamelukes and Turks, they abandoned the field, and returned to Cairo, ready to sell their lives as dearly as possible. They met the new-comers at Tourah, but instead of bloodshed, they fraternized, and the united bands of lawless soldiery entered the capital, which they gave up to sack and pillage, just as if it had been a conquered Christian city.

Unable to quell the mutiny, Mehemet Ali withdrew his own clansmen, and stood on guard, prepared for the worst. Khurshid ordered him to return to Minia, and accused him of treachery. Whereupon the other retorted that it was impossible to control the troops unless they

were paid, and again he declared his intention to retire to Kàvala. He also sent messages of friendship to the notables, reminding them of his past conduct—how he had united with Bardisy in order to give the Mamelukes a chance of restoring order; how he had driven them out when he found them incapable; how he had released Khusrev, and had been faithful to Khurshid. Ordered to return home, he had sold his furniture and prepared to start, but had been sent by the pasha against the Mamelukes. He was not responsible for this invasion of Bashi-Bozuks from Syria. Khurshid had now outlawed him, so that he must consult his own safety; but what did the notables intend to do?

The sack of Cairo was still proceeding when Khurshid told him that he was appointed governor of Jeddah. But it was too late. All Cairo had now revolted against the pasha, holding him responsible for the Bashi-Bozuks. Mehemet Ali appeared the one man needed for their salvation, and the sheikhs, supported by the people, waited on him, and insisted that he should act as governor pending the decision of the Porte, to which they were sending a petition in his favour. Thus, on May 14th, 1805, the hour and the man had arrived, and Mehemet Ali was elected pasha by public acclamation.

As Khurshid would not resign, but summoned the Mamelukes as allies, Mehemet Ali and the populace

besieged him in the citadel, and a fierce bombardment began on both sides. Left to themselves, it is probable that Khurshid and the Mamelukes would have prevailed, but early news arrived that a firman was coming in favour of Mehemet Ali, which was confirmed by the capoudan anchoring at Abukeer, and summoning Khurshid to his presence. Mehemet Ali at once sent a heavy bribe to the admiral, who sailed away with the ex-governor, and in April, 1806, a new firman recognized our hero as pasha of Egypt. This step may have been partly due to French influence and opposition at the Porte, for while we were working for Elfy and the Mamelukes, Napoleon's agents espoused the cause of Mehemet Ali.

Khurshid, though a failure through no fault of his own, deserves a little notice, for it was he who, as Pasha of the Morea, captured and executed the arch-rebel Ali, Pasha of Tebelen, in 1822. But no sooner had he done this than the Porte, fearing that he might follow Ali's example, rewarded him with the fatal bowstring, and ended a loyal career. It was by such wanton cruelty to its ablest servants that it showed men like Mehemet Ali what little distinction was made between loyalty and revolt. The central government was in the hands of a few viziers, and no mercy was shown to provincial governors who displayed the slightest independence of

action. The system was to shuffle them like a pack of cards, and to retain all the power at Stamboul.

Thus, while appointing Mehemet Ali as pasha, the Porte accepted bribes from Elfy, and a new capoudan was sent to Abukeer with orders to transfer Mehemet Ali to the governorship of Salonica. But the Albanian held his ground, for, though beaten by Elfy in the open country, he still occupied the capital, where the notables were on his side. He told the capoudan that he was ready to retire, but that his men, to whom he owed £100,000, would not let him depart. He also assembled his officers, and put the case before them.

"You do not wish me to go," he said; "but how can we resist the capoudan and Elfy combined? You live in luxury and let your men pillage the people, and thus bring me into discredit. I alone may be the first victim, but what of your fate after my fall? If you wish me to stay, swear on your swords to obey and to follow me to the death."

The oath was taken, and the Albanian leader prepared for resistance. But at this crisis he was saved by disunion among the beys, and while they quarrelled, he sent his son Ibrahim, a lad of seventeen, as a hostage to the capoudan with £10,000, and a promise of £20,000 more as a proof of submission. The tide

had turned. Napoleon was urging the Porte to attack Russia, the ally of England. The French consul, Drovetti, used his influence on Mehemet Ali's behalf, and the capoudan sailed away, convinced that the best course was to support the Albanian against the Mameluke. In November, 1806, a new firman arrived confirming the appointment of Mehemet Ali. In December Bardisy died suddenly of a mysterious disease, and in January Elfy succumbed to the plague. "It is all over with us," said Elfy, with his last breath. "Mehemet Ali is master of Egypt. The Mamelukes are lost, for they have not known how to unite against him."

Khusrev and Tahir, Ali Gezayirli and Khurshid, Bardisy and Elfy, each and all had disappeared. The Mamelukes were far weaker in 1807 than in 1801, while the Cairo notables clung to Mehemet Ali as a refuge from the Bashi-Bozuks. They chose him as their master; it was their money, their influence which maintained him in power at the commencement, and it was only gradually that he pushed away the ladder by which he had mounted to the throne.

One quality alone he lacked, and this was bestowed on him by the folly of our Government. The Albanian soldier of fortune, whose life had been saved by Sir Sidney Smith, whose courage had won the admiration

of our generals, was now to appear as a national hero against the British invader, and his complete victory over a handful of our veterans, the disgrace inflicted on our arms, raised him to a height where he was able to indulge in dreams of independence.

CHAPTER VII.

THE SECOND BRITISH EXPEDITION, 1807.

In 1806, while preparing to fight the Russians at Eylau, Napoleon instructed his ambassador Sebastiani to persuade the Porte to create a diversion across the Pruth, and, as the Turks were only too glad to find an ally against their hereditary foe, our ambassador, Mr. Arbuthnot, left Stamboul and joined Commodore Louis at Besika Bay, as a preliminary to our declaration of war against Turkey. The next step was that a squadron of eleven ships, under Sir John Duckworth, sailed from Malta, in February, 1807, with orders to force the Dardanelles, and to attack the capital if the Porte persisted in its alliance with the French. The admiral obeyed his orders, fought his way through the straits, and anchored off the Golden Horn, but allowing himself to be cajoled by the Turks, was then obliged to fight his way out with a total loss of some 300 men. On reaching Malta, he was told to go to Sicily, and embark Major-General Mackenzie

Frazer's force of 4000 troops, and convoy it to Alexandria. This brigade of veterans formed a part of the small army with which Sir John Stuart had defeated the French at Maida, in Calabria, in July, 1806. Our object was to assist the Mamelukes against the Turks in Egypt, and to redeem certain promises made to Elfy since 1801; we courted disaster, and were not disappointed. Had Frazer's troops been sent with Duckworth to Constantinople, we might have brought the Porte to terms; or if he had been allowed to take all the eight regiments which fought at Maida, he might have acquitted himself with credit in Egypt. But only the 31st, the 35th, the 78th, and a foreign legion of Chasseurs Britanniques appeared off Alexandria on March 17th under Commodore Louis, and summoned the city to surrender. After a first refusal, Frazer landed 1000 men, under Oswald and Boxer, at Marabout, and prepared for the assault; but during the night the governor had listened to our consul, Colonel Missett, and the gates were opened next morning.

The news which Missett had to give to Frazer and Louis was of a depressing nature. Of the 40,000 Mamelukes who had faced Napoleon in 1798, not 10,000 remained, and, worst of all, their ablest leaders, Elfy and Bardisy, had recently died of disease, which was

not free from a suspicion of poison. A new Albanian Mameluke power had arisen under Mehemet Ali, who had driven the remnant of the Georgian Mamelukes some three hundred miles up the Nile to Asiout. If they had only landed the previous November, the British would have found Elfy with a strong force at Damanhour; at present they could only request the beys to fight their way down to the sea, and meanwhile it was essential to capture Rosetta as a commissariat depôt.

Melancholy as the situation appeared, Frazer, who afterwards was at Corunna with Moore, Baird, Hope, and other heroes of the Egyptian campaign of 1801, was not a man to flinch from his task. A detachment under Wauchope and Meade was sent against Rosetta, which surrendered without a blow. Then, overcome by the heat and deceived by the treacherous calm of the inhabitants, our men fell into disorder, and lay about disarmed and thoughtless of danger. The awakening was terrible. The Turkish leader suddenly returned with 500 Bashi-Bozuks, stole in by the aid of the natives, and, opening fire from the houses, shot down the invaders, and drove them in confusion through the narrow streets to the city gate. In trying to rally their men, Wauchope was killed and Meade severely wounded, and if the Turks had not lingered to cut off the heads

of the slain, scarcely an English soldier could have escaped to Abukeer. Our loss was 400 killed and wounded; 120 were taken alive and sent to Cairo, and in the boats conveying them were also thrown 90 heads of their fallen comrades. These ghastly trophies were stuck on the ends of poles and exhibited in the capital.

To avenge our defeat, Frazer sent Colonel Stewart on a second expedition against Rosetta. Our men were 2500 in number—part of the 35th, the 78th Highlanders, Chasseur detachments, and a few of the naval brigade with guns and mortars. On April 8th Stewart began the bombardment, which lasted twelve days, the sorties of the Turks being repulsed with heavy loss on both sides. He also sent Major Wogelsand to occupy the village of El-Hamàd, ten miles up the river, so as to keep him informed of any attempt to succour the town.

On his part, Mehemet Ali, aided by the French consul, Drovetti, had not been idle. Inflicting a defeat on the Mamelukes at Mangabat, he returned to Cairo, rousing the people against the infidel invaders. Then he pushed a force of 4000 infantry and 1500 cavalry, under his deputy, the Kiahia Bey, and Hassan Pasha, towards Rosetta, bidding them advance in parallel columns on either bank of the Nile, as had been done by Napoleon and Hutchinson on the march to Cairo.

The first engagement was at El-Hamàd, where Wogelsand, with five companies of Chasseurs, repulsed Hassan's column; but one company, going too far in pursuit, was surrounded and cut off, losing 35 of its number. The heads of the slain were sent to the Kiahia, who crossed over from Berembal and joined Hassan. Meanwhile Stewart, informed by Wogelsand, had sent forward Colonel Macleod, who arrived with three companies of his own regiment (the 78th) and two of the 35th. Seeing his force of less than 1000 British infantry opposed to some 4000 infantry and 1000 cavalry, Macleod made his men retire in separate detachments. The result was that the enemy charged our right, and cut off the 35th under Major Moore, who were all killed or taken prisoners. Macleod in the centre formed his immediate command of 275 Highlanders into square, and fell back slowly, halting now and again to repel the cavalry, who threatened us on every side. Wogelsand, a thousand yards distant, was plunging through the loose soil with four companies of Chasseurs and two guns, also in square formation. Then Macleod was shot through the head, and Mackay, captain of the Grenadier company, as senior officer, found himself obliged to change his square into line to resist the advancing infantry. But while deploying, the cavalry fell upon him, and cut up the detachment so completely

that, out of the original 275, only Mackay and 15 men reached Wogelsand's square alive.

There, not far from the river, the last stand was made. The remnants of our Maida veterans, who had driven off Regnier's Frenchmen at the point of the bayonet, were now about to succumb to a horde of Bashi-Bozuks. How long the struggle lasted we cannot know, but, with his ammunition expended and his men broken, Wogelsand at last surrendered. And then ensued an episode of humiliation equalled by that of Majuba alone. The Mackenzie tartans of the Rossshire Buffs were exposed in triumph by the Albanians just as the Boers made merry over the Gordon kilts; and our men were sold as slaves by auction to the highest bidders. Such was the fate of three regiments which were fresh from victory at Maida, and the contrast will be more apparent when we learn that Regnier who lost that action drove these Albanians into the sea at Abukeer in 1799, and was himself repulsed by the Chasseurs under Abercrombie in 1801. The French had beaten the Albanians, we had twice beaten the French, and now the Albanians had vanquished us. Our loss at El-Hamàd was quite 1000 killed, wounded, and prisoners.

Stewart at once spiked his guns and retired from before Rosetta to Lake Edkou, reaching Alexandria with

less than half of his original force of 2500. Frazer had not 2000 men left out of the 4000 landed a month before.

The British captives were pushed into boats and sent to Cairo. At the mooring-places for the night the Turks set up a head or two on a pole by the banks to mark their triumphant return. Our wounded were neglected, and cruelly suffered from the flies, the filth, and the heat. On their arrival at Boulak, strong and weak were made to march as best they could to the Ezbekieh, where they were shown the heads of their comrades slain at Rosetta. The hot sandstorms of April, or "Khamàseen," were blowing, and our men had to stoop so low as to crave the charity of the Moslem crowds who lined the streets. Many of the natives, touched by their sufferings, put some on donkeys or in carts, and attended to their wants. Thus, amid the jeers and curses of the majority, and assisted by a minority of the populace, the captives were brought to that citadel which we had taken in 1801 (and which we now occupy), and were flung into dungeons, to await the good pleasure of Mehemet Ali. Besides these 466 prisoners of the rank and file, Majors Wogelsand and Moore, and 22 other officers, were also present. They were conveyed to better quarters, and met with decent treatment. Altogether 450 heads of British soldiers

were exposed on two lines of poles forming an alley in the Ezbekieh, through which the pasha and the people passed up and down with exultation. The French consul, Drovetti, now behaved as humanity directed, and sent doctors to our sick and wounded, the Levantine and Syrian colonies raised subscriptions, and Mehemet Ali himself could afford to be generous.

Meanwhile Frazer wrote to the pasha, offering ransom for the officers and sending medical comforts and surgical appliances. Mehemet Ali was ready to meet his wishes. He had seen our strength in 1801, and dreaded lest his unexpected success might force us to send a larger army to retrieve our disaster. His treasury was empty, his troops mutinous, the slightest reverse at our hands would undo his patient labour of two years. He, therefore, agreed to ransoming the officers and even the men on easy terms. For this purpose Frazer had instructed his paymaster to honour all bills drawn at Cairo, and thus during the summer of 1807 a large number of released British soldiers were sailing northwards to Rosetta for Alexandria. Several young prisoners preferred to remain, and some of them even turned Moslem. Among these was the celebrated Keith, a native of Edinburgh, aged twenty, who had been a gunsmith of the 78th, and was taken in Macleod's square. Of him we shall hear later on in the Wahhàbi

war, when he rose to be governor of the holy city of Medina.

The Grenville ministry of "all the talents" had fallen, and George Canning became Foreign Secretary under the Duke of Portland while the disaster of El-Hamàd was taking place in April. Napoleon had avenged his repulse at Eylau by the victory of Friedland in June, and concluded the treaty of Tilsit, and we decided to evacuate Egypt. On behalf of Frazer, Colonel Sherbrooke, afterwards a distinguished Peninsular officer, met the pasha at Damanhour. The terms of withdrawal were arranged, prisoners were returned, and by September 14th the last of the ill-fated expedition was able to leave for Malta.

Comment on our failure is needless; but Mehemet Ali had won deserved renown. The Mamelukes had boasted of English help, and now the result was ludicrous. In one day the pasha had ceased to be an adventurer, a leader of Bashi-Bozuks. He had become a power to be reckoned with. He was no longer a foreign Albanian, but a native patriot, the defender of Moslem Egypt against the infidel.

When we have such a proof of his courage, his sagacity, and force of character, it is unjust to attribute all his successes to intrigue and unscrupulous treachery. Doubtless he was as cunning as his native rivals; but

at least he beat the English in the open field, and his victory laid the solid foundation of his throne. Moreover, it doomed the Mamelukes and branded them as public enemies, false Moslems who had called in foreign infidels to help them against the pasha.

CHAPTER VIII.

THE NEW RÉGIME.

As a reward for his victory, the Porte conferred on Mehemet Ali a pelisse and sword of honour, besides allowing his son Ibrahim to return to Egypt. This recognition was of the highest value, for, with his army in open revolt and his treasury empty, he might otherwise have succumbed to internal opposition.

In the army so lax was the discipline that, while he was supposed to pay for 90,000 men borne on the rolls, not a quarter of that number existed, perhaps not a tenth was fit for service. Cairo was the scene of pillage and rapine, and even the pasha himself was in peril of assassination. Such conduct led him to occupy the citadel, which he carefully provisioned and fortified, making it his headquarters, where he could take refuge from mutiny. His trouble lay in the fact that the turbulent Albanians were his own clansmen, who regarded him merely as a tribal chieftain of limited powers. But the worst offenders were the officers, who

rendered him scant obedience. Well might he exclaim years later: "Wellington is a great general, but he never had such soldiers as mine to deal with!" He owed his throne to the Albanians, but could enjoy no peace with them in the country as a compact force. Thus his efforts for the next fifteen years were directed to weeding them out and replacing them with more amenable and disciplined Mogrebins, Turks, and Soudanese. Lastly, a bad example was set from Stamboul, whence news often came of massacres and revolts by the Janissaries. These Moslem Prætorians had recently deposed Selim III., and put his cousin Mustafa IV. on the throne. A year later (1808), a vizier named Bairakdar tried to restore Selim, but Mustafa produced the corpse of his predecessor, and dared the vizier to oppose the wishes of the soldiers. Civil war broke out, and, after a slaughter for three days, the Janissaries remained masters of the palace, having dethroned Mustafa in favour of his younger brother Mahmoud II., who, as avenger of his dynasty, was destined to wipe them off the face of the earth during the throes of the Greek revolution.

Meanwhile, too, the Wahhàbi fanatics of Arabia had seized the holy cities and stopped the annual pilgrimage. The Porte, therefore, ordered Mehemet Ali to fit out an expedition against them, leading him to understand that

his tenure of office in Egypt depended on this act of devotion to his suzerain.

Now the pasha was practically bankrupt, and, if he must obey, then he must obtain a steady annual revenue; and, as the only important source of revenue was the cultivated soil, therefore he must bring the surface of the country under his direct control, and no voice must be raised against the execution of his will in taxation. He intended to rule for his own benefit without any modern philanthropy for the peasants; and, from this point of view, he must maintain public security and repress brigandage. Granted an effective police, the fields could be tilled and the produce brought to market; after which, the next question was—to whom did the fields belong? The religious body of "Ulema," or learned divines, held a vast amount of real property in trust for charitable institutions; the military corporation of the Mameluke beys claimed a still more extensive domain; and the remainder of the soil was divided among private individuals.

The Mamelukes, humiliated by the English defeat, were deprived of their estates in the Delta, but received tracts in Upper Egypt as his tenants. Having quieted these warlike rivals, Mehemet Ali confiscated the "wakf," or property in mortmain, bequeathed to the Ulema for religious and charitable uses. He did not

abolish the sacred principle of wakf, but merely ousted the Ulema from the administration of its revenues. Of course they loudly protested, but he convinced them that he alone was the nominee of the sultan, and that the latter was the sole and ultimate legal guardian of such estates. Master of the sword, he was able to assert his rights, and from that day the wakfs of Egypt have remained in the hands of the Khedivial Government.

Mehemet Ali then abolished all private tenure of land, and reverted to the assumption of regal ownership, as established by Selim I. at the time of the Turkish conquest in 1517. He summoned all landholders to prove their titles. The trembling wretches were obliged to submit, but no sooner were their documents in his grasp, than he declared them null and void as against himself, sometimes promising a trifling indemnity, which they usually failed to receive. Moreover, just as the Domesday Book had been destroyed by the Mamelukes on the eve of Selim's conquest, so now did the pasha destroy all title-deeds found in existence. As time passed it became impossible to prove what had been Mameluke or wakf property, or the smaller farms of private persons. The tribunals were powerless, the people were at his mercy, and a complete agrarian revolution left him in sole possession of hundreds of thousands of acres.

The next point was how to cultivate these lands for the Crown. The middle-man having been ousted, the pasha must deal direct with the peasants. These fellaheen were serfs, and the rule was that so long as a fellah paid his share to the lord, he might scrape a living out of the soil, and his son might succeed him. But there were no rights, no vestige of real property among the fellaheen until recently, when first the Land Law of Said Pasha, then the Moukabalah, or Compensation of Ismail, and finally the jurisprudence of the new tribunals, established the present system of regarding the fellaheen as true "free-holders" of lands which they had been cultivating for a certain period as taxpayers to the Crown.

Mehemet Ali appointed "moudirs," or directors, of his reforms in the provinces, some fourteen in number. These officials began a cadastre of the cultivated soil, estimating the quantity of acres attached to each village. When, as an exceptional case, a large estate was given to a favourite, the owner was not interfered with; but by far the greatest portion of Egypt with its thousands of villages remained directly under the crown, and in these a paternal régime obtained. During the last century, "sheikh-el-beled," or lord of the land, was a title of honour held by the senior Mameluke bey, such as Murad or Ibrahim. Under Mehemet Ali it was

applied to the headmen of every village, one of whom was officially recognized as the "omdeh," or prop, of the local government. This omdeh, nominated by the moudir, was responsible for the total amount of taxes for his village acres, and he, in turn, distributed the land among such fellaheen as he chose, each of whom had to pay his assessment. The peasant was merely a beast of the field, an animal at the mercy of his omdeh; the latter was the whip in the moudir's hands, and the moudir, an influential bey or pasha, had to render account to Mehemet Ali, the sole proprietor of Egypt.

Such was the scheme commenced in 1808, and gradually carried on for twenty years, till its success enabled him to raise armies, build fleets, and challenge the supremacy of the sultan. At first he was wary in crushing or conciliating opponents as his unfailing sagacity directed. Later on he gave or leased large estates to favourites. Then again the moudirs seized certain tracts, not against the pasha, but from the villagers, whom they ejected, killed, or caused to disappear. Rapacious omdehs, working under the moudirs, continued the same spoliation on a smaller scale, no questions being asked if the total assessment of taxes were paid. The corvée for canals, the horrors of recruiting for the wars, the wholesale exile of peasants to the Soudan or Arabia—all these measures threw

immense power into the hands of local officials, who thus began to replace the old proprietors abolished in 1808. Mehemet Ali did not trouble himself about these details, he merely insisted on a maximum of crops and of taxation. Not a clod of earth, not an ear of corn, not a piastre profit from sale of grain belonged to any one but himself. After his lion's share, the officials might provide for themselves regardless of the fellaheen. The emancipation of the peasantry did not begin till the British occupation.

CHAPTER IX.

THE END OF THE MAMELUKES, 1811.

PRESSED by the Porte to attack the Wahhàbis, Mehemet Ali made a treaty with the Mamelukes, and began to undertake the task thrust upon him. Immense stores of timber, iron, cordage, and ammunition were purchased abroad and collected at Boulak (Cairo), where he established an arsenal with skilled workmen. His first object was to build a fleet for the control of the Red Sea, and after the complete skeleton of each vessel was prepared, the keel, the ribs, the masts, the planks, anchors, and rigging, were placed on camels, sometimes eight abreast, and conveyed to Suez, where they were finally put together. So well was this achieved that before the end of 1809 he had a flotilla of thirty brigs in that harbour, ready to carry his artillery and baggage for the army which was to march along the pilgrim road to meet the ships at Yembo, the port of Medina.

Having drained the treasury by these expenses, he levied a benevolence of £40,000 on the Copts, and

raised £250,000 by an extra tax on the fellaheen. He also tried to persuade the Mameluke beys to come to Cairo; but, warned by their old chief Ibrahim, they took fright, and fled back to their strongholds at Beni Suef. It was then that he sent his lieutenant, Hassan, to expostulate with Ibrahim, and the latter's reply sums up all that can be said against the pasha by his worst enemies.

"No ruler is greater than Mehemet Ali," he began, "but we, who know him well, are aware of his treachery and ingratitude to those who have raised him to his high position."

"And who are they?" asked Hassan.

"His first victim was Genj Osman, who opened the citadel to your uncle Tahir against Khusrev. Next he incited the two colonels against Tahir, and they slew him, but were themselves slain, and cleared the way for the pasha. Then he sought us, and won over the noble Bardisy, who behaved like a brother. Persuaded by him, Bardisy slew Ali Gezayirli, and abandoned Elfy. Then he incited the troops against Bardisy, and drove us out of Cairo. Then he invited Khurshid, and came and warred on us. When Khurshid learnt his character, Mehemet Ali headed a mutiny, instigated the sack of Cairo, and won over the sheikhs, such as Seyyid Omar Mukram, to revolt. Mukram put him at

the head of affairs, he worked for the pasha, and now he is in exile, as we are. How can we believe his promises of friendship? When we were lords of Egypt it was flourishing and strong. Look at it now under his yoke."

What a confession of weakness from the Nestor of the Mamelukes! They might have crushed Khusrev, Khurshid, and Mehemet Ali in turn, if they had united in 1801. Bardisy ought to have seen that there was no room for two factions, Mamelukes and Albanians, or French and English. It is folly to pretend that the pasha was a wolf and the Mamelukes a flock of sheep. Even now all might be retrieved if Ibrahim, as senior bey, would arouse his men. Several courses were open to him. Offering his alliance to the Wahhàbis, he might work round to Suez, and even burn the fleet. He might occupy Kena and Kosseir, and help the Wahhàbis in the Red Sea. Or he might play a waiting game. As the bulk of the pasha's army must soon depart for Arabia, the Mamelukes might starve him into surrender and capture Cairo. The notables had been robbed of their lands and the Ulema of their wakfs. The sultan was powerless, and the army need never return from Arabia if the beys were to hold Suez and Kosseir. Such was Ibrahim's last chance of regaining the ancient supremacy of his

order, but he was too pusillanimous to take advantage of it.

When the speech was reported to Mehemet Ali, the truce naturally came to an end, and was followed by a vigorous war in Upper Egypt. But the pasha's want of strength led him to open negotiations which, in spite of Ibrahim's warning, were accepted by Shahin, the young successor of Bardisy. Many of the beys, with Shahin at their head, came over to him, were welcomed with effusion, and allowed to settle in Cairo, where they formed a rich colony of their own.

Mehemet Ali was in a dilemma. On the one hand, he had alienated the affections of the people by his exactions for the Wahhàbi expedition; on the other hand, he dared not despatch his army to Arabia and leave himself defenceless. The destruction of the beys, therefore, became inevitable, and, laying his plans with the greatest secrecy, he nerved himself for the awful butchery upon which he had resolved.

In February, 1811, a picked force of 4000 men assembled at Cairo under the pasha's second son, Toussoun, a lad in his teens, who had been appointed to command the Wahhàbi expedition. On Friday, March 1st, Toussoun was to be invested with the pelisse of honour, and then to start on the memorable campaign. All the notables were summoned to the

citadel, and the beys of Shahin's party were also invited. The Mamelukes accepted the offer. They remembered how in 1805 Mehemet Ali had massacred more than a hundred of them whom he had inveigled into the town, but that was a long time ago during the war. They now felt safe in their numbers, 500 strong, with numerous supporters in the city. Little did they understand the character of the man whom they had thwarted in his ambition. They arrayed themselves in their richest attire, their costly armour, and their robes of state, and, with their horses gaily caparisoned, went out to meet their doom.

On that fatal morning, in the presence of the notables, Shahin and his magnificent household appeared to pay their respects to the pasha, who received them in the great hall of the citadel. Coffee was served, and polite conversation took place. Then the civilians withdrew, so as to leave room for the military procession, and the ranks being filled, the signal for departure was given. A corps of Turkish irregulars opened the march, then came the Janissaries, followed by the Albanians under Salih Koch, who was in the pasha's confidence. After these were the Mamelukes, and some regulars closed up in the rear. The head of the column came down the slope to the gate of Azab, which opens out on the Rumili Square, the lane through which they

passed being a narrow defile cut out of the rock and shut in by high walls. As soon as the Janissaries issued out into the square, Salih Koch shut the gate behind them, and told his Albanians that the pasha wished them to massacre the Mamelukes and let not one escape. His men turned about, some of them going round by another route to gain the summit of the walls; and then a pitiless fire was poured down on the bewildered Mamelukes. Hearing the sound of musketry in front, the regulars, who were behind on higher ground, opened fire from the rear, so that the beys, penned in like sheep, could make no resistance. Some of them dismounted, and, taking off their heavy robes of ceremony, faced their assailants sword in hand; others, accepting their destiny, calmly knelt down to perform their last devotions as pious Moslems. The Albanians continued the slaughter from the heights, and, Shahin being slain, most of the survivors cried for quarter, and endeavoured to find sanctuary in the harem enclosure, where Amina, the wife of the pasha, had already made herself beloved by the people for her acts of mercy. But there was no escape.

"Replevy cannot be
From the strong iron grasp of vengeful Destiny." *

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* Thomson, "The Castle of Indolence," ii. 32. The story of the leap of Amin Bey from the gate is a pleasant fiction. This man,

One after another the Mamelukes were seized and beheaded, while the corpse of Shahin was dragged about in triumph. The citadel had become a shambles, and not one of the beys or their squires who had entered it an hour before, all panoplied and prancing, remained alive.

Meanwhile the pasha trembled for the success of his plot, and it was only as the firing ceased and the heads of victims were shown to him at the window that he recovered his equanimity. M. de Lesseps asserts that Mehemet Ali was so doubtful of the result that he had horses at the postern ready to mount and fly for his life. Mengin relates that after the affair was over, the pasha's Genoese doctor entered, and gaily remarked, "It is finished. This is a *fête* for your highness!" Mehemet Ali asked for a glass of water.

Crowds had assembled in the bazaars to see the procession pass on its way to camp outside the walls. Suddenly the cry was raised that Shahin was slain, and in a moment all the shops were shut, the stalls abandoned, and a panic-stricken multitude of holiday

being delayed, was not present at the ceremony, and only came up as the Janissaries were issuing. To his surprise, ingress was barred, and, hearing the sound of musketry, he guessed that treachery was afoot, and fled eastward to Syria. Eventually he reached Stamboul, where the sultan treated him with the greatest consideration, as if to deceive the world into believing that Mehemet Ali had acted contrary to the wishes of the Porte.

seekers ran home for safety. Then a scene of pillage and murder ensued, and soldiery went from house to house on the pretence of searching for Mamelukes. After a night of horrors, Mehemet Ali rode through the streets, and gently upbraided his officers for having allowed such disorder. At the same time he sent a force to follow up his success in the provinces, so that the measures carried out simultaneously in all parts of the country led to the extermination of many thousands of the unfortunate sect. Nearly 500 fell with Shahin in the citadel, and the total slain in Cairo alone amounted to 4000. Ibrahim Bey fled south from Beni Suef, and was chased beyond the cataracts by his namesake, the pasha's eldest son.

The picturesque finale of the Mameluke order of chivalry was an act of poetic justice executed on the most worthless corps of men which has ever darkened this earth by six hundred years of idleness and tyranny. This artificial race of slaves formed an alien army of occupation, despising the natives over whom they ruled, and treating the country as the victim of their lusts. It is true that they have left some picturesque tombs and mosques, the beauty of which leads us to forget the vices of the builders; but even these monuments prove their selfish ostentation, each sultan trying to surpass his predecessor by a separate edifice. Unlike the

Seljuks of Asia Minor or the Moors in Spain, they created little in the shape of public works, such as canals, bridges, harbours, market-places, schools, colleges, and libraries. Doubtless some of them meant well, but as each distinguished sultan was a usurper, so he could leave no strong dynasty behind him in his turn. War was their profession, and rapine their trade. So long as they triumphed and new recruits could be bought, all was well; but when disaster came, their doom was sealed, for they had no national reserve on which to draw. Forty thousand were in arms against Napoleon; 20,000 might have existed when Hutchinson retired. They suffered severely for ten years till the massacre of 5000 in 1811. After this only a few hundred Georgian Mamelukes escaped with Ibrahim to Dongola, though others hid in the villages, and were pardoned by the pasha, and even taken into the public service.*

Thus of the Mameluke it may be said that his existence "was a battle and a march, never resting, but driven like the wind across the war-convulsed land." He lived by the sword and perished by the sword, and

"Nothing in his life
Became him like the leaving it."

* Artin Pasha states that more than 2000 boys under eighteen years of age, belonging to the Mamelukes, were seized by Mehemet Ali. These were taken into his body-guard, trained as cadets, and transferred to Assouan after the Albanian revolt of 1815. They formed the nucleus of the officers of the four regiments raised a few years later.

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CHAPTER X.

THE WAHHÀBI WAR, 1811–1818.

HAVING rid Egypt of the Mamelukes, Mehemet Ali was free to undertake the herculean task of annihilating another race of marauders among the Bedouins of Arabia. These were the Wahhàbis, a religious sect which took its name from Mohammed, the son of Abdul-Wahhàb, a fanatic preacher. Born about 1690, this man attracted notoriety as a member of the extreme Hanbali School of Islam, which delights in pharisaic ostentation of moral purity. Such a nuisance did he become in his native village that he had to fly for his life, till he found refuge at Deráya, the seat of a chieftain called Saoud, a petty sheikh of the Anaiza tribe of Nejd. Here he was welcomed, and began to preach his doctrines of reform, namely, that the sole guide was the Koran and the orthodox traditions; and that the abuses which had crept into Islam were due to the idolatrous Turks and profligate sheikhs of Mecca, who led a life of self-indulgence, and corrupted the faith as laid down by the Prophet.

Now, Saoud was an ambitious man, and it occurred to him that he might work the religious propaganda of Abdul-Wahhàb from political motives, and, by reviving the zeal of the early Saracens, place himself at the head of a caliphate, such as it existed in the eighth century. Saoud as warrior, and Abdul-Wahhàb as monk, were iconoclasts, who intended to destroy the images and shrines of Mecca, and to restore to the holy city its pristine purity.

Beginning quietly in 1750, Saoud made such progress that, on his death in 1765, he left a strong principality to Abdul-Aziz, who was his son by a daughter of the preacher. Then followed the conquest of the central plateau of Arabia, and when Abdul-Wahhàb died in 1787, his grandson was at the head of a powerful Bedouin confederation. Several Turkish armies were defeated, Acre, Damascus, and Bagdad were threatened, the shrine of Kerbela was pillaged and burnt. Then, in 1802, Abdul-Aziz was slain by a Persian dervish in the mosque of Deráya.

He was succeeded by Saoud II., the greatest of the dynasty, a man who raised the Wahhàbi power to the highest point it ever attained. In April, 1803, he entered Mecca, and, after destroying eighty of the splendid tombs of the Prophet's descendants, forbad the worshipping at shrines or the offering of prayers

for the dead. He also closed the coffee-houses and taverns, collected all the pipes and tobacco, the rosaries, amulets, silks, satins, and other articles of luxury, and had them burnt in huge bonfires on the public squares.

"When the usual hours of prayer arrived, his myrmidons of the law drove with leather whips all slothful Moslems to their devotions. The mosques were filled. Never since the days of the Prophet had the city witnessed so much piety. Not one pipe was to be seen, and the whole population of Mecca prostrated themselves at least five times a day in solemn adoration." *

Prayers for the sultan as caliph were also abolished, and Saoud wrote to the Porte, warning it to send no more official caravans of pilgrims accompanied with trumpets and drums.

After failing at Jeddah, he captured the second holy city of Medina, where the sepulchre of the Prophet was desecrated, and spoil to the value of £100,000 carried off.

With the greater part of Arabia under his control, Saoud II. had now to show the true nature of Wahhàbiism in its day of triumph. He was an able leader, the provinces were well governed, discipline was introduced among the Bedouins, and a revenue of £250,000 filled his treasury. On the other hand, his sect was a

* Hughes' "Dictionary of Islam," Wahhàbis.

failure in the towns. A reign of terror ensued, from which the majority of peaceful Moslems looked anxiously for a deliverer. Caravans were so highly taxed that they soon disappeared, and, while Saoud boasted that Mecca was open to pilgrims, the foreign visitors were so ill-treated that, on their return home, they declared that Wahhàbi-ism was nothing but an organized system of plunder under the cloak of religion. Herein lay Saoud's difficulty. He must act as if Islam, which had issued from the Bedouins, was still but a Bedouin faith and type of civilization, to which all foreign Moslems must conform. It is as if the inhabitants of Palestine were to claim pre-eminence as Jews or Christians. Such a theory forced him to ignore the history of the expansion of his faith, the conquest of Syria, North Africa, Turkey, Persia, and India, all of which countries possess Moslem races far superior to the treacherous and ignoble Bedouin of the desert. Had it not been for the annual pilgrimage, or Hajj, the rise of Wahhàbi-ism would be as unworthy of mention as the wars of negroes on the Congo, but, unfortunately for Islam, Saoud occupied the holy cities, whither every Moslem is morally bound to proceed at least once in his life. Now, the annual pilgrimage is the renovation of the faith, the retention of its orthodoxy, the revelation to

a hundred thousand worshippers how comprehensive is the grasp of their religion on a multitude of nations, who, though different in race, in language, and in colour, are yet united in their reverence for the Prophet of God.

As lord of Mecca, where he had installed the cunning Ghalib as grand shereef, it was to the interest of Saoud to treat the pilgrims better than the Turks had treated them, to relax his severity, and to let the strangers return home singing his praises as the true successor of Mohammed. By adopting an opposite policy, by setting up the bestial type of the Bedouin as the beau-ideal of the human race, he drove the pilgrims to look to the Sultan of Turkey, so that when Mehemet Ali arrived as the latter's nominee, the sympathies of all honest Moslems were with the Albanian and the Turk, and not with the Wahhàbi marauders.

Then began a struggle which affords yet another instance of the influence of sea-power on history. With his Suez fleet, the pasha held the ports of Arabia, thus controlling the trade and the pilgrimage. Yet such was the genius of Saoud in guerilla warfare, and such the unpardonable treachery of the Porte, which tried to rob him of Egypt while he was absent fighting for the sultan, that more than once things looked black for Mehemet Ali during the vicissitudes of the war.

In 1811 the first expedition of 8000 men, under

Toussoun, captured Yembo, and made an attempt against Medina. It was utterly routed in the pass of Jedeida near Safra. The Albanians fled, and Toussoun owed his life to the gallantry of a Scotch renegade, Keith, who had entered his service after the British campaign of 1807. The Egyptians fell back on Yembo, with the loss of half their men and all their artillery and baggage.

When Mehemet Ali heard of this, he bitterly reproached Salih Koch and the other Albanians for their cowardice and mutiny to his son; but, as he was under a deep obligation to Salih, who had conducted the massacre of the Mamelukes in the citadel only a few months previously, he contented himself with paying the mutineers some £6000, and exiled them from Egypt, in spite of their promises not to offend again. The pasha, however, was inexorable, feeling convinced that he must get rid of his turbulent countrymen if he was to avoid the sudden collapse of his fortunes.

Reinforced from Kosseir, Toussoun again advanced on Medina, which he took after a short blockade. It is stated that Keith, or Ibrahim Aga, at the head of the storming-party, was the first in the breach, and first within the precincts of the Prophet's sepulchre. A year later the renegade Scotchman was appointed governor of the holy city.

From Medina, Toussoun marched on Jedda, where Ghalib opened the gates with effusive professions of loyalty. Mecca also surrendered, and at last Mehemet Ali was able to send the keys to the sultan as a proof that he had restored the prestige of the Turk.

Then the tide turned. The Egyptians were routed in several skirmishes. Saoud never risked a pitched battle, but manœuvred to cut the lines of communication, to capture convoys, and harass detachments. So serious became the situation that Mehemet Ali saw the urgent necessity for his own presence at the seat of war. The lad Toussoun stood no chance against such men as Saoud and Ghalib combined. Leaving Egypt to the care of his faithful lieutenant, the Kiahia Bey, Laz-oghlu, the pasha arrived at Jeddah in August, 1813, and his first step was to deport Ghalib out of the country. Saoud retaliated by a series of brilliant victories in the desert, and then these two great leaders, recognizing each other's ability, settled down for a prolonged trial of strength.

It was at this time (February, 1814) that the Kiahia Bey seized all the lands of private individuals, offering them an illusionary indemnity in exchange. The wealthier landowners had been ousted since 1808, and now the entire surface of the country had come into the hands of a single proprietor. By this means

money and troops were sent to the pasha, who began to win over certain Bedouin sheikhs and to establish his authority more firmly. He also encouraged local trade, and thus made the war pay its own expenses instead of draining Egypt.

At this crisis an irreparable misfortune befell the Wahhàbis in the death of the invincible Saoud, who expired of a fever in April, aged sixty-eight.

"Victory," says Andrew Crichton, in his "History of Arabia," "never abandoned the colours of Saoud while he was at the head of his troops; and to his loss may be attributed the disasters which soon after befell his nation. His last words were addressed to his eldest son Abdullah, advising him never to engage the Turks in the open plain, a principle which, if strictly followed, would have ensured in all probability the recovery of the Hejaz."

But Abdullah set these wishes at defiance, with the result that, in January, 1815, he was utterly routed near Besel, and Wahhàbi-ism rapidly declined.

It was at this season that the traveller Burckhardt, after a perilous journey across the Korosko desert to Berber, and thence by Kassala and Suákin to Jeddah, met the pasha at Táyif, near Mecca. Mehemet Ali, having called Napoleon a coward for his abdication to Elba, asked Burckhardt about England and our plans in the East. He dreaded lest Wellington should invade Egypt with the Peninsular army.

"*The great fish swallow the small,*" said he, "and Egypt is necessary to England for supplying corn to Malta and Gibraltar. I am the friend of the English, and hope they will not attack Egypt in my absence. If on the spot, I shall at least have the satisfaction of fighting personally for my realm. I love Egypt with the ardour of a lover, and, if I had ten thousand lives, I would willingly sacrifice them all to possess her. England must some day take Egypt as her share of the spoil of the Turkish empire."

Here we see the real Mehemet Ali, a man free from political "cant," making no concealment of his conviction that the sword is the sole arbiter in the Eastern question. Burckhardt was a Swiss in the service of the English African Association. The pasha looked on him as a spy, yet, far from molesting him, he suffered Burckhardt to perform the pilgrimage in November, 1814, to visit Medina, and to return to Egypt under his protection in 1815. He says he is the friend of the English, but not afraid of them; he would sooner die than abandon his realm like Napoleon. What a forecast of 1840! The chief problem of his career was how to escape from the impending extinguisher of England's supremacy, for he knows that its ultimate descent is inevitable. The great fish swallow the small.

Hearing of Napoleon's escape from Elba, and of a probable invasion of Egypt by the Turks, the pasha

quickly returned by way of Kosseir and Kena, and reached Cairo on the day of the battle of Waterloo. He owed his throne to the devotion of his Kiahia, who had recently put down the conspiracy of a Mameluke, Latif Bey, suborned by the Porte. Alexandria was fortified, and Mehemet Ali attempted to reorganize an army on a European footing. The state of affairs is well described by Burckhardt in July, 1815.

"The pasha continues to improve the condition of Egypt and of his finances. He has begun to exercise the troops, has established a factory of muskets, and possesses 2000 muskets bought in London. About twenty ships of his are trading to Italy and Spain, six more in the Red Sea, and it is in view to establish a direct commerce with the East Indies. Immense sums have been spent on fortifying Alexandria and Cairo. But what secures him more than anything else is the death of three or four thousand soldiers, the most rebellious and fiercest of his troops, whom he constantly placed as vanguards against the Wahhàbis, and of whom very few returned."

Warned by the faithful Abdin Bey that a conspiracy had been formed for his overthrow, Mehemet Ali took refuge in the citadel on August 4th, and Burckhardt writes—

"The city of Cairo has been exposed to serious disturbances. The pasha tried to introduce the Nizam Jedeed (or New System), and began to drill his men according to European tactics. They broke out in open rebellion,

and he had the mortification to see his capital exposed to their fury. They stripped the greater part of the shops, and sacked the bazaars, after which they returned to their quarters, having in vain endeavoured to break open the gate of the Frank Street. The new system has now been given up, and the pasha, conscious of the strength of the rebels, has not deemed it advisable to punish them; but, in order to conciliate the people, he has reimbursed to them out of his pocket all their loss, calculated at £40,000."

The crisis, however, passed away, and the mutineers were eventually provided for in the Soudan, whence few returned to vex him with their imitations of Janissary revolts at Stamboul.

Meanwhile Toussoun was carrying on the war with indifferent success. Keith laid down his life for the young prince in a skirmish, and both sides agreed to a truce. Suddenly news arrived of the military revolt in Cairo. Toussoun at once returned, and his father gave him a magnificent reception after his four years' absence.

Rejecting further overtures from Abdullah, the pasha decided to send his eldest son, Ibrahim, for the purpose of crushing the Bedouins in their desert stronghold of Deráya. There had always been some jealousy between Ibrahim and his younger brother, who appears to have supplanted him in his father's affections, and though the elder had done good work in driving the

Mamelukes as far as Dongola, he envied the more conspicuous triumph over the Wahhàbis. He now had the opportunity of surpassing both his father and brother in desert warfare, and of beginning that military career which was destined to fill Europe with his fame. Soon after reaching Medina he heard without regret of Toussoun's untimely death, and a rival being thus removed, he joyfully turned his attention to the work in hand.

The barbarism that ensued need not be recorded. Exasperated by a repulse at Raiss, Ibrahim spent the year 1817 in pushing doggedly through the heart of the central plateau, capturing several villages, till he arrived at Deráya, some 400 miles east of his base at Medina. The siege of this capital, whence the Wahhàbi propaganda had issued seventy years previously, began in April, 1818. For a time he failed, and the explosion of his magazine left him helpless till fresh stores could arrive. But he was not to be daunted. As an Albanian Turk he despised the Bedouins quite as much as the British despised the Hindu mutineers of Delhi. The Wahhàbis were brute beasts, who frightened away pilgrims and defiled the sepulchres of the Prophet. Honourable capitulation, mercy, pardon, were vain words at such a time. It was a struggle between two races, and once more the Arab acknowledged his master

in the Turk. Step by step the invaders won their way through the suburbs, storming the walls and hemming in the last garrison without hope of relief, till, in September, 1818, Abdullah surrendered to the conqueror. Taken to Cairo for the inspection of the pasha, he was sent on to Stamboul, where he was beheaded. As for Deráya, not one stone was left upon another, the palm-trees were burnt, and the inhabitants driven away.

Wahhàbi-ism as a power in Arabia was the work of three remarkable men, Saoud I., Abdul-Aziz, and, greatest of all, the grandson, Saoud II. For more than sixty years (1750–1815) these men had achieved a *tour de force* which Abdullah failed to maintain. Perhaps the latter was inferior to his ancestors, but he had stronger enemies to resist. By lavish expenditure Mehemet Ali had seduced many of the sheikhs from their allegiance, and then Ibrahim, grasping the strategy of the campaign, marched straight upon the capital. The guerilla warfare of Saoud was no longer possible. Ibrahim besieged a town, and forced a battle or retreat. Egyptian artillery decided the issue.

Thus ended Wahhàbi-ism as a definite attempt to restore an Arab caliphate and to wrench the custody of the holy cities from the Sultan of Turkey. Limited to the desert, it was a success, but it failed among the

towns on the coast. So long as the Turks are free to land fresh troops for their garrisons in Arabia, the sultan may assume the title of caliph within his own empire; but if ever those reinforcements are cut off, we may hear of a new Wahhàbi-ism and the rise of an independent grand shereef at Mecca, with the consent of the dominant naval power in the Red Sea.

The part taken by the British Government at that time deserves notice. Adopting the Wahhàbi tenets, the pirates of the Persian Gulf became so bold as to attack our merchantmen and even our armed cruisers, and not always without success. Annoyed at this, we sent a first expedition from Bombay to Ras Kheim in 1810, and subdued a colony of them after considerable loss. But the piracies continued, and spread round as far as Aden. Our second expedition, in 1819, met with signal disaster, and it was not till 1820 that, after a desperate struggle, we captured the pirate stronghold near Ras el-Hadd, and cleared the Indian Ocean of the Wahhàbi corsairs.

It was at the beginning of the second expedition that some British ships arrived at El-Kateef in the gulf with an offer of alliance to Ibrahim. An officer, Captain Sadleir, was ordered to find the Egyptian army. To his surprise, as he advanced, he learnt that the war was over; nevertheless, he pushed across the peninsula, and

met Ibrahim at Medina in September, 1819. That general declined to negotiate, but begged Sadleir to remain till orders came from Cairo.

The answer of Mehemet Ali was a polite refusal. The great fish swallow the small. Our supremacy in the Mediterranean was bad enough; why throw open the Red Sea to England sooner than was necessary? He preferred that the East India Company should not trench upon his trade monopolies at Mocha and Jeddah. Sadleir, therefore, returned to Bombay, and Ibrahim came home to enjoy a triumph at Cairo. Escaping from his courtiers at the palace, Mehemet Ali hid in a shop in the bazaars, and watched the cavalcade of his warrior-son with the eyes of disinterested affection.

CHAPTER XI.

THE SOUDAN.

MEHEMET ALI'S invasion of the Soudan may be ascribed to two motives—a desire to secure the monopoly of the caravan trade, and especially of the gold which came from those regions, together with an idea of obtaining negro recruits for an army with which he could overawe the turbulent Albanians of Cairo. No sooner, therefore, was the Wahhàbi war ended than he prepared a first expedition under the command of his son Ismail, who longed for an opportunity of showing himself the equal of his elder brothers, Ibrahim and Toussoun, as a military leader.

To protect his western flank, he sent a force of 1300 men against the fanatical population of Siwa in the oasis of the ancient temple of Jupiter Ammon. This expedition started in February, 1820, and, after a desperate battle, completely succeeded in its object. Siwa was permanently annexed to Egypt, while certain Europeans surveyed the district, and furnished the accurate information published by Jomard in 1823.

The main expedition for the Soudan left Cairo in July, 1820, and consisted of 3400 infantry, 1500 cavalry, some artillery, and a contingent of 500 friendly Ababdeh Arabs. As it passed Wadi Halfa, the remnants of the Mamelukes, who had been driven south by Ibrahim, the pasha's eldest son, and who had formed their "ordeh," or camp, at the place now known as Dongola, broke into two parties, the one surrendering to the Egyptians, while the other retired into Kordofan. Old Ibrahim Bey had recently died, and with him the famous order, which had ruled Egypt for six centuries, definitely ceased to exist.

Ismail met with little opposition till he reached the great bend of the Nile at Korti, where he routed the fierce tribe of Shagiyehs in two pitched battles, thus clearing the road to Berber, which he occupied without further resistance. Shendy soon afterwards was surrendered by its "malek," or king, Nimr, the Tiger, a semi-independent governor under the Sultan of Sennaar. The Shagiyeh also made submission, and Ismail pushed on to Cape Khortoum, a promontory at the junction of the two Niles, so called because it resembled the long proboscis of an elephant.

Leaving the White Nile, he proceeded up what was then held to be the main stream, and arrived at Sennaar, where the Sultan Bady paid him homage, and

was appointed the viceroy's agent. The short campaign had been entirely successful, and Ismail sent down thousands of slaves to Assouan, where a military camp was being formed for the drilling of the new army.

In 1821 Ibrahim joined his brother, and a division of labour was agreed upon. Ismail was to ascend the Blue Nile as far as possible, while Ibrahim was to explore the White Nile on the west. The idea was that if the White Nile flowed into the Niger, the expedition would follow it up and come out on the Atlantic coast; otherwise Ibrahim would turn aside into Kordofan, raise troops, and advance northwards through the Sahara to Tripoli and the Mediterranean. The mere attempt to realize such grandiose projects shows us that at this period the young princes had an unbounded faith in their father and in themselves, holding nothing to be impossible for the dynasty of Mehemet Ali. It was a revival of the great Macedonian spirit which had carried Alexander to the mouth of the Indus.

Ismail accordingly ascended the Blue Nile as far as Tomat in latitude 11° N., whence he returned early in 1822. Ibrahim, however, fell dangerously ill, and was obliged to return to Cairo, but his men made an excursion as far south as Jebel Dinka. A full account of these early explorations is given by the Frenchman,

M. Caillaud, who accompanied Ismail as the chief of a small group of *savants*.*

Meanwhile, the viceroy had sent a third expedition under his son-in-law, Mohammed Bey Defterdar, into Kordofan, which province was annexed in 1822. And it was lucky for the Egyptians that this force was available, inasmuch as Ismail, on his return to Shendy, had so exasperated Nimr by his cruelties perpetrated on the submissive inhabitants, that a conspiracy was formed, and the young prince, while feasting with his staff of officers, was burnt alive in the palace as a holocaust of vengeance. Mohammed Defterdar retaliated by terrible massacres. The province was thoroughly subjugated, and a new capital was founded in 1823, which has since become famous under the name of Khartoum. For the next fifteen years the Egyptian Soudan was turned into a hunting-ground for slaves, the "ghazwas," or razzias, being carried out by officers and men, who received no other pay but what they could raise from their captures in these expeditions. Dr. Bowring, in his Report, 1840, gives details of the atrocities committed by the troops; and an eye-witness, Mr. Holroyd, narrates facts too loathsome to be recorded here. Bowring at last brought the matter to

* F. Caillaud, "Voyage à Meroé, au Fleuve Blanc, Fazogl, Sennaar, et Siwa, 1819–22." Paris, 1827.

the notice of Mehemet Ali, and possessed enough influence over the pasha to obtain some promise of reform.

Suddenly, without warning, Mehemet Ali, at the age of sixty-nine, paid a visit to the Soudan, in order to see for himself the true state of affairs. Leaving Cairo in October, 1838, he ascended the Nile, crossed the Bayuda desert from Korti to Metammeh, arrived at Khartoum in November, and solemnly proclaimed the abolition of the slave-trade, as he had promised to Bowring. Then he penetrated as far as Fazoglu, and returned to Alexandria, where he arrived in March, 1839, after only six months' absence!

Of his two objects, the pasha had succeeded in one—the recruiting of a Soudanese army. But the search for gold proved an utter failure. The caravan trade had been ruined by the heavy dues imposed at Assouan, slave-hunting continued as before the proclamation of 1838; and for the next forty years the Soudan became a place for the self-enrichment of a few pashas, and an exile for thousands of fellaheen who were driven there as if in compensation for the negroes brought into the Delta. Something, however, was effected by the early explorers. In 1840 three expeditions, directed by French *savants*, such as Thibaut, Arnaud, and Sabatier, ascended the White Nile to within five degrees of

north latitude; and as regards commerce, men like Petherick pushed inland as far as the Bahr Ghazal, their efforts being seconded by Catholic missionaries, who began to establish themselves at Khartoum and in the far interior.

Things went from bad to worse, so far as the local government and slave trade were concerned, till Said Pasha's visit in 1857, when he made a genuine effort to put a stop to the most glaring abuses. But no sooner had he departed than matters returned to their old groove of tyranny, if for no other reason than because the Egyptians, being themselves slaves at home, could not be expected to carry out a civilized administration over a still lower order of humanity. Before there could be any hope for the Egyptian Soudan, the Government at Cairo had itself to be purged and purified from its corruption.

In 1869 Sir Samuel Baker was appointed Governor-General, with full powers to annex as much of the Equatorial Province as he was able to do with the means at his disposal. A few years later he was succeeded by General Gordon, who accomplished wonders during the short time that he remained in office. But the task, difficult under any circumstances, became quite hopeless as bankruptcy fell upon Egypt; and while the Aràbi revolt paralyzed the Home Govern-

ment, the Mahdi found the opportunity ready to his hand to raise the entire population, and to throw off the yoke of the Khedive. Recent events under the British occupation are too well known to need recording here. The Soudan was nominally "abandoned" from 1885 till 1896, when Dongola was recaptured, and a further advance ordered against Berber.

If one may venture to indulge in a brief discussion upon this subject, it is only to point out that the fatal mistake committed by the Egyptian Government was not merely its attempt to annex too much territory at once, but rather its neglect to develop the eastern portion before undertaking the control of the west and the south. *The value of the Egyptian Soudan is strictly limited to the banks of the Nile and its tributaries,* that is, to the provinces of Dongola, Berber, Khartoum, Sennaar, Kassala, and Massowa. Thus the pasha's first efforts should have been turned to the task of reviving the ancient kingdom of Meroé, both from the Nile route and from the Red Sea. What pains one chiefly in the study of this question is the blindness which led to the waste of numerous expeditions into Kordofan and Darfour, while every effort should have been made to colonize the valuable provinces between the river and the east coast. The enterprise was a failure because it was wrong in principle and in manner

of execution. Instead of public tranquillity and honest trade, we meet with nothing but slave-hunting, massacre, and the ruin of caravans. The Mahdi's revolt was merely a repetition on a vast scale of the burning of Ismail at Shendy some sixty years before.

But, for good or for evil, Mehemet Ali has been justified by history for his invasion of the Soudan. The Delta is dependent for its water upon the lakes and floods of both branches of the Upper Nile. The entire watershed must belong to one power which can decide how the irrigation of each province is to be carried on, with due regard for the interests of all. Distances will be gradually shortened by rail and steamer, and although there may not be very much gold, there is an inexhaustible supply of valuable products, such as gum, indiarubber, coffee, and other tropical plants. Those sources of wealth may be tapped by various roads, along the Nile, or Suakin, Massowa, Zeila, or Zanzibar; but, in a future day, when the valley of the Nile shall be as prosperous and as justly governed as that of the Ganges, Englishmen will not forget the name of the great pasha who, with the slender means at his disposal, dared to bring those provinces under his dominion.

CHAPTER XII.

THE GOVERNMENT OF EGYPT.

THUS far we have followed the pasha in his rise to power, and in his conquests over the Mamelukes, the Bedouins, and the Soudanese. Hitherto he has been an Oriental monarch dealing only with Eastern races. Before discussing the more famous achievements in Greece and Syria, which brought him into contact with Europe, it is as well to consider the internal condition of Egypt during that middle period of his reign, which extends from 1821 to 1833.

The object of his ambition was to make himself practically independent of the Porte under a nominal suzerainty, limited to the annual tribute of £60,000. All his actions were directed to this end, and, on the whole, from his point of view, he succeeded, because he always asserted that, before any good could be effected in Egypt, a stable government must be established, free from the constant changes of pashas sent from Stamboul. This was the basis of his policy, and,

as it was true and sound, therefore, however severely some may condemn him, the impartial critic will be ready to admit extenuating circumstances in his favour. We must not paint Mehemet Ali in neutral tints, which leave no clear impression on the mind of the spectator. At times he deserves our admiration, and that should be cordially granted; at others he merits our rigorous censure, and it is impossible to condone his offences. The white and the black, therefore, must lie side by side without mingling into drab, for, while he was always a great man, we can scarcely speak of him as a good man, and it stands to his credit that he made little pretensions to virtue. Especially in the earlier half of his life can we find no trace of modern European "cant" with regard to his motives; that weakness was developed as a veil of protection from trading consuls, curious visitors, and antiquarians, who flocked to his presence, and whom he thought it might be to his interests to humbug and befool. Such a course was not natural to his Oriental character had he been left alone, had he lived, say, in Morocco or Albania, face to face with none but the Porte.

He acknowledged the headship of the sultan, but warred against his equals, the palace viziers, whose treachery towards him while he was absent fighting for his caliph in Arabia, showed him that, in their eyes,

there was no difference between loyalty and rebellion. Determined to hold what he thought his own, never sure of the morrow, unable to wait in patience for the gradual development of a sound financial and agrarian reform, Mehemet Ali lived as it were from hand to mouth, raising every available penny of revenue so as to be ready for any emergency. Such a course, no doubt, involved the misery of the peasants; but not only did he despise those fellaheen, he held that they had suffered more under the Mamelukes, and would be worse off under the pashas of the Porte. Such was his justification to himself and his friends, and we are bound to examine its truth.

The chief points of interest are those connected with revenue, expenditure, commerce, and the army on the one hand, and his dealings with the natives and the foreign consuls on the other.

From a list given by M. Mengin, we find that the receipts in 1821 amounted to £1,200,000, and the expenses to a little less. The land-tax brought in £660,000 on two million acres, at an average of 7*s.* per acre.* Customs were £80,000; salt, £7000; and fisheries, £5000. The remainder of the budget is made up of minor details, the chief of which was an iniquity called the "little treasury," or money derived from

* It now amounts to £5,000,000 at £1 per acre.

articles bought of the peasants and sold by Government agents, at a profit of £100,000. In addition to monopolies on ivory, incense, etc., he gained £22,000 on 4000 cwt. of safranum, bought at 15*s.* per cwt. and sold abroad at £10. Similarly, he purchased 600,000 bushels of wheat, beans, maize, and peas, at about 1*s.* per bushel, and sold them at a profit of £84,000. His expenditure was as follows:—

	£
Pay of 20,000 Albanian and other irregulars ...	500,000
Pay of civilian employés, workmen, etc.	155,000
Pasha's Civil List	120,000
Annual tribute to the sultan	60,000
Building palaces, barracks, factories	53,000
Gifts, "bakhsheesh," outlay for festivals	50,000
Compensation for wakfs and lands seized	45,000
Mecca Caravan, or Mahmal	10,000
Reclaiming land, cultivation of silkworms, etc. ...	7,000
	£1,000,000

This total of a million ought to leave a surplus of £200,000, but the pasha never enjoyed a real surplus, nor did he keep accounts in the European sense of the word; indeed, even so far as 1838, our consul-general, Colonel Campbell, speaks of the finances as being a "complete and incomprehensible chaos." No Egyptian budget was published till some forty years afterwards, and M. Mengin's figures can only be taken as a rough guide.

It is, however, in commerce that we touch the secret

of Mehemet Ali's military power. An autocrat in government, he was a monopolist in trade, and treated Egypt as his private farm. He made a monopoly of all the chief produce, buying grain from the peasants at his own price, and speculating wholesale for export without a rival. The harvests were seized and carried to his magazines, to be sold thence for the profit of the treasury, and the pasha became the great merchant of Egypt, dealing direct with European buyers. The loss to the fellaheen, of course, was enormous, but as the pasha had bought their grain at a derisive price, nearly all the cash he received from the foreign brokers was pure profit, and went to the support of his army. Often, too, he was obliged to sell on credit, and thus lost heavily from bankrupt Europeans, against whom he had no legal redress. Take one instance: In August, 1816, he sold a million bushels of wheat, first at 2*s.* 6*d.*, and then at 3*s.* 6*d.* per bushel. News came of bad harvests on the continent, ships flocked to Alexandria, and prices rose to 5*s.* But the crops were not ready, ships remained idle, prices fell, and many merchants found themselves his debtors, unable to pay. The waste was visible in the mountains of corn that lay rotting in his barns for want of a purchaser, and this too while the fellaheen were starving.

One cause of loss he soon removed. Hitherto the

grain barges had sailed from Rosetta across the bar with a favouring wind to Alexandria. Advised by his confidential agent, our trading-consul, Mr. Briggs, he cut a canal from Atf on the Nile to Alexandria harbour, a distance of forty-five miles. It was completed in twelve months, and opened in 1820. He called it the Mahmoudieh, after Sultan Mahmoud, and it is said that, out of some 300,000 fellaheen engaged on this corvée, quite 20,000 perished from hunger and ill-usage. Rosetta decayed, but Alexandria, henceforth supplied with Nile water, rapidly advanced, and the pasha could bring his grain to the quays independently of the winds on the coast.

Just as he monopolized the exports so did he try to control the imports. Formerly, says M. Mengin, 1000 tons of drugs arrived annually from Arabia, but when the pasha fixed his own tariff at Suez, these lessened to 100 tons, and the commodities found their way elsewhere. So, too, coffee became an expensive luxury, and Europeans carried on a lucrative contraband trade in this and other necessaries.

The same may be said of his factories. Mehemet Ali wished to foster native industries, to make his own muskets, ammunition, and uniforms, to rival Europe in his silk and cotton goods, to turn Egypt into a manufacturing centre. As he failed to discover coal, he

imported that mineral, with iron, timber, and machinery, and set up a number of model factories, wherein the workers were under a sort of coercive discipline. Having the revenue of the country to draw upon, and no public to audit his accounts, he continued to work these establishments at a loss for many years, much to the admiration of his sycophants; but, later on, when money was scarce, the factories were closed, and the unnatural system entirely disappeared.

Again, one of the most remarkable traits in the pasha's character was his mania for foreigners, an eagerness to welcome strangers of every degree, to listen to them, reward and help them if possible, and above all to persuade them to believe in his schemes of reform. In his opinion, the fellah was a serf, a beast of burden; the Turk a hopeless barbarian, fit only to be his sergeant, or tax-collector; but a third element remained, by the cultivation of which he might create an instrument of profit, a bulwark of defence, and even a final refuge from his enemies. In no respect did he prove himself more conspicuously to be a born leader of men than in his consummate handling of the Europeans with whom he had to deal. He was only an ignorant major of Bashi-Bozuks, knowing little of our civilization, yet by his genius for exploiting the wants and ambitions, the vices and failings of Europeans in general,

by making himself indispensable to all of them in turn, he gained their loyalty and enthusiasm just as if he had been one of an old and long-established dynasty of Christian kings in Alexandria. The fact remains to his credit that, as a whole, the interested European colony of Egypt gloried in the strength of Mehemet Ali, feared him, and lamented his fall at the hands of Palmerston as the ruin of their own fortunes.

The pasha and the foreigners were drawn together by a mutual necessity; they both wanted money. He had seized the land and its produce, but he could not realize his property into cash without their aid. They, on the other hand, were penniless, owing to his monopolies. Now, these monopolies were quite illegal under the capitulations; they did not exist in Turkey, and their abolition by Bulwer's treaty of 1838 led to the pasha's commercial ruin. But, in the interval, European governments were negligent or indifferent, and Mehemet Ali had gradually acquired absolute power in Egypt. His ante-chamber became the real Bourse of Alexandria, he controlled the markets, and everything depended on paying him court in order to have the earliest and best intelligence.

Now, as the monopolies were illegal, and not tolerated at other trading centres like Smyrna, Aleppo, Stamboul, how was it that the consuls allowed the

system to flourish in Egypt? The answer is that the consuls were themselves the chief offenders, and shared the monopolies with the pasha. Writing of our first consul-general, Colonel Missett, who retired in 1815, Burckhardt says—

"His rigid integrity, his accuracy in business, and inflexible firmness, were the only checks which Mehemet Ali had experienced in his relations with European Governments, for the other consuls are under such great obligations to him that they never dare uphold their nation's interests in opposition to those of the pasha."

Missett was succeeded by Henry Salt, the Abyssinian traveller, who appears to have devoted himself to the study of antiquities with the more celebrated Belzoni. Salt let the pasha heap monopoly on monopoly, and set the capitulations at defiance, while he divided Thebes with his French colleague Drovetti in rivalry as to who should make the most of the pasha's firmans for excavations. He made and sold various magnificent collections, and died leaving a large fortune. In 1826 he was followed by Mr. John Barker, who also paid some attention to antiquities, and accepted the pasha's firmans.

Thus, on the one hand, Mehemet Ali bribed the salaried consuls-general, after Missett's departure, with special licenses to remove priceless antiquities, and on

the other hand he controlled the unsalaried trading consuls by giving them shares in his monopolies. For many years his favourite agents were the English firm of Briggs and Company, one of whose partners, so late as 1837, was our consul at Alexandria. Antiquities and monopolies—such were the means by which Mehemet Ali silenced the consular corps in those days, and enjoyed impunity over Europeans and fellaheen alike.*

We can now go on to compare the budgets of 1821 and 1833. Both revenue and expenditure have doubled, the former rising from £1,200,000 to £2,500,000, and the latter from one to two millions.

Revenue.	1821.	1833.
Land tax	£660,000	£1,125,000
"Little Treasury"...	105,000	450,000
Customs	78,000	112,000
Octroi on cereals	—	180,000
Capitation tax, or "firdeh" ...	—	350,000

The other items do not call for remark; but it will be seen that while trade through the customs has risen only £34,000, there has been an enormous increase in other taxation, direct and indirect.

In expenditure the contrast is more vivid, owing to new items; whereas in 1821 an army of 20,000 mutinous

* See George Gliddon's Pamphlet No. 2, "An Appeal to the Antiquaries of Europe on the Destruction of the Monuments of Egypt. London, 1841.

irregulars had cost half a million, in 1833 a force of 100,000 regulars and 50,000 irregulars cost £1,200,000, and the naval expenses amounted to £400,000. In 1838 the revenue was estimated at four and a half millions, and the expenditure at three and a half; but this was an optimistic guess, owing to the want of accounts and the depreciation in the coinage.

With regard to the army, having failed to introduce the new system of drill in 1815, Mehemet Ali gradually weeded out the mutineers by sending them to destruction in Arabia and the Soudan; moreover, he isolated his Bashi-Bozuks in various districts of the Delta, while he formed a camp of exercise at Assouan. Among the numerous Frenchmen who entered his service was Captain Joseph Sève, better known under his Moslem title of Suleiman Pasha. Born at Lyons in 1788, Sève began his career as a sailor, fought against us at Trafalgar, became a hussar, distinguished himself in many battles on the Continent, and only lost the pleasure of fighting us at Waterloo by reason of his being on Grouchy's staff. Arriving in Egypt in 1819, Sève made such a good impression that he was soon appointed army-instructor at Assouan, where he commenced with 400 Mameluke youths taken into the pasha's service. The Soudan war was in progress, and from time to time he continued to receive hundreds of

captured negroes sent to him as recruits. Two years of unremitting toil ensued, and in 1823, when the news reached Cairo of the burning of Prince Ismail at Shendy, and when a panic led to riot among the Albanians, Sève, who had transferred his camp to Khanka, near the capital, appeared on the scene with 25,000 Soudanese troops ready to support the pasha's authority. Six magnificent black regiments marched through the city, and the gallant Frenchman who had created them was made a bey (colonel), with a salary of £1600 a year. The crisis was passed. Henceforth Mehemet Ali had a new army of his own, consisting for the most part of faithful Soudanese. To them he added regiments of fellaheen; and remnants of Albanians no longer dared to mutiny as of old. A spirit of discipline having once been introduced, the rest was easy. The Turks, conscious of their martial superiority, were ashamed to yield in matters of drill to inferior races of Soudanese and Egyptians; and, while all the field officers were members of the dominant race, a stiffening was also given to the native battalions in the shape of Turkish subalterns and sergeants. Similar efforts were made with the artillery, and, although the cavalry was only commenced later on, the pasha now possessed an army trained on the French system, of which he had every reason to be proud.

With regard to the navy, the development of his commerce led him to form a Mediterranean squadron, if only as a protection against Greek corsairs who preyed indiscriminately on every flag in Levantine waters. Making Alexandria his real capital, he built a palace at Ras-el-Teen, where he was better able than at Cairo to deal with foreign consuls and to superintend his maritime affairs. He not only sold produce for export, but he also purchased many ships, and sent them laden to Europe. He bought men-of-war new and second-hand, his ambition being to overawe the Porte both by land and sea. In his own way he was applying the lesson of the French expedition. Napoleon failed in Egypt because of Nelson's victory; secondly, he failed in Syria because of Smith's intervention. The pasha profited from this experience, and lavished his money on the fleet. The first squadron which perished at Navarino was bought more or less ready-made, but the second was built in the new arsenal constructed for him at Alexandria by De Cerisy. In 1832 he possessed eight battle-ships, and fifteen frigates and corvettes, carrying 1300 guns and 12,000 sailors. His army at that date amounted to 150,000 regulars and 100 field-pieces.

Such, then, was the power of Mehemet Ali as the result of his commercial policy in Egypt. Surely a redoubtable champion against the Porte, and worthy of

European attention! How are we to estimate him—merely as an Oriental monarch blind to the progress of his Christian neighbours, or as an enlightened candidate for admission into their civilized circle? The weakness of the sultan, the jealousies of the Powers formed his opportunity. For some fifteen years he will enjoy considerable license, and then, when that interval has passed, a second treaty of London and a bombardment of Acre will expel him from Asia, just as a first treaty of London and the battle of Navarino drove him out of Europe.

The constant factor in the problem before him is the naval supremacy of England. How far can he venture without making it worth our while to intervene? That is the general question. But his private misfortune is the hostility of Khusrev and other viziers at the Porte, and his future will depend on whether our naval power is exerted in his favour or against him. A wise Ptolemy, seeing the struggle between Rome and Carthage, sought the alliance of the former, and thereby guaranteed his kingdom for many generations. Again a new maritime rivalry was springing up in the Mediterranean. Mehemet Ali had an inkling of the truth when he told Burckhardt, as early as 1815, that England must some day occupy Egypt. But then he thrust the inevitable behind him as a nightmare, and ventured on an independent policy which ended in his own humiliation.

CHAPTER XIII.

NAVARINO, 1827.

We who are familiar with the story of Bulgarian atrocities and of Armenian massacres in these latter days, when the Ottoman empire is being rapidly dismembered, are in a position to take for granted all that can reasonably be said concerning the similar causes which produced the Greek revolution of 1821. It may, therefore, suffice to state that the war of independence was divided into two parts; that during the first half of the struggle the insurgents were so uniformly successful as to lead Europe to believe that the battle had been won by their own unaided efforts; and that, at this crisis, their hopes were shattered by the sudden apparition of Ibrahim Pasha, who, in the course of the next three years, completely turned the tables, and brought the revolted provinces once more under the iron yoke of the Turks.

After the failure of many expeditions by sea and land, Sultan Mahmoud sought the aid of his rebellious

vassal, Mehemet Ali, and by a firman dated January 16th, 1824, appointed him Pasha of the Morea, with orders to reduce it to subjection. Already, in 1821, a small Egyptian force had been sent to Crete, of which island the pasha was made governor as the reward of his services; but this second expedition was to be carried out on a much larger scale, and its remarkable success was well calculated to impress Europe with the fact that Egypt, far from being the victim of invasion, was now capable of taking the offensive under a Moslem Napoleon of its own. It would have been better for Mehemet Ali had he marched at once upon Acre. It was the parting of the ways; he preferred an Oriental policy, and alienated Christian Europe by his cruelties in Greece.

On July 24th, 1824, a squadron of sixty ships of war and a hundred hired transports sailed from Alexandria, carrying an army of 17,000 disciplined troops under the command of Ibrahim. At the beginning of the revolt Ali Pasha, of Yanina, had been slain by Khurshid; the latter had been defeated by the Greeks and put to death by the Porte as a reward for his fidelity; Khusrev the grand admiral had suffered many disasters afloat; and the path now seemed clear for Mehemet Ali to step in and to repeat in Peloponnesus the experiment already commenced in the valley of the Nile.

Ibrahim joined Khusrev at Rhodes, but a naval victory gained by Miaoulis drove him for shelter to Crete, where he remained several months. At last, in February, 1825, he evaded the Greek fire-ships, and landed at Modon, near Navarino. The latter place surrendered in May, and its Greek garrison was treated with a magnanimity it did not deserve after its atrocious massacre of the Moslem women and children when the Turks had capitulated there some years previously. Ibrahim, however, began with clemency; nor was it till afterwards that he indulged in that wholesale system of murder and outrage which has left an indelible stain on his reputation.

After a month spent in contesting every mile of the road, he entered Tripolitza, where, in 1822, the Greeks had been guilty of one of the most barbarous massacres on record upon their Moslem captives. The rebel flotilla, meanwhile, had been creating a diversion in Crete, and also ventured upon a futile demonstration before Alexandria. But the fate of Greece was to be decided neither by fire-ships nor by desultory skirmishes in the hills. Everything depended on the siege of Missolonghi, the northern capital which Reshid-Mehemet, the Turkish Serasker, or commander-in-chief, had been trying to capture since April, 1825. In despair he begged Ibrahim's assistance, and the latter,

having received large reinforcements, crossed the Gulf of Corinth with 10,000 men, joined Reshid, and by skilful operations starved the town into surrender in April, 1826, after a loss of 6000 Egyptians and 20,000 Turks.

Flushed with this success, Ibrahim returned to the Morea, while Reshid, laying siege to Athens, captured it in spite of Cochrane and General Church, whose efforts were thwarted by the jealousies of Greek demagogues. The rebellion had now sunk to the level of guerilla warfare; and Ibrahim, exasperated at the loss of his convoys, began to wreak vengeance by turning the country into a wilderness, and shipping off thousands of women and boys as slaves for his father's flourishing market in Alexandria. So well did he succeed in this hellish purpose that Europe intervened, and by a treaty of London, July, 1826, England, France, and Russia, ignoring the opposition of Austria, sent their combined squadrons to the coast of the Morea. Already, in February, 1827, our admiral, Sir Harry Neale, had warned Ibrahim that slave-running would involve him in war with England. His successor, Sir Edward Codrington, who had commanded the *Orion* at Trafalgar, told the captains of his fleet that it was important to avoid hostilities with Turkey, and that they were to act merely as "conciliators." In September,

therefore, Codrington made an armistice with Ibrahim on behalf of the Greeks, and on this condition the Turco-Egyptian fleet was allowed to enter Navarino. Next day Ibrahim informed him that Cochrane was attacking Patras, and asked permission to go to the rescue. Codrington refused, whereupon Ibrahim slipped out with several ships; the rest of the Turco-Egyptian force followed, but was driven back; and the three admirals, having lost confidence in Ibrahim, decided to enter Navarino and anchor in the midst of the enemy.

The French colonel, Mary, who acted as interpreter for the pasha, told Mr. Senior many years later that Codrington wished Ibrahim to evacuate Greece, which the Egyptian general declined to do without orders from his father. The admiral then warned him and retired; and Ibrahim exclaimed to Mary, "I never saw such people nor heard such language in my life!" To which the colonel replied: "I do not wonder at that, for this is the first time you have ever talked to men who were not your father's subjects."

The three squadrons under the nominal command of Codrington entered Navarino on October 20th, and found the enemy moored three deep in the form of a crescent, numbering one 84-gun battleship, two 74's, five 60's, fifteen 48-gun frigates, twenty-six corvettes, eleven brigs, and five fire-ships, mounting 2082 guns,

and carrying 19,000 men, in addition to some forty armed transports.

The British squadron consisted of the flagship *Asia*, 84 guns, two 74's, three 48's, and five small vessels, a total of 456 guns. The French, under De Rigny, were a little weaker, with 356 guns; the Russians, under Count Heyden, 464 guns, making a total of 27 ships and 1276 guns in the three squadrons.

As the *Asia* led the way past the battery at the harbour mouth, the Turks said that Ibrahim had not given permission for the allies to enter, to which Sir Edward replied that he was not come to receive orders, but to give them, and that if any shot were fired at the allied fleet, that of the Turks would be destroyed, and that he would not be sorry if such an opportunity were given him! He then calmly anchored between the Turkish commodore, 84 guns, and Moharrem Bey, the Egyptian commodore, a 64-gun double-banked frigate. The *Genoa* and *Albion* anchored astern, followed by the Russians, while the French steered to the left-hand side of the land-locked harbour.

Scarcely had the British taken up their positions when Captain Fellowes, of the *Dartmouth*, seeing some activity among the fire-ships, sent a boat to warn them off. The only reply was a volley which killed all the English crew, whereupon Fellowes and the French

admiral each fired a broadside, and the action began. A dense smoke soon rendered it impossible to notice what exactly happened, but the Egyptian Moharrem Bey told Codrington that he did not wish to fight. Our admiral therefore spared him, and first destroyed the Turkish commodore and another ship, both of which dropped away complete wrecks, leaving the *Asia* exposed to the inner line, by whose destructive fire her mizzen-mast was shot away. Moharrem then changed his mind, and fired into the *Asia*, but his ship was soon cut to pieces, and another Egyptian blew up. For three hours the battle was fiercely contested by the Turks, whose squadron was much larger and far more ably fought than that of Ibrahim's contingent. The fire-ships exploded in succession, and, as each of the enemy became disabled, her surviving crew escaped to shore after setting her on fire, so that the greater part was totally destroyed. Thus ship after ship, including that of the Tunisian admiral, was silenced, broke into flames, exploded, or was wrecked; and gradually towards sun-set, out of the sixy-five Turco-Egyptian vessels that had been afloat at 2 p.m., few could be seen above the surface of the waves. On the side of the allies the French and Russians had fought with commendable ardour, the combined losses amounting to 172 killed and 481 wounded—British, 280; French, 179; and Russian 194.

Of the three Turkish line-of-battle ships all had been lost, with more than half their crews; others had suffered according as our shots had reached them; and the enemy's casualties amounted to some 6000 killed and wounded. Our *Asia*, *Genoa*, *Albion*, and *Talbot* were so damaged that they had to be sent home for repairs as soon as reinforcements arrived. Such was the retribution which Ibrahim had incurred by ignoring the traditions of the British navy as it flourished under Nelson's captains: "When in doubt, fight, and you can't be far wrong!" This is what Codrington had done, oblivious of the fact that he was supposed to be a diplomatist while in charge of our Mediterranean squadron, and unable to appreciate Stratford Canning's carefully worded despatches from Constantinople, which left everything to his discretion. The failure of Duckworth at the Golden Horn in 1807 had been due to his letting the Turks befool him, and Codrington now wiped that incident out of the memory of our navy.

And yet in Ottoman politics there is often a secret motive unknown to the British public. The Turkish commodore had orders to kidnap the Egyptian army by embarking them as if for Alexandria, and then bringing them to the Dardanelles. The Egyptian squadron was far the weaker of the two, and the Porte's gratitude had turned to fear and jealousy of its vassal's successes

by land. Ibrahim suspected this at the time, and ascertained its truth later on : thus he and his father, while loudly protesting, took the disaster very stoically. They had saved their army on shore, while the Turkish fleet had been destroyed.

Metternich, wild with rage, spoke of Navarino as an "assassination," and undoubtedly it caused great excitement in England, where the Ministry found they had been playing into the hands of Russia, who invaded Turkey in the following year. Wellington, however, spoke highly in Codrington's favour. The real difficulty was a political one, a facing both ways, a desire to save Greece from Turkey and Turkey from Russia, who was our ally at Navarino. It left to the Czar the credit of assuring Greek independence by the treaty of Adrianople in 1829, and its chief value to us at the present day is a warning to know our own mind and to avoid paper blockades with suspected allies in Levantine waters.

The next question was the evacuation of the Morea. George Canning had died in August, just before the battle, and his successor, Lord Goderich, gave way to Wellington in January, 1828. Palmerston's plan was a joint occupation by 6000 British and as many French troops pending the reorganization of the country as an autonomous vassal state; but as it was doubtful

whether Parliament would consent, the scheme fell through, and a French division of 15,000 men, under General Maison, landed in Greece (September, 1828) and restored order. Meanwhile, our consul, Mr. Barker, threw some light on the situation in Egypt. Mehemet Ali, he said, had guaranteed the safety of British subjects, and although the ambassadors had left Constantinople, not one English, French, or Russian merchant at Alexandria had the least thought of leaving—such was their confidence in the pasha. Thirty Turkish men-of-war and transports and seventeen Egyptian vessels returned to Alexandria with some 5000 Greek slaves.

In August, Codrington appeared off that town, drove back some ships that were going to reinforce Ibrahim, and sent an ultimatum to the pasha threatening to bombard Alexandria if orders were not at once despatched for the evacuation of the Morea. Thanks to Barker, a convention was accordingly signed, and in October Ibrahim returned with less than half of the 42,000 regulars employed during the long campaign. Palmerston took up the matter of the 5000 slaves very warmly, and wanted Peel to hold Ibrahim and his army as hostages for their restitution; but nothing was done beyond liberating some 400 who were willing to return; the greater number of the women preferred

to stay with their Arab husbands, in spite of official entreaties to the contrary.

The Navarino campaign was the fatal mistake in the pasha's career, for it stamped him in the eyes of Christian Europe merely as a Mameluke warrior, and nothing more. He might have left Greece alone; he might have saved Missolonghi and Athens, and guaranteed his own independence in Egypt under the protection of the Powers. Instead of this he aroused the implacable animosity of Palmerston by enslaving the Greek population, and he brought himself into collision with the British fleet. From this moment we begin to lose sympathy for him, because all his efforts are devoted to Mameluke war and rapine, from which no good can result, because the selfishness of his ambition is in no way superior to that of the viziers at the Porte with whom he has to contend. He is developing into a danger to the public peace of Europe in the Eastern question, which he is too weak to solve by his own resources.

CHAPTER XIV.

THE WAR IN SYRIA, 1832, 1833.

For his ability shown during the war Consul Barker was promoted to succeed Mr. Salt as consul-general in Egypt, a post which he held till 1833. Mehemet Ali, he informs us, was very arrogant towards the consular corps, many of whom were dependent on him for a share in his monopolies, or else for permission to dig and export antiquities. The pasha was increasing his army, fearing that, after its war with Russia, the Porte would turn its attention to Egypt. By the advice of M. Jumel, he made the fellaheen cultivate the new Maho cotton, and reaped a large revenue from the seizure of the crops. In 1828, besides the £60,000 annual tribute, he sent £200,000 to Stamboul, and all the money he could spare from this form of "bakhshish" he devoted to his armaments. Mr. Barker has left a valuable note on this subject which deserves to be recorded—

"When I arrived in 1826," he says, "every one declared his conviction that the viceroy could not go on for six

months longer, that he was driving the way to ruin, with madly conceived projects out of all proportion to his means. Yet so far from such result, his projects, deemed impracticable then, were not one-fifth so considerable as those since carried into effect, nor one-tenth so gigantic as the enterprises in contemplation. Since, therefore, we have witnessed the completion of some, and the progress of other projects, which appeared for four years the dreams of a madman, it is fair to infer that we are unacquainted with the extent of his pecuniary resources, and that they are in reality adequate to the execution of his designs. He had a wonderfully good cotton crop this year (1831)—150,000 bales; and in short, if he has not got possession of *Aladdin's Lamp*, there is no accounting for his wealth." *

In 1829, Mehemet Ali was ordered to send his fleet to Stamboul, and a force of 20,000 men against the Russians at Erzerum. He promised to obey, but evaded the summons. He had a genuine grievance against the Porte. Twice he had exhausted Egypt for the wars in Arabia and Greece; the Pashalik of Acre had been promised to him instead of Crete, and Stratford Canning suggested that this should be done in compensation for the evacuation of the Morea. The Porte, however, refused, and the pasha was left the choice between submission and open rebellion. England and France

* Consul-General John Barker (1771–1849), "Syria and Egypt under the last five Sultans." London, 1876. 2 vols. 8vo. A valuable book of reference on Egypt for the years 1826–1833.

were busy both in Spain and in Belgium, Russia had her hands full in Poland, and he decided to raise the first pretext available for the invasion of Syria. He counted, moreover, on the goodwill of France, who had recently sounded him as to an alliance against Algeria. Mehemet Ali was haughty enough to suggest that if the French would lend him their ships under *his* flag, he would soon bring the dey to terms; but Charles X. had the dignity to decline. The pasha, nevertheless, felt anxious lest the conquest of Algiers might extend eastward, and threaten Egypt. Wellington warned him that any tampering with the Algerian question would lead to his prompt deposition, and special missions were sent by us to Cairo in that sense.

Many years later, when the old duke used to bewail our military decadence, he said that at this period of 1830 he could keep Mehemet Ali quiet by merely raising his finger. There is no doubt that the pasha lived in awe of Wellington; and thus, while he abandoned dreams of conquest in Algeria, he hoped that we might leave him free in the East. Nor was he mistaken; and the most remarkable feature of his victorious campaign in Syria is the suddenness with which he "rushed" Europe into granting him his desire.

A pretext was ready to his hand. Ahmed Pasha

"El-Jezzar," or the butcher, who had repulsed Napoleon in 1799, had died in 1804, after a long and infamous reign, being succeeded by his Mameluke Suleiman, who, in turn, had obtained the reversion for his slave Abdullah in 1819. The latter, after two revolts against the Porte, had been saved only by Mehemet Ali, who ransomed him for £10,000, so that Abdullah was bound by gratitude to his liberator.

Now, the Pasha of Egypt was grievously oppressing his fellaheen to the extreme limit of human endurance. Taxation, corvée, military service decimated the male population; thousands needlessly perished in the digging of canals, tens of thousands dragged out a miserable existence under the lash of tax-collectors in the villages, while, in order to evade conscription, young men would either blind themselves of the right eye, or mutilate the right hand, or pull out the front teeth necessary for biting the cartridges of the new musket. But, besides all this, the peasants of Lower Egypt were emigrating across the desert into Syria, and Mehemet Ali therefore begged Abdullah to drive them back into the land of bondage.

The Porte, however, had made Acre a centre of intrigue against the pasha, and caused Abdullah to refuse the iniquitous request. Mehemet Ali then petitioned the sultan, and was told that the Egyptians

were not his private slaves, but the subjects of the empire, free to settle where they pleased without his illegal vexations. Demands were again made for his army and fleet, and for further subsidies, thereby provoking him to revolt, for it is obvious that he could not raise a gigantic revenue for the purpose of assisting the Porte without torturing the fellaheen, and penning them like cattle in their villages.

Khusrev must have smiled as he sent this irritating reply. He was now at the palace, the confidant of the sultan, ever in the front rank as admiral, war minister or grand vizier by turns. He wrote to the pasha, begging that old quarrels should be forgotten, and asking for an asylum near that well-remembered citadel of Cairo, where he had been humiliated in 1803. A few years later (1837), Sir Henry Bulwer describes him as

"A shrewd, bold, illiterate barbarian, very aged, though still vigorous, and rather proud of being shorter and stouter than any other man in office. He had great influence over the sultan, and authority over the Mussulman population, who respected him from the knowledge that he was ready to have every man in the empire drowned, shot, poisoned, or decapitated, if it was necessary to carry out the views of himself or his master." *

* "Life of Lord Palmerston."

Mehemet Ali decided on war, not against the sultan, but against Khusrev, the prime mover of the palace intrigues. An epidemic of cholera delayed him for a time, but on November 1st, 1831, a division of 9000 infantry and 2000 cavalry crossed the Rubicon at El-Areesh, the *Torrens Ægypti*, and proceeded to Jaffa, where it met a strong fleet from Alexandria under Ibrahim as commander-in-chief. Where Napoleon had been harassed by the lawless people of Samaria, Ibrahim was hailed as a deliverer; and, most important of all, the famous Beshir, Lord of the Lebanon, whom Mehemet Ali had succoured in the past, came to the Egyptian camp before Acre, and thus assured the final success of the enterprise.

The fort of St. Jean d'Acre was a pentagon with sides about 400 yards in length. The garrison consisted of some 3000 Turks and Albanians, the sworn ruffians of their master. The bastions were high and strong, ammunition and supplies were abundant, and it was only after a siege of six months, when the garrison had been reduced to one-half of its original number, and the walls had crumbled under the ceaseless fire of a hundred guns and mortars, that it was taken by storm at the end of May, 1832. The Turks, with their usual dilatoriness, had done nothing to relieve it by sea.

Meanwhile the state of affairs at Stamboul enables us to realize the extraordinary good luck of the pasha. By a firman dated May 2nd, Mehemet Ali was outlawed and deposed, the governments of Egypt, Crete, and "Abyssinia" being conferred on Hussein Pasha, who had massacred the Janissaries of the capital in 1826. This nomination, however, which carried with it the command of the army for the reconquest of Egypt, was most distasteful to Khusrev, who wanted it for himself, having provoked Mehemet Ali into revolt for that purpose. Seeing that Sultan Mahmoud was enamoured of the Nizam Jedeed,* Khusrev had thrown all his energy into the task of drilling the new Turkish levies with the aid of European officers; and though the result was far from satisfactory, the army had really improved, and, on its own merits, was worthy of skilful leadership. It was now about to enter on its first campaign, and Khusrev implored the sultan to give him the command. Foiled in this, the infamous vizier, swearing that no rival should reap the reward of his efforts, determined to wreck the expedition, and, as he was now Serasker, or war minister, he began to thwart Hussein at every step. The result of his intrigues was soon apparent, for, although a nominal force of 45,000 regulars assembled at Adana, all the

* Or *New System* of Army Discipline.

principal officers looked to him for reward, set Hussein at defiance, and flung aside their discipline.

After the capture of Acre, Ibrahim secured it as a base of operations, sent Abdullah to Alexandria, and then set out with 9000 fellaheen, 9000 Druse volunteers and Bedouins, and 24 guns towards Damascus. That city opened its gates on June 15th, and the Egyptian general, being asked by the chief of the mosque whether prayers were still to be said for the sultan, ordered that venerable sheikh to be flogged for daring to doubt the loyalty of Mehemet Ali! Aleppo then offered its submission, and Ibrahim, safe in his rear, advanced on Homs, where Mehemet, who had been imposed by Khusrev as second in command under Hussein, decided to give battle, although the greater part of the Turkish army was fifty miles behind. The result of the conflict may be gathered from Ibrahim's bulletin of his victory of July 8th—

"Two regiments of Egyptian cavalry were on the right, the Guard and 11th Infantry and six guns in the centre, two more regiments of cavalry and the Bedouins on the left. The enemy advanced in three columns, but, being attacked by the Bedouins, fell back after a short cannonade. Four regiments of their infantry and three of cavalry were in line, with two guns between each two regiments. Again we repulsed them, but one of their regiments persisted; whereupon four battalions of our Guard in two columns

charged so vigorously that, while they threw the enemy into disorder, our cavalry on the right completed the disaster by putting them to the rout.

"The enemy had 7000 regulars engaged; of these 2000 were killed, and as many taken prisoners. Our loss amounts to 102 killed and 162 wounded.

"Never," concludes Ibrahim, "have I seen such a rout; and I do not hesitate to say that even two or three hundred thousand of such troops would cause me no anxiety. We will beat them, please God, wheresoever we may find them!"

No sooner did news of this disaster reach Hussein than his army mutinied and fled north in a rabble crowd. He managed, however, to collect a force at Aleppo, but as the Turkish fleet had arrived at Alexandretta, he retired thither without delay. On July 17th, by long marches, Ibrahim entered Aleppo, where he was hailed as a deliverer, and after a short rest, set off in pursuit of Hussein, whom he found strongly posted in the pass of Beylan, near the sea. Of the battle of July 29th the Egyptian bulletin says—

"The enemy, seeing us advance, opened fire, but so well did we reply that his batteries were soon silenced. While his left wing was thus annihilated by our artillery, the Guard and the 8th stormed the heights with prodigious valour. The enemy yielded, and, abandoning everything in flight, began to retreat at sunset, leaving us to bivouac on the field.

"Up till now we have taken 80 guns, and killed or captured 13,000 men. The prisoner, Colonel Aarif, declares that they numbered 36,000 regulars at Homs, of whom scarcely 5000 returned to Hussein, so that the number of their fugitives must be immense. Our loss was only twenty."

In consequence of this victory, the Turkish fleet at once abandoned Alexandretta, and Ibrahim, pressing his advantage, sent forward the youthful Abbas (afterwards Pasha of Egypt) to occupy Adana beyond the mountains. Thus, in the space of seven months, the whole of Syria had been lost to the sultan, while, by his strategy and tactics, Ibrahim had raised himself to the first rank among modern generals. Most of the credit is justly his own, but a portion may be reserved for the Frenchman Sève or Suleiman Pasha, who acted throughout as his chief of staff.

Nothing daunted by the enormity of his crime, Khusrev threw all the blame on Hussein (who was recalled and banished to the Danube), and once more asked for the command of the army and the Pashalik of Egypt. Again he was refused in favour of the Grand Vizier Reshid, and once more he determined to ruin the efforts of his rival. The situation was a curious one. Mahmoud seems to have been a monarch gifted with remarkable energy of character and violence of passion, who sought to drown his sorrows in the

flowing bowl and in the excesses of his harem. Twice defeated by Russia, deprived of Greece, terrorized by the Janissaries, he had survived all these humiliations, and was engaged in a civil war with his provincial barons. His attempt to introduce European reforms had made him unpopular throughout his empire, and, in his isolation, he was obliged to turn to his viziers for support. Among these men none seemed so loyal, so able and unscrupulous as Khusrev, and the sultan would never part with him from the palace. Khusrev's price, however, was a heavy one; he would brook no rival near the throne, but, as Bulwer says, would slay any man who ventured between him and his sovereign. He bore an implacable hatred against Mehemet Ali. Both men were "illiterate barbarians," but Khusrev, at least as shrewd and as energetic as the pasha, had had his wits sharpened by a deadlier rivalry with his equals at the Porte, and by a keener diplomatic training, not among paltry Levantine trading consuls at Alexandria, but among independent ambassadors of a weightier calibre. He possessed a sounder knowledge of the latent strength of the empire and of Continental interests involved in the maintenance of its integrity; and he felt that, if he only could retain his influence with the sultan, he was bound to beat Mehemet Ali in the end. Treachery to Hussein or Reshid, the fortune

of war at Acre, Homs, or Beylan, were trifles as compared with his personal supremacy at the Porte. He was the prime minister, while the pasha was a local upstart; and so cleverly did he work that, even after the battle seemed lost, out of the nettle Danger he plucked the flower Safety by turning the victorious rebel into a public nuisance to united Europe.

No wonder that Mehemet Ali was anxious for a compromise, alarmed at Ibrahim's success, and trembling for the fate of his beloved son. Syria, of course, he would not relinquish, but his ambition did not extend beyond; and, now that Ibrahim paused on the threshold of Asia Minor, the father yearned for overtures of peace. Meanwhile he ordered fresh levies in Egypt, and inflicted heavier taxation. A new army of 50,000 men was to be raised; but, owing to self-mutilation, recruits could not be found, and we read that out of one gang of 6000 brought up for examination only 253 were passed as fit for service.

The weakness of the Porte, however, formed his real strength, inasmuch as the Turkish population openly sympathized with Ibrahim against a sultan who had inflicted every possible humiliation on the country. They cared little for the victory of 10,000 fellaheen over 60,000 Turks of the dominant race. At least, that was better than Navarino, than the Russians at

Adrianople. After all, Ibrahim and his officers were true Moslem Ottomans, like themselves, whom they could welcome with open arms. The Pasha of Egypt was a God-sent champion against the Czar.

Now, in August, 1832, if France looked kindly at the rebel, our ambassador, Stratford Canning, on the eve of his departure suggested that a British squadron should be sent to help the sultan. That no such course was taken, he adds, "may or may not be regretted, but the truth is that our premier, Lord Grey, having no ships to spare, could not make up his mind to apply to Parliament for more."

"Could not make up his mind." That has been the cause of most of our difficulties in the Levant, because the strength of our policy does not lie in being for the Turks or against them, or in remaining neutral, but in decision of character which shall prevent our fleet from drifting about in the Eastern Mediterranean. Our Cabinet did not know what to do; it was confronted with a new problem, and pretended that no such problem could exist. The victories or defeats of the pasha were of little consequence as compared with our understanding the Egyptian question which had sprung up like an armed man from the dragon's teeth sown by Napoleon.

So, also, the absence of Stratford Canning from the

embassy for the next ten years may or may not be regretted according as we believe in the wisdom of that diplomatist or otherwise. But the Great "Eltchi" had one virtue—he did know his own mind, and often forced his views on later cabinets at home. Thus, had he remained, he might have succeeded, or he might have brought on his Crimean War twenty years sooner. Yet, looking back over the past, some of us may conclude that perhaps it was better to give Mehemet Ali a fair chance of exposing his worthlessness as a ruler in Syria, and of letting his vaulting ambition overleap itself. In 1832–33 England was fully occupied with her Parliamentary reforms and commercial troubles at home.

Reinforced by the fleet, Ibrahim pushed on from Adana to Konia, while the Turks concentrated at Ak-Shehr, ninety miles further. The grand vizier, Reshid-Mehemet, had taken over the command, and in concert with Khusrev had sent forward a few thousand regulars and 30,000 Bashi-Bozuks. A Georgian Mameluke by birth, Reshid was one of the most honourable men in the public service. With the aid of Ibrahim he had taken Missolonghi and Athens; he had then crushed a rebellion in Albania, which had been fomented by Mehemet Ali, and now, as titular Pasha of Cairo, he was entrusted with the task of driving back the

victorious Egyptians. For this purpose he wisely resolved to play a waiting game, thereby forcing Ibrahim either to pass a terrible winter on the plains, or to retreat, or to attack him at Ak-Shehr under every disadvantage. Whether the plan was good or bad, Reshid as commander-in-chief chose to adopt it, and had the right to put it to the proof. This, however, was denied him by Khusrev, the war minister. Reshid wished to take with him the 45,000 veteran Bosnian troops, with whom he had conquered Albania, and, confident that they were following, he hurried on to Ak-Shehr. No sooner was he gone, however, than Khusrev refused to let these troops leave Stamboul, persuading the sultan that the 10,000 regulars, 40,000 Bashi-Bozuks, and 90 guns already at the front, were ample for the defeat of Ibrahim's 15,000 regulars, and 36 guns; moreover, a victory must be gained without delay, or else Russia would intervene. Mahmoud ordered Reshid to attack the Egyptians at once. In vain did the grand vizier point out that, although stores had been collected at Brusa for 100,000 men for six months, none were sent to him, and his army at Ak-Shehr was starving and in rags. At this crisis General Mouravieff arrived at Stamboul on a special mission from the Czar, and warmly supported Khusrev, with the result that Reshid was abandoned to his fate.

Meanwhile Ibrahim also was in a desperate position; and so dismal did the prospect seem, that on the eve of the final victory Mehemet Ali exclaimed, as he tore his beard, "I have sacrificed my son, I have sacrificed my son!"

Goaded on by the palace, Reshid advanced, and posted his army upon ground with which Ibrahim had already made his men familiar by frequent manœuvres. On the morning of December 21st, in spite of a thick fog, the grand vizier moved to the attack, with the result that his opponent, noticing as the fog cleared away a wide gap between the main body and the left wing, brought out his reserve, pushed it forward on his right, and cut the enemy in two before the centre had been engaged. In trying to rally his defeated left wing, Reshid was captured, and the Egyptian reserve (now the advanced right wing), still making a long wheel to their left, fell upon the rear of the Turks, who were in dense column and unable to deploy. A massacre ensued, and the battle was already half won. Meanwhile, however, the Turks had been successful against the Egyptian centre, and were working round his left when Ibrahim, ordering the 14th regiment to form square, massed his artillery near that point, faced part of his second line about, and, by a decisive charge of cavalry, completed the triumph of the day. In his

tenth bulletin Ibrahim puts his own losses as low as 262 killed, and 530 wounded. On the other hand, 50,000 Turks had been routed, and 7000 Albanian Bashi-Bozuks had passed over to the victors.

The news of the battle of Konia struck the sultan to the ground, but his people hailed it as a decree of God against an impious ruler. Further resistance was out of the question, only unconditional surrender remained. Ibrahim was advancing, amid the enthusiasm of the peasantry, who supplied him with provisions and means of transport across the mountains. Moreover, by a flash of genius, he had placed Reshid at the head of the Egyptian army, and caused all his own proclamations to be issued in the name of the grand vizier. Thus, a fortnight after the battle he had reached Kutaya, 180 miles from Konia, and only 100 miles, or a week's march, from the Bosphorus. This had been done by Egyptian fellaheen in the depth of winter among a dominant race which ruled them as slaves. Fresh troops had joined him, and now with an efficient force of 30,000 regulars Ibrahim threatened to seize the capital if his father's orders were not at once obeyed. Little wonder that such a glorious campaign should fill with admiration every soldier in Europe, and strike consternation into the hearts of the ambassadors. Ibrahim had achieved the impossible. The Egyptian

had defeated the Turk in three pitched battles against odds, had out-fought him, out-marched him, out-manœuvred him, and taken him captive. Yet, such is the paradox inherent in the land of Egypt, that all this time a Turkish Bashi-Bozuk would be going from village to village, flogging the fellaheen, and sending them in gangs, like flocks of sheep, to learn how to conquer his countrymen. With the help of a few score Turkish boys and pashas, and a few hundred sergeants, Mehemet Ali had raised the money and the men for the Egyptian victory over the Ottoman empire. After all deductions made, no praise seems too high for Ibrahim's genius in war.

Then negotiations ensued. One of the causes of Mehemet Ali's success being the popular enthusiasm for him as a champion against the Russians, Nicholas retaliated by offering his alliance to the sultan, who secretly accepted it against the advice of Khusrev. Mouravieff went on a fool's errand to Alexandria, where in vain he tried to frighten the pasha, and a Russian squadron landed 13,000 troops at Hunkiar-Skélési on the Bosphorus. France was playing a double game, supporting Turkey through her ambassador Roussin, and encouraging Mehemet Ali through her consul-general in Egypt. Thus there was danger of France and Russia coming to blows, and bringing on a war in

Europe. Roussin offered the pasha the southern half of Syria, but this was refused by Mehemet Ali, who insisted on all Syria, and the province of Adana besides. He also begged France and England to support his "rights" in accordance with "justice, equity, and their own interests." At the same time Ibrahim threatened to take up his winter quarters in Stamboul; and Roussin, who is praised by Palmerston for his conduct, with the aid of Khusrev, the leader of the anti-Russian party, persuaded the sultan to agree to the convention of Kutaya. The firman of outlawry and deposition dated May 2nd, 1832, was annulled, and a new firman, of May 6th, 1833, granted Mehemet Ali all that he asked for.

CHAPTER XV.

THE TRIUMPH OF MEHEMET ALI.

MEHEMET ALI had obtained his heart's desire—the peaceful possession of Egypt. But his ambition had grown with his conquests, and he talked of his "rights," of "equity and justice," forgetful that, after all, he was but a rebel like the Wahhàbis or the Greeks. Nothing but the presence of a Russian force prevented Ibraham from occupying Stamboul, and acting as mayor of the palace under the orders of his father at Alexandria. Both the czar and the pasha had imaginary claims of their own, and both had to be bought off; so that while the Egyptians retired to Syria, the Russians, having signed the treaty of Hunkiar-Skélési on June 26th, by which the sultan placed himself under the protection of Nicholas, and closed the Dardanelles to the ships of war of other nations, also evacuated the Bosphorus at their leisure.

In 1833 Mehemet Ali was master of Syria and Egypt, but held no firman as to his dynasty. In 1841 he

lost Syria, but obtained the inheritance of Egypt for his family. In the former year he was triumphant, and had imposed himself on Europe. In the latter he had been publicly disgraced, humbled, and stripped of that military prestige which he had so laboriously acquired. On the whole, therefore, he must have made some serious mistakes in his foreign or internal policy, perhaps in both, during the interval.

His personal misfortune was that Wellington did not believe in his power, and that Palmerston never forgave his massacres and enslaving of the Greek population. Both of these statesmen, as general in the field and as war minister respectively, had over-thrown Napoleon, and were the last persons to be imposed upon by any other military adventurer, especially if he enjoyed the support of France. Moreover, they were determined to maintain the integrity of Turkey as against Russia, so that the more the pasha's action tended to weaken the sultan, the more did it become pro-Russian and anti-English. This was the basis of Palmerston's Eastern policy as foreign secretary from 1835 to 1841, and Mehemet Ali's ignorance or defiance of it caused his humiliation.

Again, the pasha had implored the intervention of England and France on behalf of his "rights," and received his reward in spite of the sultan, who, taking

refuge in Mouravieff, dared Ibrahim to advance. Syria, therefore, was a gift from France and England, and thus it was to his interests to be loyal to both countries, and, at any cost, never to let Egypt become a bone of contention between them. By neglecting this, by saying one thing to us and another to our rivals, he brought about the logical sequence in his own discomfiture. He fancied that silencing a consul-general at Alexandria was the same thing as intimidating Palmerston in London.

But his cardinal mistake consisted in taking too much territory, instead of limiting himself to Acre or Damascus. "Syria" is a geographical expression, and not the home of a single race. Its area is 50,000 square miles as compared with the 12,000 square miles of cultivation in Egypt. Add 10,000 square miles from Adana, and we see that the pasha had annexed territory five times as large as Egypt, containing the distinct, and often mutually hostile, provinces of Palestine, the Lebanon, Damascus, Tripoli, Aleppo, and Adana.

Again, until Napoleon's arrival, Syria had been more or less independent; but, in order to drive out the French, large Turkish armies had come, and garrisons remained till the invasion of Ibrahim. Groaning under the yoke of the Porte, the various

populations hailed the Egyptians as their saviours; but, when the first flush of enthusiasm had passed away, and the people awoke to the bitter truth that the modern Pharaoh was worse than the average pasha sent from Stamboul, a reaction set in, and Mehemet Ali found the difference, to his cost. He never thoroughly subdued or organized Syria; he occupied it on false pretences, and when once he had forfeited the goodwill of its people by his tyranny, retreat was inevitable because he had only the limited resources of Egypt to draw upon. Moreover, as Syria had been given to him for the sake of peace, and as he could not secure tranquillity, the Powers were obliged to eject him with ignominy.

Another point is the pasha's system of government in Egypt as applied to Syria. The provincial administration of all Turkey, including Egypt, was tyrannical and bad to the last degree. But Egypt was distinguished by the peculiarity of the "lash" as a potent means of government, no other race of men but the fellaheen being docile enough to submit to being flung on their faces and flogged on the soles of their feet. Some thirty years' use of the "kourbash" in Egypt had unfitted the pasha to rule the hardy mountaineers of the Lebanon, the Nosairi, or the wild tribes of the Jordan. Deprive Mehemet Ali of the

lash, and what he called his "government" falls to pieces. Egyptians might submit, but the Syrians would never yield to such humiliation. They were massacred, and dragooned, and outraged; but they revolted again and again till his evacuation.

Now, Ibrahim, with all his faults, possessed some redeeming qualities, and there is reason to believe that, weary of war, he yearned for peace in his principality. He deserves credit for allowing European consuls to settle in Damascus, and to wear European hats and clothes for the first time in the history of that ancient city. He encouraged trade, the planting of orchards, and the cultivation of waste lands. He set his face against Moslem fanaticism, and often risked his popularity by siding with the Christians. At the age of forty-four, after a hard life, he preferred a good-humoured, paternal *régime*, like that of a lazy pasha from Stamboul, to the task of hunting the natives over hill and dale. When all has been said in their favour, Mehemet Ali and his son were merely two among many scores of pashas of their day, with the same tastes and failings. The fact of having drilled an army did not change their language, religion, or race. Thus there were times when Ibrahim felt weary of pretending to be European, moments when he would have welcomed a compromise with Khusrev, if his

awe of the pasha and love of the dynasty had not braced him up to fight the duel to the bitter end.

It was always the implacable Khusrev who fomented local disturbance, who poisoned the minds of the ambassadors at the Porte where he was now grand vizier. Why had Mehemet Ali allowed him to escape from Cairo in 1804? He rued that clemency thirty years later.

And yet all might have been well if the pasha had not been in such a hurry. But he wanted money, and saw no reason why Syria should not pay its own expenses and supply its own recruits. He therefore sent a fatal letter to his son, ordering him to carry out two measures, the imposition of a poll-tax and the disarmament of the people. Both of these might have been effected gradually, but it was madness to provoke the whole country at once, and to turn the Egyptian garrison into an army of tax-collectors and policemen. The towns gave little trouble, but it was different in the mountains. A revolt broke out in Palestine (1834), which spread so quickly that Ibrahim was besieged in Jerusalem, whence he was only rescued by the landing of Mehemet Ali at Jaffa with reinforcements. Father and son then made a terrible campaign through Samaria and beyond Jordan, after which the pasha returned to Egypt, where he boasted to the

English consul-general of his exploit as a masterpiece in "practical" government! Similar troubles followed in the Nosairi mountains and in the Lebanon, and it was not till 1836 that the warlike Druses and Maronites had been cowed into apparent surrender.

Nor was this all. Having disarmed the natives and turned them into unwilling recruits, orders were given for the seizure of as many transport animals as were needed for the troops. Caravans would be stopped, the goods flung on the ground, and the camels, horses, and mules led away to the military depôts. Thus, if Ibrahim was opening up trade with the one hand, his father caused him to strangle it with the other by rendering all traffic precarious.

"The tax of blood was the least evil. Impoverishment weighed down the spirits of the people; and later, in the hour of conflict, Syria was lost to Mehemet Ali not more by the arms of the sultan and his allies than by a revolt which made the whole land rise as a huge wave throwing off an incubus." *

Then, just as the fellaheen of lower Egypt had fled into Palestine, so now did the Syrian peasantry begin to emigrate north over the Turkish frontier. Before the end of 1837 the country was ripe for rebellion,

* Consul A. A. Paton's "History of the Egyptian Revolution," vol. ii. p. 122. London: Trübner. 2 vols., 8vo, 1876.

turning once more in despair towards the sultan whose yoke it had recklessly exchanged for the heavier one of the Pasha of Egypt. In vain Ibrahim respectfully begged for a little moderation and peace. His father began to distrust him as lukewarm in the cause, and, stung by these groundless suspicions, he grew more morose and sullen, more relentless in the rapine which he was ordered to inflict.

But if the state of affairs was bad in Syria, it was much worse in Egypt, where no language is too strong to picture the misery which existed. The foreign colonies, no doubt, were flourishing under the system of monopolies, but during the second half of the reign, while Europe was amazed at the pasha's conquests, behind the roar of the cannon and the cheering of Levantine traders and consuls, who greeted him as the maker of a new Arab empire, a wail of agony rose from every peasant in the land. Never did Pharaoh treat the alien Jews so harshly as this Albanian major of Bashi-Bozuks treated the native population of Egypt. On this point there is an almost complete consensus of opinion among contemporary writers, although the French sometimes evade it, or else gloss it over with irrelevant panegyrics on his force of character. But the English were practically unanimous, and the denunciations of private travellers were more than

confirmed by a valuable report from Consul-General Campbell, dated January, 1838:—

"If the manufactories of the pasha are prejudicial to the country, his monopolies are no less so, yet the partisans of that system persuade him that it is useful, and that without it he could not support his enormous expenses. The formidable armaments are cruelly burdensome; the pretext being his visionary fear of attack by the Porte. To put an end to these evils he should restore to agriculture a part of the men employed in the army and navy.

"The administration of the Finance is a complete and incomprehensible chaos, nor are any efforts made to remedy the disorder. The accounts are all kept by Copts, who are the only people capable of doing it; but they are universally rogues and thieves, and their accounts are kept in such a way that, although Mehemet Ali has a positive conviction that he is cheated by them, he cannot discover in what manner.

"To sum up—the Government, possessing itself of the necessaries of life at prices fixed by itself, disposes of them at arbitrary prices. The fellah is thus deprived of his harvest, and falls into arrears with his taxes, and is harassed and bastinadoed to force him to pay his debts. This leads to deterioration of agriculture, and lessens the production. The pasha, having imposed high taxes, has caused the high prices of the necessaries of life.

"It would be difficult for a foreigner now coming to Egypt to form a just idea of the actual state of the country as compared with its former state. In regard to the general rise in prices, all the ground cultivated under the Mamelukes was employed for producing food—wheat, barley,

beans, etc., in immense quantities. The people reared fowls, sheep, goats, etc., and the prices were one-sixth, or even one-tenth of those at present. This continued till Mehemet Ali became viceroy, in 1805. From that period until the establishment of monopolies prices have gradually increased; but the great increase has chiefly taken place since 1824, when the pasha established his regular army, navy, and factories." *

This extract shows us that the fellah was better off under the Mamelukes than under the pasha; and for this reason—the old tyranny was a careless one and intermittent. Mehemet Ali, however, brought the new tyranny of Egypt to the refined perfection of a devilish art, and left no loophole of escape for any peasant from lifelong penal servitude. He, as it were, muzzled the ox that trod out the corn; he left nothing for the gleaners in the field; he swept every threshing-floor without a thought for the sufferings of his victims.

And now the end was fast approaching. Lord Palmerston had accepted the post of foreign secretary in Lord Melbourne's Cabinet of 1835–41, and his attention having been attracted to the disturbed condition of Syria as well as to Mehemet Ali's gigantic armaments, he sent a special agent to Egypt to report upon "all the questions which have a statistical character, and a

* Dr. (afterwards Sir John) Bowring's "Report on Egypt and Candia," published as a Parliamentary Blue Book, 1840.

bearing directly or indirectly on the development of the resources of the country." Such was the apparent official motive of Dr. Bowring's visit to Egypt in 1837–40. But more lay beneath the surface. The French asserted that Mehemet Ali was a powerful monarch. The pasha himself boasted of his fleet and of an army of 250,000 men ready to defend his empire. What truth was there in all this? Bowring's Report may be summed up in a few words: "I have seen the nakedness of the land; the pasha's power is a sham, and he is incapable of serious resistance."

Confident in the truth of this information, when everybody seemed against him, and talked of the invincible strength of Mehemet Ali, Lord Palmerston roundly declared that the whole thing was a fraud, and that if the pasha did not keep quiet he would be pitched into the Nile! The viceroy's triumph was over.

CHAPTER XVI.

LORD PALMERSTON'S POLICY.

AFTER the convention of Kutaya, so anxious was Lord Palmerston for peace in the Levant, that he sent Colonel Campbell to replace Mr. Barker, who, as consul-general, had occasioned certain difficulties with the pasha. Our new agent appears to have received instructions to leave Mehemet Ali a free hand; at least, he did nothing to oppose him, and was himself, after six years' residence, 1833–39, superseded by Colonel Hodges. Thus the pasha was not a victim, but the master of the situation, and no prince threw away greater chances than he at the height of his power. He ignored the lesson to be drawn from Napoleon's failure—that naval supremacy in the Mediterranean belonged to England, and not to France; both countries had for a moment united to crush him at Navarino, both had afterwards assured him the government of Syria. But he now listened to French intrigues, and, by attaching himself to Louis Philippe,

whom Palmerston cordially distrusted, drove England to insist that Egypt should never be under French domination so long as we controlled the sea approaches to that country. Moreover, he was aggressive, and tried to dictate as mayor of the palace at Constantinople. He made himself a public nuisance when he might have quietly devoted the last fifteen years of his reign to the regeneration of Egypt.

On May 25th, 1838, Colonel Campbell informed Lord Palmerston that—

"The pasha had stated his intention of declaring his independence, that he would wait a reasonable interval for a reply from the British Government, in the hope that measures would be taken to preserve the peace at the same time as his independence was recognized."

It is important to bear this fact in mind, as French writers contend that we wantonly attacked the pasha, who was anxious to live in peace with the sultan.

On June 5th Lord Palmerston wrote to our ambassador at Paris—

"My own opinion has long been made up. We ought to support the sultan heartily and vigorously with France, if France will act with us; without her, if she decline. I foresee difficulty in getting the Cabinet to take any vigorous resolve. Very few public men in England follow up foreign affairs sufficiently to foresee the consequences of events which have NOT happened."

On June 8th he wrote again—

"The Cabinet agreed that it would not do to let Mehemet Ali declare his independence, and separate Egypt and Syria from the Turkish empire. That would result in a conflict between him and the sultan, the Turks would be defeated, the Russians would fly to their aid, and a Russian garrison occupy Constantinople and the Dardanelles, which, once in their possession, they would never quit. We are prepared to give naval aid to the sultan against Mehemet, and intend to order our fleet to Alexandria, so as to give Mehemet an outward and visible sign of our inward resolve. We should like the French to go there too at the same time.

"I write this on the supposition that France is honest, and can be trusted. *It must not be forgotten that one great danger to Europe is the possibility of a combination between France and Russia*, which, though prevented at present by the personal feelings of the Czar, may not always be as impossible as it is now."

He then proposed a meeting of the Powers at London to give their joint support to the sultan, so that the pasha might either abandon his scheme, or else the matter be settled without disturbing the peace of Europe.

Henry Bulwer, at Constantinople, then suggested a certain degree of independence in the internal affairs of Egypt; to which Palmerston replied:

"The Turkish empire, which has endured for centuries, is likely to outlive the creation of yesterday, such as is

Mehemet Ali's authority. To frame a system of future policy in the East upon the accidental position of a man turned seventy would be to build on sand; *and no one can tell what will come when Mehemet Ali goes.*"

Bulwer had just drawn up a commercial treaty with Turkey which struck a death-blow at the pasha's monopolies, and thus it became more important for the latter to establish his independence, otherwise his finances were ruined.

Meanwhile Sultan Mahmoud, in spite of the warning of our ambassador, Lord Ponsonby, decided to attack his powerful vassal. An army was collected at Sivas under the Serasker Hafiz Pasha, who was assisted by Moltke and other German officers; and as Ibrahim barred the western road through Adana, this army had drifted eastward and south to Birejik on the Euphrates, where it concentrated in May, 1839, to the number of 50,000 regulars and 30,000 Bashi-Bozuks.

On his part, Mehemet Ali, having informed the consuls that he would pay no more tribute till his hereditary right was acknowledged, suddenly departed for the Soudan, in October, 1838, penetrated as far as Senaar in the futile search for gold, and returned to Cairo in March, 1839, when he sent orders to Ibrahim to attack the Turks.

The credit of the victory of Nezib, fought on June

24th, may fairly be given to the Frenchman, Suleiman Pasha, whose advice was followed by Ibrahim, while the counsels of Moltke were rejected by the foolish Hafiz. The Turkish army had ceased to exist, and the capital lay once more at the mercy of the invaders. Mahmoud, however, did not survive to learn of the disaster. Ever since the defeat of Konia his health had broken down, and his sceptre had fallen more and more into the hands of Khusrev, who, "though every now and then in temporary disgrace, kept his foot on the neck of every subordinate." As Khusrev had opposed the campaign of Nezib, he was out of office at the death of Mahmoud, on June 30th; but no sooner was Abdul-Mejid proclaimed than he became once more grand vizier, and held the post long enough to ruin the pasha in the negotiations for the Treaty of London.

Then a strange event happened. The Admiral Ahmed Fevzi, a former *protégé* and now a rival of Khusrev, feeling that his head was forfeit to the implacable grand vizier, decided on an act of treachery which brought matters to a climax. Deceiving his second in command, Admiral Walker, he sailed with nine battle-ships, eleven frigates, and four brigs, containing 21,000 men, and surrendered them all to Mehemet Ali at Alexandria on July 14th, 1839. His plea was that Khusrev had poisoned Mahmoud, and therefore it

was his duty to save the empire. He was welcomed with effusion, and the pasha told the consuls that no peace was possible till the infamous Khusrev was ejected from office. His speech to the Turkish officers deserves to be recorded—

"My children," said he, "we are all of one nation, and no one must say 'I am an Egyptian, or I am of Stamboul.' We have one faith and one sovereign, whom we must free from his enemies. Our monarch is a flawless diamond, and if foul breath tarnishes it, it will not be ours. I refer to the infamous Khusrev, whose counsels have proved so pernicious. If he remains grand vizier, the empire is ruined. Let us, therefore, render him impotent for harm."

This sealed the pasha's fate. Lord Palmerston did not care a piastre either for Khusrev or for Mehemet Ali; what he wished to avoid was the Russian occupation of Constantinople, and he therefore negotiated with Marshal Soult, the French ambassador in London.

Louis Philippe was playing a double game, loyal to the sultan as against Russia, but also encouraging the pasha so as to increase French influence in Egypt. Palmerston had been in favour of the autonomy or independence of Christian Greece, but he saw that there was not room enough for two great Moslem states in the Levant, especially with the Czar at the Golden Horn, and the French in Cairo.

In this mind he wrote to Bulwer at Paris—

"The more I reflect, the more I am convinced that there can be no permanent settlement without making Mehemet Ali withdraw into his original shell of Egypt. He seems to be conscious of his own inability to resist united Europe."

While France held out Russia came forward, and Baron Brunnow said that the Czar would unite with England, Austria, and Prussia, either with or without France; indeed, that he personally preferred France should be left out.

On December 6th, Palmerston complained of the proposed increase of the French squadron at Toulon, and added—

"I saw Captain Cogan to-day, just home from Bombay through Egypt. He saw Mehemet at Cairo, after his ducking in the Nile, and thought him looking much out of spirits and careworn."

Unfortunately for himself, Colonel Campbell had been advocating the pasha's tenure of Syria; he was promptly recalled, and superseded by Colonel Hodges, of whom Palmerston wrote in March, 1840—

"The accounts sent by Hodges lead me to think that the pasha will end by yielding. He was very angry, violent, and vehement in asserting that he will never give way. *All this indicates weakness and internal fear.* The Mehemet Ali cry in Paris and elsewhere is got up by

Mehemet Ali himself, and we can never allow that he, acting through a fictitious public opinion in France, shall dictate to us ; neither, indeed, can France herself, even if it be the real and deliberate opinion of France, give law to Europe. Let the French say what they like, they cannot go to war with the four Powers in support of Mehemet Ali."

Meanwhile, the French were shuffling their ministers and envoys like a pack of cards. Under the Molé cabinet Soult had been ambassador in London ; under Soult, Sebastiani ; and on March 1st, 1840, Thiers sent over Guizot, who, in turn, became premier a few months later. Palmerston's opinions about them all is expressed in a letter to Lord Granville, April 16th—

"It has long been quite evident that the French Government have been deceiving us about Buenos Ayres, as they have done about almost every other matter in which we have had communications with them, such as Spain, Portugal, Greece, Tunis and Egypt, Persia, etc., upon all of which their language and their conduct have been directly at variance. The truth is, however reluctantly one may avow the conviction, that Louis Philippe is a man in whom no solid trust can be reposed."

M. Thiers now tried to prolong negotiations through the summer, and thus save another year to the pasha, as the fleets could not act on the coasts of the Levant in the winter. He therefore coaxed Mehemet Ali to yield in some trifles, and then began to submit these

paltry concessions for serious deliberation. The plan was discovered; Palmerston threatened to resign on July 5th, and Lord Melbourne being forced to submit, a treaty was signed by the four Powers on July 15th. Thus, as Bulwer says, "the mine by which M. Thiers meant to blow up Lord Palmerston was met by a countermine which blew up M. Thiers." By the terms of this convention, if Mehemet Ali accepted his state of vassalage he might have Egypt for his family and Palestine for his own lifetime. If he did not accept this offer in ten days, Palestine was forfeited, and Egypt alone remained open; if he sulked for another ten days, then Egypt itself might be lost, and he and his family would be outlaws in the eyes of Europe.

All through the spring of 1840 the old pasha had been trying in vain to bully and cajole Colonel Hodges as he had formerly treated Colonel Campbell during many years. On one occasion Hodges reported that Mehemet Ali was talking about his "rights," and Palmerston promptly answered—

"Remind the pasha that he has no rights except such as the sultan has conferred, and that the sultan is entitled to take away that which he has given, and may probably do so if his own safety should require it; and that if in such a case the sultan should not have the means of self-defence, he has allies who may possibly lend him those means. You should also take an occasion of suggesting to the mind of

Mehemet Ali that to a garrison which capitulates in time, honourable conditions are granted; but that a garrison which insists on being stormed, must take the chances of war."

Nevertheless, the pasha, trusting to France, began to resist till Rifaat Efendi came from the Porte to notify the decision of the sultan. He then played the *rôle* of injured innocence.

"These propositions," he said, "are evidently absurd, and of a nature to cause my ruin. France is ready to aid me, has more than once offered her intervention; but I have always refused it because my intention is not to allow Christian troops to ravage the territory of Moslems, and I am ready to sacrifice my life and all I possess to my patriotism."

To the consuls he said—

"My reply to Rifaat is what you ought to expect from me. I cannot accept the terms; and you know the character of Mehemet Ali too well to suppose that he will allow himself to be buried alive."

On September 5th Rifaat and the consuls saw the pasha's secretary, Sami Bey, who was told that the twenty days of grace had passed, and was asked for the final decision of Mehemet Ali. Sami answered—

"We have already accepted Egypt; but as to Syria, the pasha's non-acceptance not being a refusal, he wishes to submit a request which he flatters himself you will communicate to your courts."

This pretext for gaining time being rejected, the Porte at once notified the pasha's deposition, with the blockade of Egypt; and the four consuls-general left Alexandria while the ambassador of Louis Philippe openly threatened the sultan with war. At this period Lord Palmerston's letters are very amusing.

"Tell M. Thiers," he writes, "that if France throws down the gauntlet we shall not refuse to pick it up; and that if she begins a war, she will to a certainty lose her ships, colonies, and commerce before she sees the end of it; that her army in Algeria will cease to give her anxiety, and that *Mehemet Ali will just be chucked into the Nile. It would certainly be a good thing if he could be got rid of altogether*, yet that is improbable, for he will give in long before matters come to such a point. We do not want to oust him from Egypt if he is content to spend the rest of his days there as a faithful servant."

The battle was won, and Khusrev was free to retire from the post of grand vizier in June, for his ambition had been achieved, and his implacable vengeance gratified by the treaty of London, which dealt with Mehemet Ali as with a public nuisance.

CHAPTER XVII.

THE LAST CAMPAIGN.

OPERATIONS began by the Frenchman, Suleiman Pasha, Governor of Beyrout, telling the consuls that Mehemet Ali had rejected the decision of the sultan, and that Syria was in a state of siege. Ibrahim was at Damascus with a well-equipped army of 40,000 regulars; his troops had routed the Turks at Nezib in the previous year, and were capable of making a desperate resistance before evacuating the country. Moreover, the prestige of the pasha was still in the ascendant, and he could point to a total array of 250,000 men under his standards, of whom 130,000 were regulars and 40,000 sailors of the fleet. As a counter-blast he issued three proclamations, the one declaring that the French were coming to his aid; the second that he was the champion of Islam against the infidels; and the third, addressed to the Maronites, warning them that an English occupation would mean the triumph of the Druses over the Catholics of the Lebanon. The Syrians, however, began

a rising on such a scale that Ibrahim abandoned the north, and concentrated upon Damascus. Suspected by his father, harassed by contradictory orders, he was ready to fight or to retreat while there was yet time. But he saw the impossibility of watching a long line of harbours against a superior navy which was supported by a hostile population. On the other hand, one or two successes, followed by a leisurely withdrawal, would have formed a handsome finale to his military career; winter was coming on, the fleets could not remain off a dangerous coast, and if he could only fling a landing force back upon its ships he might claim a peace with honour. His sudden collapse was as extraordinary as his former victories, and may be imputed to his weariness or disgust with his father.

Hostilities commenced with the arrival of a British squadron under Stopford and Napier, assisted by some Austrian ships and 4000 Turkish regulars. A landing was effected near Beyrout, and that town was bombarded, but its large garrison prevented its capture. Ibrahim then advanced from Baalbek to oppose Napier, who had pushed forward a battalion of English marines and four battalions of Turks in order to cut off Beyrout from the rear. On September 24th an engagement took place near Brumana, when the Egyptians retired with precipitation. This was followed up by the

deposition of old Beshir, and the appointment of his relative, Kasim, to the Emirate of the Lebanon. One Englishman deserves special mention, Richard Wood, who, as political officer from the Embassy, assembled the sheikhs and explained the true nature of the situation at a moment when our neglect or want of skill in handling these leaders might have thrown them back into the arms of Ibrahim, and enabled him to make a stout resistance.

On October 8th a decisive action was fought, wherein the Turks stormed the heights of Kalaat Meidan, and after desperate fighting restored that national prestige of their dominant race over the Egyptian fellaheen, which should never have been lost at Konia and Nezib. Napier and Omar Pasha and Colonel Hodges were present, and Mr. Paton, also an eye-witness, says that "Ibrahim had to throw himself into the gorge, not twenty-five men of any of his corps remaining together at sunset, and he himself escaped with difficulty, accompanied by a few horsemen."

Suleiman then evacuated Beyrout and joined his chief, who fell back on Damascus. Sidon capitulated, and Stopford sailed down to Acre, where he arrived on November 2nd. The squadron consisted of three first-rates, four 74's, three frigates, and three steamers, with three Austrian frigates, and a Turkish 74, under Walker.

The landing force amounted to 3000 Turks, and a few Austrians and English. Against this the town possessed 147 guns on the sea walls, and five field batteries, with a sufficient garrison for the defence. On the 3rd, Napier, with half the squadron, steered for the outer batteries on the north side, while the other division entered the harbour and attacked the south or inner face. The action had become general when suddenly the whole fortress was illumined with a blaze of light—the chief magazine, containing thousands of barrels of powder, had exploded. It would be impossible, says one authority, to describe the devastating effects of our fire combined with this catastrophe. Colonel Schultz, commandant of the town, made, however, a gallant defence, and the fellaheen stuck to their guns as bravely as at Alexandria in 1882; but he had not reckoned on our coming in so close, and the result was that most of his shot flew over our hulls. Paton says that, by the explosion, two entire regiments were annihilated, and every living creature within the area of 250 yards square ceased to exist. At sunset the battle was at an end. The garrison escaped during the night, and the allies entered next morning, the confusion being increased by a series of explosions which continued among the burning ruins for three days, in spite of every effort to check them.

Thus did the third siege of Acre reveal to Mehemet Ali, as the first had done to Napoleon, the supremacy of naval power in the Levant. And yet all this time there was lying idle at Alexandria his combined fleet of Turkish and Egyptian vessels—21 battle-ships, 17 frigates, 18 brigs, with 40,000 men. Far from creating a diversion, and withdrawing some of our squadron in pursuit, no effort was made to embark his doomed army at an early stage of the retreat. The Turkish officers had repudiated their admiral, Fevzi, their ships were dismantled, and the Egyptians had to guard their Ottoman captives. Captain Fisher, with a few cruisers in the offing, dared them to come out, while the Levantine colony ridiculed the enrolment of a national guard drawn from the donkey-boys and water-carriers of the town. To such a depth had the pasha fallen in the space of a few weeks.

And now the last act of the drama had begun. Ibrahim, who had so often led his docile fellaheen to victory, was called upon to show his generalship in time of trouble; Suleiman, who had survived the horrors of Moscow and of the Beresina, was again to prove his indomitable courage in the peninsula of Sinai. Let it be recorded to the honour of the Egyptian army, that every officer and man did his duty, and maintained his discipline to the end.

On December 29th, amid the admiration of the populace, the retreat commenced. Sixty thousand troops and 20,000 camp-followers, women and children, left Damascus in perfect order for their memorable march to the south. The country was up in arms against them, and for safety they took the eastern road beyond Jordan. Arrived at Mezerieb, fifty miles, after a week's slow travelling, Ibrahim sent Suleiman with the artillery and baggage towards Akaba, while he marched for the Syrian desert in the hope of reaching El-Areesh.

After a month's terrible journey, Suleiman eventually arrived at Cairo with 7000 men, and most of the 200 cannon with which he had started, his route having been by way of Petra, Akaba, and Suez.

Ibrahim's main body, of which he brought up the rear, suffered more severely, and by the time it had reached the southern end of the Dead Sea, his guards and line regiments and cavalry had melted away under the ceaseless attacks of the Bedouins. Colonel Alderson, who witnessed Ibrahim's arrival, says that out of 62,000 from Damascus only 30,000 reached Gaza, and these were in a state of destitution. Sulei-man had saved 7000; so that some 25,000 must have perished in the course of a month's retreat. But the American consul at Cairo, Mr. Gliddon, declares that

of the 80,000 who left Damascus, only 15,000 effective troops remained, that about 5000 went into hospital, of whom few were saved, and that of the camp-followers 5000 may be taken as the number which survived. "Such," he exclaims, "was the result of a few European ships, and a handful of Austrian and British marines, co-operating with a small Turkish army and the maddened vengeance of an outraged Syrian population!"

Mehemet Ali still hoped that the French fleet might come to his aid. Louis Philippe and M. Thiers, however, flinched from such a step, and the retirement of the latter enabled his successor, M. Guizot, to enter the European alliance. Thus the climax approached. On November 8th, M. Cochelet, the French consul-general, was publicly insulted by Mehemet Ali, who, turning to those about him, complained that he had been deceived by France, that his disasters were due to her pernicious counsels, and that in future he would be guided by his own opinions. Next day the news of the fall of Acre filled him with despair, and he sent orders to Ibrahim to evacuate Syria; he offered to give up the Turkish fleet, and to obey the sultan if he could be left in possession of Egypt. At this juncture Napier arrived, and, having received copy of a despatch from Palmerston to Ponsonby, with the old naval pluck of Sidney Smith in 1799, speedily

settled matters on his own responsibility. He wrote the pasha a friendly letter, and was then welcomed to an audience. Consul Larking gave good advice, and there is a native tradition to the effect that, when Napier interviewed the viceroy in Ras-et-Teen Palace, he said, "If your highness will not listen to my unofficial appeal to you against the folly of further resistance, it only remains for me to bombard you, and by God, I *will* bombard you, and plant my bombs in the middle of this room here, where you are sitting!" Thereupon the pasha succumbed, and a convention was written out and signed. But, just as the senior admiral, Lord Keith, had overruled Smith's wise convention of El-Areesh with Kléber, so now did Stopford and Sir Charles Smith wax furious at Napier's breach of discipline in granting the pasha's army a retreat with all the honours of war. Palmerston, however, supported him. "Napier for ever!" he wrote, "I thought Carlos da Ponza would do all that man could do, and drive the Egyptians out of Syria." The Porte and ambassadors nevertheless disapproved, and a compromise was effected, namely, while Napier's personal guarantee was officially repudiated, Palmerston stated that the Powers would advise the sultan to give the pasha the hereditary tenure of Egypt.

It was for these reasons that Colonel Rose (afterwards

Lord Strathnairn) refrained from destroying Ibrahim's army as it lay helpless at Gaza, and, when transports arrived, the last remnants of the ill-fated gallant troops were conveyed to Egypt. On the other hand, scarcely had Napier signed the convention than a terrible storm drove the British fleet for shelter to Marmoricé Bay, in Asia Minor, where, Paton says, Napier was much gratified at being received by the ships with three cheers and the rigging manned.

"Thus it will be seen," writes Bulwer, "that the forces of Ibrahim, when confronted with a small resolute force of Europeans inspiriting a Turkish one, and aided by a friendly population, was like a flock of sheep which Don Quixote mistook for an army. Guizot said that the whole question depended on the strength of the pasha. The French considered him strong enough to resist us. Had they been right, the allies would have had to give way, and France without an effort have been triumphant. As it was, the French were wrong. Mehemet Ali had been ignominiously worsted; the French therefore had to give way, and submit to the consequences of their erroneous opinion."

This exposure of the Mehemet Ali fraud was entirely due to Lord Palmerston, who based his conviction on Bowring's report on the poverty of Egypt. The pasha's supporters declared that he was invincible, and when Palmerston suddenly proved the contrary,

they changed their note, said that England was a bully, and implored mercy for the viceroy who had enriched them with his iniquitous monopolies.

But, first, complete submission had to be made; and in January, 1841, the arch-rebel, who had spared none in the path of his ambition, addressed to the grand vizier (not Khusrev) the following letter:—

"Thus, then, when your highness shall, please God, have taken note of my prompt submission, you will lay it at the feet of the pity of my august and powerful sovereign, of whom I am so proud to be the faithful servant; and you will employ your good offices in order to cause a man advanced in age and faithful, who has grown old in service, to experience without ceasing the effects of his master's clemency."

On receipt of this, Palmerston obtained the consent of the Powers to a joint request, asking the Porte to bestow the inheritance of Egypt on the pasha. This memorandum of January 30th was followed by the firmans of February 13th and June 1st, 1841, and Mehemet Ali was left in peaceful possession of the province which he had won by the massacre of the Mamelukes thirty years previously.

CHAPTER XVIII.

THE OLD AGE OF MEHEMET ALI.

And now, when Egypt had been conferred upon him by the sultan and the powers, the viceroy was too old to enjoy the coveted prize. In 1838 he had told Bowring, "If I had ten years to devote to this country, I would change the appearance of it." In 1841 he had still eight years to live, but he was a broken man, and it would be absurd to hold him to the fulfilment of his promise. Others might congratulate him, and declare that he had defied Palmerston and won Egypt, after all; but Mehemet Ali knew better—the iron had entered into his soul. For the first time in his life he had been beaten, and he never recovered from the humiliation to his pride. What was Egypt but a remnant of that Arab empire which he ruled previous to the fall of Acre? what was vassalage compared with his haughty claim to independence, to dictating at the Porte? He had loved to impose his yoke by the sword, and the anti-climax of Napier's threat to bring the palace of

Ras-et-Teen in ruin about his ears was an insult which could not be forgotten. Egypt—*his* Egypt—as a formidable power had vanished, and nothing remained but a small province on the road to India, the retention of which he owed to Palmerston's contemptuous good-nature. No one felt the truth of this more than the pasha himself.

Moreover, his occupation was gone. Egypt had been merely an estate whence he drew the resources for the maintenance and expansion of his fame abroad, and the delight of his life for the past twenty years had been to assert his influence in foreign affairs—in Greece, Crete, Macedonia, Anatolia, Syria, Bagdad, Mecca—in every province of the sultan's dominions. At a moment's notice he was deprived of all these elements of excitement, and dismissed into retirement. He had despised Napoleon for abdicating to Elba, but he himself was now in much the same plight. Nevertheless, he made a last effort. As his army had been reduced to 18,000 men, he caused Alexandria to be fortified by French engineers, and sent Said Pasha to the Porte to beg for a more generous firman. All he received for his lavish expenditure was the rank of "sadr-àzam," or grand vizier, thus reaching the level of Khusrev after forty years' rivalry.

In the interior things went from bad to worse; or

rather, the truth was now laid bare. His vast army had to be disbanded, and thousands of officers clamoured for civil employment. In 1842 a murrain of cattle, followed by a Nile flood, half ruined the country; locusts arrived in 1843, and the villages were depopulated. The machine of government had stopped working, a panic set in among the local governors, and a council in Cairo made a famous report, which forms the most damning native judgment on the pasha's failure as an administrator. Mr. Paton says—

"The report showed that when one village had been depopulated and could not pay its taxes, the deficit was thrown on its neighbours; and the fisc was inexorable in insisting on the maximum. It went into minute details, proving that the magnificent public works carried on by unpaid labour were the chief cause of depopulation, and there is no doubt that this was one of the principal causes of the misery and exasperation of the people. Mehemet Ali, having ceased to recognize any landed property that was not his own, would not even admit that the peasants had a right to their own labour. Slaves instead of freeholders was his motto, poorly compensated for by some showy public works on the models of Europe."

The difficulty was how to break this unpleasant news to the old man, who rarely issued from his harem. He feared deposition at the hands of Ibrahim, and talked of abdication and retirement to Mecca. Such was the

public anxiety that the consuls intervened. A reconciliation was effected with his loyal son, and matters improved a little for the next two years.

Meanwhile Ibrahim's health had quite broken down, and he was ordered to make a tour in Europe, accompanied by the young Nubar, destined to be prime minister of Egypt forty years later under the English. From Italy Ibrahim passed to Paris, where he had a magnificent reception, and then he reached London in June, 1846. Here he became the lion of the season among the public, who spoke of him as "Abraham Parker," and, after a series of visits to different towns, he was conveyed in the man-of-war *Avenger* to Alexandria, where he arrived during his father's absence at Stamboul.

Mehemet Ali had at last accepted an invitation to pay homage to the sultan. He was welcomed with the honours due to his grand-vizieral rank, and, on being ushered into the audience chamber, he wished to prostrate himself and kiss his master's feet. But Abdul-Mejid raised him, and bade him be seated. This interview was followed by one of a more dramatic nature, when the old enemies Khusrev and Mehemet Ali, octogenarians both, embraced with effusion, and agreed to forget the past. Their last meeting had been in 1803, when the pasha had led Khusrev out of prison in Cairo citadel, and suffered him to return to the Porte.

But though his arrival was a triumph, the sojourn was cruel. The courtiers upbraided "le vaincu de l'Angleterre" with his faults, his reverses and misfortunes. These reproaches and the bitterness of his fallen ambition completed the ruin of his health. He returned to Egypt scarcely the shadow of his former self. On his way back he paid a visit to his native town of Kàvala, which he had not seen since 1799, when he had quitted it as a soldier of fortune to carve out an empire with his sword. The island of Thasos had been bestowed on him, and he left many marks of his liberality towards the benevolent establishments which are still endowed by his successors.

In Egypt he soon resigned the control of affairs, not to Ibrahim, whose state of health rendered him incapable, but to Abbas, his grandson by Toussoun. Yet Mehemet Ali's last great public act must be recorded. In April, 1847, he laid the foundation-stone of Linant and Mougel's Barrage amid a crowd of some 40,000 spectators, and of fellaheen who had been called out for this corvée. He wished to build it with stone from the Pyramids, after the manner of the citadel and walls of Cairo, and was only deterred from his purpose by the horrified Frenchmen pointing out that it would be cheaper to use fresh material from the quarries!

Again Ibrahim was ordered abroad by his physicians,

and during his absence his old father went to Naples, where he heard of the deposition of Louis Philippe. Loyally remembering how that schemer had assisted him in 1840, Mehemet Ali determined to head a great expedition against France, in order to restore his ally to the throne. His attendants conveyed him back to Alexandria, whither Ibrahim quickly followed on hearing the news of his sire's imbecility. A Council of Regency was formed, and in July, 1848, the Porte recognized Ibrahim as lawful heir to the pashalik. He accordingly paid homage at Constantinople, but soon after his return succumbed to a malady which had been undermining his constitution for many years. His lamented death in November led to the recall of Abbas from Mecca, and the latter also, in his turn, proceeded to Constantinople for the firman of investiture.

History must record that the first acts of Abbas were to undo all that his grandfather had done—good, bad, or indifferent. He abolished the iniquitous monopolies, threw trade open, cut down the army to 9000 men, closed the factories, the schools, and other pretentious institutions, dismissed many European officials, and let it be understood that he favoured old-fashioned Turkish ways and Moslem fanaticism rather than Mehemet Ali's weakness for Levantine civilization. In the eyes of Abbas whatever was, was wrong; he would have none

of it. He had come into his kingdom, and brooked no opposition to his morose and taciturn will.

It was time for the old lion to die when his first successor had thus annihilated the edifice so laboriously erected, when the destroyer was the son of his beloved son Toussoun, over whose untimely corpse he had wept like David over Absalom. Forty years previously Ibrahim Bey, in acknowledging the genius of Mehemet Ali, had protested against his treachery and heartlessness. Bardisy, and Elfy, and Shahin, with all their Mamelukes, Saoud and Abdullah with the Wahhàbis, Nimr and the Soudanese, whom he had hunted down as slaves, the Greeks, the Syrians, and his own fellaheen were now all fully avenged by Abbas. His most implacable critics, Gliddon, Holroyd, Madden, and many others, whose pages burn with fire as they record the ceaseless misery of the Egyptian race under his tyranny, now found their judge in Abbas. Not the harshest word in these pages directed against Mehemet Ali while he was at the height of his power can equal the contemptuous scorn with which Abbas Pasha treated the founder of the Khedivial dynasty.

Alone in his gloomy palace of Shubra, which is still haunted by his shade, all but forgotten by his family, the consuls and the public, the old man passed peacefully away in his dotage on August 2nd, 1849, in

the eightieth year of his age, and the forty-fourth of his long and eventful career as Pasha of Egypt. He was buried by the side of his wife, the good princess Amina, in the family vault at Imam Shaféiy, near the citadel of Cairo.

CHAPTER XIX.

THE CHARACTER OF MEHEMET ALI.

It is exceedingly difficult to do justice to the character of the Great Pasha, and perhaps the simplest way to arrive at a satisfactory decision may be to separate the various periods of his reign, and to draw a distinction between his conduct towards the Moslem Orientals on the one hand, and his policy towards Christian Europeans on the other.

There was nothing mean or paltry in Mehemet Ali, nor did he abuse his power in wreaking petty vengeance on individuals. He had no regard for human life or suffering, but he never slew or tortured from caprice. He kept a very large harem, and he had many, many children, of whom only some ten survived him; but no breath of scandal has sullied his private morals, and that, too, in a generation when the vilest accusations were made against so many of his contemporaries. His glory and his misfortune lay in this, that he was a remarkable instance of what is possible among those

old Greek races which have accepted Islam and turned Turk without losing their kinship to more civilized Christian nations. Born on the frontiers of East and West, he lived in an epoch when the Cape route was about to be abandoned for a revival of the more ancient road through Egypt. A great problem was thrown upon him, the import of which he did not realize, for, while above all other men he stood in need of a sound political education, his unprecedented good fortune at the outset caused him to trust in his own untutored genius, and to despise that knowledge the want of which rendered his efforts barren in the end.* He rose to the surface as a major of Albanians, and he won over the sheikhs because he was a genuine leader of men, a striking personality, the heir and disciple of Napoleon in the East, whom he resembled in energy and ambition. He possessed the same appetite for work, the same freedom from mental fatigue, a love for details combined with a grasp of the government as a whole.

In stature he was rather short, but of powerful build, with handsome features and a piercing glance. His hands were small and shapely, he was scrupulously neat in his dress, exacting in the forms of etiquette, but affable and sympathetic towards those whom he

* He did not learn his alphabet till the age of forty, when he took lessons from a negress slave in his harem.

delighted to honour. He was in all things a thorough Osmanli of the highest type, and although he had a slight knowledge of Arabic, which he spoke with a Turkish accent, he despised it as a language fit only for slaves.*

Mehemet Ali made a good beginning by destroying the Mamelukes; he may have been justified in seizing the lands in order to improve the finances, and in levying troops for the purpose of arousing a healthy national spirit. He did good work in crushing the Wahhàbis and in restoring the holy cities to united Islam. His invasion of the Soudan has also its degree of merit, nor can we blame him for aiding the sultan in Greece against Christian rebels. Lastly, there is much to be said for his Syrian campaign, while the triumph of Kutaya ought in no way to be diminished. From 1805 to 1825 he was establishing himself in Egypt, the possession of which was still the sole object of his ambition. From 1825 to 1840 he was using Egypt as a means of winning an empire. After that date he was broken down, and his physical infirmities spare him from criticism. In the first period there is much to praise, and we meet with a hero full of promise, like Saul anointed to be captain of an inheritance,

* It was only under Ismail that Arabic became the official language of the Government. Turkish is still spoken at the Court.

like Jehu chosen from among the captains of the host. In the second period there is much to blame, and the promise remains unfulfilled. He has come into his kingdom, and can do nothing with it. He pretended that he could not hold Egypt without Syria, and in that futile struggle he wasted eight years of his life; thus, when the disaster of Acre fell upon him, he was too old and feeble to attend to Egypt itself, which had all this while been paying the penalty for his extravagance. His "reforms" were a myth, his factories and arsenals were abandoned, his monopolies came to a sudden end. When the British arrived in 1882 they could find no trace of his institutions, although he had died only a generation before; they found nothing but the "kourbash" as a principle of government, and this they promptly abolished.

Is it possible to be just towards the memory of this great man, to nothing extenuate and set down naught in malice? Apart from his ignorance, the Moslem element and Oriental habits were constantly struggling for the mastery over the latent genius of the Greek, and the result was a compromise, or alternate victories of either, a mixture of barbarism and glimpses of civilization, in varying proportions. Gradually, however, the Eastern side of his character overcame the Western: he was less in touch with Europe in 1840 than

twenty or forty years earlier; he had stood still while our civilization had been advancing in the growth of public opinion, and in respect for the sufferings of humanity.

We find him totally ignorant of the political forces then existing abroad, limiting his vision to the trading consular diplomacy of Alexandria. Herein lay his mistake. Whether Palmerston's policy was right or wrong, that policy dominated the Continent, and, as a statesman, it was Mehemet Ali's duty to have gained an accurate knowledge of the English leader who had been in the Ministry almost without a break from 1807 to 1841. He was afraid of England, but thought to win us over or stifle opposition by bribing our consuls with monopolies and antiquities. The plan was a success for some years, and the fact of its existence has had to be drawn out from various sources. He was never confronted with Englishmen of the calibre of Stratford, Canning, or Bulwer; even Bowring was a revelation, though too late, and it was only when Napier threatened to bombard him that he awoke to the truth of the crisis. In 1826 he told Mr. Barker that he had never acknowledged a master, and left him under the impression that he was as little awed by England as by Turkey. Yet it was to his interests to have studied the history of the Ptolemies, and to have made a friend of the supreme

naval power in the Mediterranean. On the contrary, at the age of seventy, he boasted to Bowring that he had never read history, and took credit for a short campaign of bribery and massacre in Palestine. Nevertheless, he spoke with enthusiasm of the ancient Macedonians. "I, too, am of their race!" he would exclaim; and, if he admired Napoleon, he made a cult of Alexander. He proposed to write his own memoirs, like Cæsar, but they have not been given to the world.

His great crime was the incessant cruelty towards the fellaheen. Nearly all might be forgiven to the pasha if he had left anything to show as the good result of his tyranny. There is nothing to show. All the resources of the land were wasted abroad, leaving the peasants as miserable in 1849 as they had been under the Mamelukes. Trading-consuls, army-contractors, and diggers for antiquities made fortunes during that half century, but no native peasant ever benefited from the pasha's experiments in empire. Mehemet Ali hindered the natural expansion of commerce, and reduced the gross volume of imports and exports by a system of monopolies which enabled a privileged few to pass goods at their own valuation, or to run contraband through a corrupt custom-house. On the whole, Egypt was poorer in 1849 than in 1799, the land was desolate, and the population had decayed.

He sold the Egyptians' birthright for a mess of pottage. In return for Christian trade he relaxed the severity of the capitulations without creating any new safeguard for his ignorant Moslems, with the result that in the next generation the Greek money-lender and the Levantine lawyer were swarming in the villages and ousting the fellaheen from their lands. It was he who begot and fostered that arrogance of the "mean white" towards the native Egyptian, of which the servile Christian colonies had never dreamed before his accession. The foreigner was necessary to him, and he paid any price for the alliance. He set up a pretentious tribunal of commerce, but native litigants sought consular protection, thereby affording the best proof of his partiality for Europeans. Christian colonies being indispensable, toleration of religion followed as a matter of course, and the Coptic community also gained by his indulgence—an indulgence, be it said to his credit, enforced in the teeth of the old Moslem party. Thus we find this curious paradox: while the Moslems of Turkey hailed him as the champion of Islam against the Czar, the Moslems of Egypt cursed him as the protector of Christians against the peasants at home.

As for reforms, Mehemet Ali did a great deal in the matter of canalization, but it was for himself. Irrigation

fell into decay, and everything had to be begun again by the British.*

With regard to education, between 1825 and 1834 about a hundred pupils were sent to France; after that date several went to England, and most of such students entered the public service. In 1827 he allowed Dr. Clot Bey to start a medical school, first at Abu Zabal and then at Kasr el-Aini, and to organize military hospitals. The ordinary schools were primary, preparatory, and special, with a total of 9000 pupils throughout the country, who were lodged, fed, and paid by the pasha. Dr. Bowring says that the regulations were judicious and well adapted to the people, but adds—

"These efforts resemble what has been done by the introduction of European machinery for manufactures, of which there has been imported an abundance fitted for a nation far advanced in mechanical science, but wholly unsuited to a people emerging from the rudest state. The desire is to arrive at a certain point without passing through the preliminary stage, to gather the fruit before it has had time to ripen, to harvest immediately after the seed is sown. Nevertheless, owing to the thousand prejudices to be overcome, what has been done is highly meritorious."

Mr. J. A. St. John says that there were 1200 pupils at Kasr el-Aini under military discipline, that little

* Clot Bey says that 355,000 men were employed annually on the corvée from 1834 to 1840.

regard was paid to health or morals, and that in April, 1832, about 300 of these lads were sent off *en masse* to Abu Zabal afflicted with syphilis, ophthalmia, or the itch. Many years later Mr. Senior states that all these educational experiments were abolished either by Abbas or Said, much to the grief of the worthy Clot Bey, who never ceased to regret his patron Mehemet Ali. It is, however, impossible to praise the pasha for sending little fellah boys to school when those children saw their fathers being flogged for taxes, driven off to corvée, or mutilating themselves to avoid conscription; when the children had to help in the corvée by carrying food to their elders, who were naked and famished as they cleaned out the canals with their bare hands; when Gliddon says that the schools and hospitals were little better than barns, and that "education" existed only on paper; when Dr. Bowring admits that the peasants were "on the extremest verge of poverty" in 1837, and that their condition was unchanged and scarcely better than under the Mamelukes.*

Ibrahim was far simpler in nature, and though in theory as severe as Mehemet Ali, in practice he was

* Dr. Bowring, "Blue Book Report on Egypt and Candia," 1840; Clot Bey, "Aperçu Général sur l'Egypte," Bruxelles, 1840; J. A. St. John, "Egypt and Mehemet Ali," London, 1834; G. R. Gliddon, "Pamphlet No. 2," London, 1841; Nassau W. Senior, "Conversations and Journals in Egypt, 1855," published 1882.

more indulgent. He preferred to leave the peasantry alone instead of harassing them to death. He was heartily tired of a system which decimated his best troops, and of a commercial monopoly which depopulated the villages. His amiable weakness was a love for planting trees and for restoring land to cultivation, as if he acknowledged the burden of Egypt, a crying for repose and sleep and recuperation. "Ye are idle, ye are idle," said his father. "For the love of God, let the people rest!" might be the reply of Ibrahim. Morose and taciturn as a rule, except with intimate friends, he reverenced the pasha, whom he served loyally and often against a better judgment. Both for the elder's reputation as a monarch and for the good of Egypt, it would have been better if Ibrahim could have inherited the pashalik after Kutaya in 1833. The father would have descended to his grave as a complete success, and the warrior son, with less ambition, might have given poor Egypt a chance of repose. It is possible that Ibrahim was not so guilty as was asserted of the excesses committed in Greece. It is certain that he repented, and wished to be milder in Syria, that he improved with age, and favourably impressed many Europeans of reputation. As a practical soldier he saw that the game was over long before the final catastrophe of Acre.

One parts from them with sentiments of affection and regret. To Englishmen Mehemet Ali will always be the victor of El-Hamàd, a redoubtable foe; and Ibrahim the hero of Kutaya who threatened the gates of Stamboul with his docile fellaheen troops. Their faults and their failings may best be forgotten, and their equestrian statues may remain in memorial of a great father and a great son, who attempted much and who perhaps succeeded in a little, and who might never have failed had not their Egypt lain across our road to India. A generation after their death our soldiers were marching into Cairo, and the dynasty of Mehemet Ali had been restored by English bayonets.

CHAPTER XX.

THE OVERLAND ROUTE.

At the time when Napier was bombarding Acre, and the wise policy of Palmerston was limiting the power of Mehemet Ali to Egypt, certain interested persons in England presented the pasha with a medal of their own invention, as a mark of their private gratitude and esteem. On the one side it bore an effigy of Mehemet Ali, copied from a bad portrait; on the other was the following inscription: "To the Friend of Science, Commerce, and Order, who protected the Subjects and Property of Adverse Powers, and kept open the Overland Route to India, 1840."

The incident excited much ridicule, and was justly denounced by those who understood the true nature of the pasha's commercial monopolies, his barbarism in the wanton destruction of antiquities, and his tyranny over the Egyptians. The "subjects of adverse powers" were more or less his agents and workmen,

their property consisted of goods in which they trafficked on his behalf, while as for keeping open the overland route, it must be borne in mind that no one derived more benefit from that enterprise than he himself. To have stopped the transit, to have injured a single English traveller, would have lost him Egypt as well as Syria.

There was nothing new in the overland route to India. The seed of its revival had been sown by George Baldwin, who, jealous of the Levant Company's trade through Aleppo to the Persian Gulf, obtained a firman for the navigation of the Red Sea. Appointed our first consul in Egypt during the French Revolution, he earned the thanks of the Indian Government by sending early news of the French alliance with Tippoo. He brought a ship to Alexandria from London, and another from Calcutta to Suez, and, ascending the great pyramid with his friends, he poured out libations from three bottles, of water from the Thames, the Ganges, and the Nile, and he toasted the union of the three rivers, and the expansion of British commerce through Egypt. So well did he succeed that his firman was cancelled, and he retired a disappointed man, living, however, to assist Hutchinson in 1801, and to write his "Political Recollections relative to Egypt, and its danger to England in the possession

of France, 1802." The letter from the Porte which ruined him is curious, as showing the state of the Turkish mind at that period. The Red Sea, it declared, was the holy sea of Mecca, not to be profaned by infidels in the vulgar pursuit of trade, and therefore the firman was withdrawn, no doubt at the instigation of the Levant Company. Thus Baldwin under the Mámelukes preceded Waghorn by some forty years as the pioneer of the overland route, and deserves to be regarded as its originator.

Again, during the Wahhàbi war, in 1815, a war, Burckhardt says, the expenses of which were covered by the monopolies at Arabian ports, an English merchant of Alexandria, Mr. Briggs, urged upon the pasha the advantages of a regular trade with India. Something was attempted by sending a few ships to Bombay, but as a whole the venture was not a success.

With the retirement of Missett, and the arrival of Salt as consul-general, the era of monopolies and trading-consuls began, and, if Frenchmen like Sève, De Cérisy, and Clot (the only three Europeans who, Mehemet Ali confessed, had been faithful to him) entered the Egyptian service, Englishmen, on the other hand, had the lion's share of the trade. Egypt was then a sort of virgin California, exploited by a few

men, who, in return for the privileges received from the pasha, never failed to sound his praises in England as the regenerator of commerce and the enlightened ruler of his land.

Such was the state of affairs during the Greek war, when Thomas Waghorn, a lieutenant of the Royal Navy, in the service of the East India Company, threw himself heart and soul into the enterprise of the new route. Consul-General Barker, who had come from Aleppo, believed in the rival scheme of the Euphrates Valley. Nevertheless, he helped Waghorn, and has left a full account of the first steps taken by that young enthusiast. It had been suggested as early as 1823, but was shelved by the East India Company as impracticable. In 1829, Sir John Malcolm, Governor of Bombay, sent a steamer to Suez; but again the scheme fell through, owing to the expenses of coaling. Barker wrote in its favour to the Directors, only to be snubbed for meddling in a matter "not in his competence." The British Government, however, approved, and asked for an official report. His reply to the Board of Control was so satisfactory, that from February, 1830, in spite of many disappointments, he had assured the ultimate triumph of Waghorn.

Mehemet Ali had nothing to do with the inauguration

of the route or its acceptance; he did not dare to hinder either the transit or the arrival of steamers. On the contrary, he had the wisdom to see that it was to his interests to welcome any proposal from the British Government, so as to be left unmolested in his designs upon Syria. He, therefore, espoused the cause of Waghorn, and never made a better investment than when he turned him into a staunch supporter among the British public. One of the finest essays on behalf of the pasha is contained in a pamphlet entitled, "Egypt in 1837," by T. Waghorn, General Agent for Steam Intercourse, *viâ* the Red Sea, between England, India, Ceylon, China, etc., dedicated to Parliament "in the hope that it will induce in Members some sort of sympathy for Egypt, instead of that indifference to her interests which permits her to be sacrificed to the bolstering up of Turkey."

He tells us that in 1836 Mehemet Ali, besides tribute, had to send £300,000 to Stamboul as "bakh-sheesh." Why, he properly asks, should Egypt be drained like this? But he does not give the right answer, which is that the pasha need not have sent it, and that he ought to have evacuated Syria, where he was wasting Egyptian money. Waghorn declares that the French are ousting us, and he looks upon his over-land route as a panacea ready to our hands. He would

have Egypt thoroughly English under the pasha. He is Kinglake's typical Englishman "leaning far over to hold his loved India," and goes on to say, in sublime ignorance of English trading-consuls, commercial agents, and sycophants, that the viceroy

> "Honoured and respected England more than all the world beside! Let us be up and doing, then, and open the doors of British industry, talent, and perseverance in Egypt, . . . the first step towards which is the repeal of the obnoxious order given by the late Mr. Canning, by which Englishmen are discouraged from settling in this country. All we have to do in order to prevent Egypt from becoming a French colony, is to cultivate a firm alliance with her, opening the doors as much as we can for English interests."

There was much truth in this, but Waghorn represented Egypt as such a Land of Cockayne filled with happy peasants and little fellah children going merrily to school, that Mr. Holroyd lost no time in exposing the nonsense to Lord Palmerston in a pamphlet which contains one of the most categoric and irrefragable denunciations of the pasha's tyranny. He ridiculed Waghorn as an intriguer who curried favour by flattery and made mountains out of mole-hills with regard to coal-depôts and mails. Mehemet Ali came to grief soon afterwards, but Palmerston had the good sense to distinguish between Egyptian adventures in Syria and the protection of our trade through the Delta. As his

journals show, he preferred to get rid of the pasha altogether, but he stayed his hand after Napier's irregular promise; and when the fate of the khedivial dynasty hung in the balance, the decision was: "Yes, he has helped and not hindered the overland route; he is better than a new-comer from Stamboul. We will give him another chance, on condition that he keeps quiet." Admirers of the viceroy pretended that we were under great obligations to him. If so, he was handsomely rewarded. The old man had many friends among the English, and a loud chorus went up on his behalf for indulgence and condonation of the past. It must never be forgotten that Mehemet Ali was a suppliant for mercy. Except France, who was powerless, the other parties to the treaty of London were hostile to the pasha, and it was Palmerston alone who assured the inheritance of Egypt to "le vaincu de l'Angleterre."

At last Waghorn enjoyed his triumph, after nearly twenty years' indomitable perseverance. On October 1st, 1845, the mail left Bombay, reached Suez on the 19th, Alexandria on the 20th, was taken *viâ* Trieste, Bavaria, the Rhine and Belgium, and was delivered at the London Post-office on the morning of the 31st. The same success was repeated with the December mail of the 1st, which reached London on the 30th, the

French Government having made great efforts to prove that the route through France was safer and shorter; with the result that Marseilles was definitely chosen as the Continental port in connection with the Peninsular and Oriental Company which had begun in 1840. Before the death of Mehemet Ali a steamer service had been opened on the Nile and Mahmoudieh Canal, between Cairo and Alexandria, and from 1842 to 1849 the average was a total of some 15,000 travellers who visited or passed through Egypt annually. Waghorn died in 1850, affirming to the last that his success had been due to the liberality and encouragement of his generous patron, Mehemet Ali. His bust adorns the harbour at Suez, and his name is honoured as that of an English seaman who, in contrast to De Lesseps, did *not* rob the Egyptian treasury, and did *not* turn his concession against his khedivial benefactor.

One likes to dwell for a moment on the triumph of the overland route, for it is the apotheosis of the old pasha, and enables us to see him at his best, to bid farewell to him with respect. We shall miss his commanding figure in the pages which follow, we shall think of him with regret when we have descended to the lower level of an Abbas, a Said, and an Ismail. Could a Mehemet Ali the Second have improved matters during the next thirty years, and have prevented the

British occupation? Or, in truth, had not the overland route, and the forecast of the Suez Canal so enlarged the political horizon as to make the Pashalik of Egypt but a minor detail, a caravanserai on the road to India controlled by Europe, by the supreme naval power in the Mediterranean? Such may, perhaps, be the philosophy of history so far as we can appreciate it at present, for, behind his asseverations that he never would yield, a terror of Wellington, of Nelson and Codrington and Napier, haunted Mehemet Ali to his dying day; and, if he could now arise from his grave in the cemetery of Imam Shaféiy, his prophetic soul would in no way be surprised at the sight of a British garrison in that citadel whence he used to gaze upon his beloved city of Cairo.

CHAPTER XXI.

ABBAS AND SAID, 1849–1863.

AFTER the death of the Great Pasha Egypt might have been forgotten but for the transit trade with India. Mehemet Ali had begun his reforms at the wrong end, often being satisfied with a mere varnish of European civilization; yet, whatever his defects and errors, he was a strong man armed, who could keep his house in peace, who would brook no foreign interference in his local prerogatives. On the one hand, Europe, in the best sense of that word, was necessary for the development of Egypt, but on the other hand it was the duty of the pasha, whether Abbas, Said, or Ismail, to use his judgment on behalf of the people, and not to surrender their rights to Christian adventurers. The country having been once thrown open, the foreign invasion annually increased, and greater pressure was exercised upon the ruler, who became like a man trying to keep his feet against a rising tide. Thus,

considerable allowance must be made for the successors of Mehemet Ali, and indulgence be shown for the extenuating circumstances of the case.

We pass from the heroic to the commonplace; we have dropped from the high plateau of the Great Pasha's reign, and begin to follow a rapid downward slope leading to the deposition of Ismail. There is little to admire in this period of thirty years—no incident of statesmanship, or of princely courage, no personal self-sacrifice, and, except perhaps in the case of Said, scarcely a sentiment of humanity displayed by the governor on behalf of the fellaheen whom he governed. The story of modern Egypt till the reign of Tewfik Pasha becomes emphatically dull after the death of Mehemet Ali, a chronicle of bad finance, of foreign swindling and roguery, of a spendthrift Court, and of disregard for the lives and sufferings of the people.

And yet there is another side to the question. We, who call ourselves Christians, cannot but feel ashamed when we learn how during that thirty years Christian adventurers victimized the Moslems of Egypt, not shooting them down, it is true, but nevertheless cruelly wronging them by the abuse of privileges and capitulations, by the mysterious processes of European law to which the Orientals were quite unaccustomed. Whatever may be the point of view, a high or a low standard

of morality, a love for truth, or a pleasant cynicism in politics, there must be one weight and one measure. We cannot condemn the Egyptians and acquit the Europeans, and if we palliate our own offences we must condone those of Abbas and Said, and even of Ismail.

Concerning Abbas a brief notice may suffice. Regent since the preceding November, he succeeded as pasha on August 2nd, 1849, at the age of thirty-six. He was murdered in Benha Palace by two of his slaves in July, 1854, after an obscure reign of five years. His character has been so generally painted in sombre colours that it is right to record the unique authority of Nubar Pasha, who still speaks of him as a true Turkish gentleman of the old school. The crime imputed to him is that he lived in seclusion, and neglected his inheritance. Yet there is much to be said in his defence. Abbas had fought under Ibrahim in Syria, and shared in all the vicissitudes of that long campaign. He had seen the total collapse of Mehemet Ali's ambition; he was convinced of the folly of resisting Europe. The land needed peace and quiet, an abolition of shams, the removal of commercial monopolies. He found himself exposed to a pack of hungry Europeans and fawning natives, whose one desire was to enrich themselves at his expense; and he took refuge in flight. Visible only to a few of the consuls-general and his

personal attendants, his life became a mystery to the public, and baffled intriguers delighted to load his memory with opprobrium. His conduct, perhaps, was ignoble, yet Egypt was saved from foreign pillage under his reign—a contrast to the days of Said and Ismail, who prided themselves on the adoption of an opposite policy.

The chief event of this period was the introduction of railways from Alexandria to Cairo, a measure carried out at the instance of the British Government in order to facilitate the transit of mails and passengers; but French opposition rendered it a source of political strife, the result being a compromise of delay and expense. On the whole, by reason of two revolutions at Paris, Abbas seems to have been under the influence of our consul-general, Sir Charles Murray; but the tables were turned when Said came to the throne, and there was no resisting the pressure exerted by the agents of Napoleon III. a few years later. Abbas hoped to obtain the reversion of the pashalik for his own son El-Hami, to the exclusion of his junior uncle Said, but his sudden murder, and the absence of El-Hami abroad, enabled the rightful heir to assume authority without opposition on July 12th, 1854.

The new viceroy was in every way a great improvement on his predecessor. Frank and genial in

disposition, Said's natural abilities had been cultivated by a good French education. As the favourite son of Mehemet Ali, he had been carefully trained for the post he was destined to fill, and few princes have begun under better auspices. There was no public debt, the revenue of three million sterling, ample for immediate wants, was capable of being gradually increased ; trade was prosperous, lands were being restored to cultivation ; all that was required from the ruler was the strength of mind necessary for the adoption of a cautious policy in protecting his own and Egyptian interests. Unfortunately, this was the one quality which Said wholly lacked. By nature energetic and industrious, he began well, and took upon himself the entire administration ; he trusted no native advisers, and therefore trained none to aid him in the future. Instead of secluding himself like the timid Abbas, he welcomed all, especially foreigners, to his presence, and delighted in generous hospitality and social intercourse. Such a system of government, excellent as it may seem in theory, utterly broke down in practice. He made himself too cheap to his visitors, and familiarity bred contempt. Moreover, he became extremely obese, and this full habit of body combined with the pleasures of the table in rendering him physically unfit for serious business. An amiable weakness was a belief in his

genius for war, and, being fond of this hobby, he equipped a large but badly disciplined army, and turned the Barrage into a fortified camp, which he regarded as a strategic centre against invasion. At the same time he was sincere in his efforts to improve the country, which he considered his private estate. Much was done to extend the railways and canals, to plant trees, and to better the condition of the fellaheen by such acts as the famous Land Law of 1858, which secured to them the first acknowledgment of freehold as against the Crown. Said Pasha was full of good qualities and good intentions, yet his weakness of character, as shown in his fits of energy alternating with periods of easy-going indifference, proved fatal to Egypt at an important crisis.

His evil genius was M. Ferdinand de Lesseps; for, no sooner had he come to the throne, than he was seduced into giving a promise for the concession of the Suez Canal—seduced, because M. de Lesseps, working on the friendship of the pasha, whom he had known as a boy, assured him that the canal would render him master of the situation against England and the Porte, while it would cost him nothing, for it would be made with French capital. It will be seen in the sequel how both these assertions were false.

Said then consulted the English consul-general, and

asked if our Government would hold him blameless if he refused De Lesseps. Sir Frederick Bruce could not give that official guarantee. France and England were then allies in the Crimea, and the unfortunate pasha, persecuted by De Lesseps, who chased him by rail and river up and down the country, at last surrendered and granted the charter in January, 1856. Owing, however, to English opposition, the concession was not ratified by the Porte till two years later.

Bruce's objections to the Suez Canal, as recorded by Nassau Senior in February, 1856, were somewhat as follows:—

"For both commercial and military purposes we are nearer to India than any European nation except Spain and Portugal, which are nothing. When the canal is open, all the coasts of the Mediterranean and Black Seas will be nearer to India than we are. The first proposer of the canal was Bonaparte, for the purpose of injuring England. At present India is unattackable. It will no longer be so when Bombay is only 4600 miles from Marseilles; and although we also shall be able to send troops through the canal, our present position of perfect safety is far better than that of the amplest means of defence."

Mr. Senior combated these opinions, and forced our agent to acknowledge that our opposition was bound to fail. Nevertheless, in order to do justice to Lord Palmerston's policy, we must try to imagine the

state of Europe under the empire of Napoleon III. When that power was destroyed at Sedan the chief danger was removed, at least for a time; but, though in abeyance, the old arguments are still sound in substance, and may be revived as against a new naval power at the Dardanelles. Moreover, M. de Lesseps deceived the pasha in both of his specious promises. The canal has not made Egypt mistress of the situation against England, nor was it dug only with French money. Instead of being completed as intended in 1864, it was a total failure, being re-established financially by the iniquitous arbitration of Napoleon III. in 1864, and rendered a success only by means of some sixteen millions sterling received from Ismail by the company between the years 1863 and 1869. Indeed, the criminal conduct of M. de Lesseps towards the khedive has only been surpassed by his more gigantic embezzlements in the affair of the Panama. In theory the canal was excellent, and its excavation was inevitable, but from an Egyptian point of view it might have been more advantageous had Said and Ismail possessed a little of the great pasha's strength of character.

As a set-off to this French triumph, Said granted a concession to the Eastern Telegraph Company, and allowed the establishment of the Bank of Egypt in

1856. The railways were pushed on, and, by the pasha's permission, British troops were sent by the overland route during the Indian mutiny. The transit was becoming a valuable item of revenue, the outbreak of the civil war in America was creating an unlimited demand for cotton; everything pointed to a prosperous future had a wise policy of economy and gradual development been adopted. Said, however, had fallen into extravagance, and commenced the public debt by borrowing £3,293,000 from Messrs. Frühling and Göschen, out of which sum he received about £2,640,000.

The end was approaching. As Mr. De Leon writes in "Egypt under its Khedives,"—

"He had mounted the throne a gay, hopeful, ardent man, with vigorous health, boundless power, and almost inexhaustible wealth. He left it but nine years later for a premature grave; his strength wasted by disease and trouble; hope, fortune, friends, all lost; and, with a soul as sick as his body, welcomed death as a release from suffering."

Said Pasha was a popular, good fellow, who in private life would have been nobody's enemy but his own. In his public capacity his amiable weakness of character became a source of woe to his country, upon whom he entailed the burden of the Suez Canal. The dominant sentiment of the writer, and perhaps of the reader, is one of sympathy rather than of blame. The political

circumstances had been growing more complex and difficult; Europe had been changing very rapidly, and Egypt could not adapt itself as quickly to the new point of contact. All might, however, have been retrieved had not the megalomania of Ismail brought about a swift finale.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE SUEZ CANAL.

THE story of the Suez Canal may be briefly told. In 1841 Lord Palmerston was blamed by some for having curtailed the independence of Egypt, yet his policy was justified by the inheritance of Mehemet Ali falling into the weaker hands of Abbas, Said, and Ismail. He continued loyal to that settlement till his death, in 1865. He was anxious for peace with the French empire, and, seeing that he could not effectually counteract the influence of M. de Lesseps without destroying the semi-independence guaranteed to the pashalik after Acre, he was obliged to let matters slowly take their course. He did not want a Suez Canal because he did not want an Egyptian Question, but he could not prevent it because the French were our allies in the Crimea, and because De Lesseps enjoyed high favour at the Imperial Court. All he could do was to delay the issue as long as possible, and he warned the

French that a state of affairs might arise which would lead to complications. The French persisted in making the canal route to India, and thereby forced an English occupation only thirteen years after its completion. Indeed, as M. Renan said in his answer to the Academy speech of De Lesseps—

"The isthmus cut becomes a strait, a battle-field. A single Bosphorus has hitherto sufficed for the troubles of the world; you have created a second much more important one. In case of naval war it would be of supreme interest, the point for the occupation of which the whole world would struggle to be first. You have marked the field of the great battles of the future."

As early as 1796 Napoleon entertained the idea of a maritime canal from Suez, but his chief engineer, Lepère, stated that the Red Sea level was thirty feet above the Mediterranean. This error was rectified by another Frenchman, M. Linant de Bellefonds, who submitted his plans to De Lesseps, at that time French consul-general, in 1833.

"In 1840," M. Linant writes, "England and the East India Company wished for a canal. In 1841 I signed a contract to that effect with the Peninsular and Oriental Company, and in 1842 the Indian Government accepted my project with enthusiasm."

In 1847 a mixed commission, of which Robert Stephenson was a member, surveyed the isthmus with

Linant, and agreed that there was no difference of level between the two seas. Mehemet Ali doubted whether the scheme would succeed, but (to his glory be it recorded) one of his last acts was to render the commissioners every official assistance. Nothing further was done till the accession of Said Pasha, and in November, 1854, M. de Lesseps obtained that viceroy's formal consent. This promise was ratified in January, 1856, by a second Act of Concession. A lease was granted for ninety-nine years, to count from the opening of the canal. De Lesseps was to make also a fresh-water canal from Cairo to Ismailia, with branches north and south to Port Said and Suez. For this purpose he was given the lands necessary for buildings and works gratis and free from taxation; the lands, not private property, brought under cultivation gratis and free from taxation for ten years; the right to charge land-owners for fresh-water which he was bound to supply; all mines found on the company's lands, and the right to work State mines and quarries free of cost or tax; exemption from customs duties on imports for the service of the company; the whole enterprise to be completed, save for unavoidable delays, within six years. Native labour was to be employed to the extent of four-fifths, a special convention settling the terms on which the pasha was to supply relays of thousands of

fellaheen diggers every three months. The tolls were fixed at ten francs per passenger and ten francs per ton of "capacity"—an ambiguous word, which led to trouble later on. The company was to be Egyptian, and subject to local jurisdiction. The profits were to be thus divided, after payment of five per cent. interest to shareholders and five to reserve fund; namely, fifteen per cent. to the Egyptian Government, ten per cent. to founders, and seventy-five per cent. to shareholders, directors, and staff. At the end of the lease the canal and its appurtenances were to revert to the Egyptian Government, the company retaining its material and stores.

Such was the princely gift of Said to De Lesseps when the enterprise began in 1858. The capital was fixed at 200 million francs (eight millions sterling) in twenty-pound shares, interest at five per cent. Owing, however, to sundry loans, the capital had risen to 458 million francs in 1887.

In 1855, while the concession was still doubtful, De Lesseps posed as the friend of England, of English free-trade and honesty. British honour, he said, forbad that we should oppose the canal on the selfish grounds that we should lose our monopoly round the Cape, and have to share the profits of transit through the Mediterranean. But on April 7th, 1856, after obtaining the concession, he wrote—

"I found Lord Palmerston just as he was in 1840, defiant and prejudiced against France and Egypt. He believed France had for a long time been carrying on a Machiavellian policy against England in Egypt, and he saw the result of this in the canal scheme. Then he persisted that it was impossible to make the canal, and that he knew better about it than all the engineers of Europe, and their opinions would not shake his. Then he delivered a long tirade about the inconveniences which would result for Turkey and Egypt if the viceroy's demands were conceded by the sultan, and the enterprise carried out. He told me frankly that he opposed me. I listened, asking myself whether he was a maniac or a statesman. Not one of his arguments was worth a minute's serious consideration. I answered all his objections as he brought them forward; but, as I was arguing with one whose mind was already made up, I found it only waste of time to prolong the interview."

Again on April 21st he wrote—

"We now know the real motive of Lord Palmerston's opposition. He is afraid of assisting the development of Egypt's prosperity and power. I have suspected this a long time, and mentioned it to Said Pasha last year with reference to a despatch from a late governor-general of India, in which he stated that if England one day came into possession of Egypt, as she had done of India, she would be the mistress of the world.

"The viceroy will see by my advice and conduct how desirous I am not to compromise him. *If I thought more of the canal than I do of him*, nothing would be easier than to give up the scheme into the hands of great capitalists

who would quickly carry it out by absorbing him. *But I want him to remain master of the situation, and for the canal to be a means of consolidating and strengthening his political position.*"

How did M. de Lesseps act up to this moral engagement? After Said, Ismail Pasha was in favour of the scheme, and paid up some two millions sterling due for 177,642 founder's shares subscribed for by his predecessor. In 1863 he referred an important question to the arbitration of Napoleon the Third, with the result that in July, 1864, the latter delivered an award for an indemnity of £3,360,000 to be paid by Ismail to the company, namely, £1,520,000 for the withdrawal of native forced labour, £1,200,000 for the resumption by the Egyptian Government of land bordering on the canal, except two hundred mètres on either bank, and £640,000 for the fresh-water canal from Ismailia to Suez. This was paid off by 1869. Again, in 1866, the company obtained a further payment of over £300,000 for the cession of Wadi Tumilat (land of Goshen), which it had bought in 1861 for some £74,000. Altogether, Said Pasha's gift cost Egypt an ultimate total of more than sixteen millions sterling paid to the company before the canal was opened in 1869.

Meanwhile, how had the enterprise been prospering since 1858? Lord Palmerston was fully justified in

predicting that, if made, the canal would be only a stagnant ditch. The Suez Canal, it must be remembered, was intended for sailing vessels. M. de Lesseps, when trying to raise money in England, said: "It is not your steamers that I am wooing, but your fleet of sailing ships now going round the Cape." He asserted that ordinary steamers, not men-of-war or mail-packets, could not afford to go to India under steam because of the great quantity of coal required. Palmerston had before his eyes the expedition of 1801, when Baird's ships were three months sailing from Bombay to Kosseir. Even at the present time it would take a fast clipper ship the better part of a month to beat up from Perim to Suez, because of the narrowness of the Red Sea. This difficulty was overcome by the invention of the compound engine for steamers, which saved nearly half the fuel, and enabled them to utilize the canal. In the opinion of Sir John Stokes, had the canal been opened in 1862 it would have been a financial failure, because the ships of that day could not have used it. Only the invention of the compound engine gave it a chance of success. Yet another factor must be mentioned—the extraordinary growth of our mercantile steam marine, owing to this invention before the canal was opened. Nevertheless, the enterprise was bankrupt. In 1871–72 its twenty-pound shares had fallen to seven,

and no dividends could be paid. Then it was that England came to the rescue by persuading the Powers at the Constantinople Conference to allow the company a surtax of 40 per cent. on the tolls. Combine these separate strokes of good luck derived from England, add the sixteen millions received from Ismail, and we see why the Suez Canal became a success.

Another point merits attention. Speaking in 1887, Sir John Stokes said—

"I have found on the part of the *Egyptian Government* a very deep-rooted opinion that the canal has injured Egypt from a national point of view. No doubt their large indemnities might lead to this impression, but the real injury arose from improvident sacrifice of the royalties, which amounted to 15 per cent. of the net receipts. These profits were abandoned in 1880 to a French syndicate to cover a debt of £700,000. During the last seven years the syndicate has encashed £1,212,000, and, supposing the receipts did not increase, the company would pay to the syndicate 14 millions sterling up to 1968 for that trifling debt of £700,000. Probably the payment will be three times that amount. I think the Egyptian Government has no right to complain, for at the time of doing it they had already received £83,000 in five bad years, so that they must have known they had got a valuable property."

In this unanswerable and business-like statement Sir John Stokes lays bare the weak point of the case when he speaks of an "Egyptian Government." The

only Government was the will of Said Pasha, or of Ismail, who pledged the future of Egypt; and it was this which Lord Palmerston feared when he predicted to De Lesseps the "inconveniences" which might arise later on. But what becomes of M. de Lesseps' promises made in April, 1856? *He* has neither made the khedive master of the situation, nor has he consolidated the power of the dynasty. On the contrary, he established for a time an autocracy of his own, aspiring to the rights and privileges of an independent maritime Power unknown to international law. When British shipowners protested against his high tariff for "capacité" of tonnage, he so prevaricated that on July 7th, 1874, Lord Derby wrote: "This is a specimen of M. de Lesseps' mode of representing facts." A display of force was threatened by Ismail, and the company accepted the inevitable, agreeing to charge on the net, and not on the gross tonnage of vessels.

But the climax was reached during the British expedition of 1882. By charter the company was Egyptian, and not French or "universal;" it could not be neutral so long as Turkey was neutral, it could not be "neutral" when the khedive was in danger from internal rebellion. For the first time, in repayment for the concession and sixteen millions sterling, there was an opportunity for the khedive to derive

some personal benefit by turning Aràbi's position at Kafr Dowàr, to become master of the situation, and consolidate his power, as De Lesseps promised in 1856. When, however, the British appeared at Port Said, in order to restore the dynasty, M. de Lesseps and his son Victor protested against their entering the canal. According to father and son, it was no longer an Egyptian, but a De Lesseps canal. Nevertheless, Admiral Hoskins smiled at these protests, and passed on to Ismailia, while M. Charles de Lesseps, at Paris, assuming the status of a maritime power, addressed a circular letter to the ambassadors, inveighing against the violation of his family canal. The French Government did not support him, and begged us to deal gently with a man who enjoyed so high a reputation as "le grand Français," and we were magnanimous. But though he failed to thwart us, M. de Lesseps made himself ridiculous. He telegraphed to Aràbi to leave his canal alone, adding, "Jamais les Anglais n'y pénétreront, jamais, jamais."

Again he insisted—

"Make no attempt to intercept *my* canal. *I* am there. Not a single English soldier shall disembark without being accompanied by a French soldier. *I* answer for everything."

Aràbi replied—

"Sincere thanks. Assurances consolatory, but not sufficient under the existing circumstances. The defence of Egypt requires the temporary destruction of the canal."

From an English point of view we cannot blame him. He was really a great Frenchman, a redoubtable foe, who believed in Egypt as a French appanage, and had worked for his country's interests there during fifty years. Then came the British occupation, and his life's work was undone in a moment. At the fatal crisis France abandoned him, as she had abandoned Dupleix, Labourdonnais, Montcalm, and other great Frenchmen, who fought us in the last century. "His" canal will remain as his monument, and the painful incidents of the enterprise will be forgotten by the admirers of his work.

His sin was against Egypt, the khedivial dynasty, the fellaheen. He turned the document of concession into a bond, and exacted the last drop of blood with his pound of flesh. However much, therefore, we may criticize the profuse expenditure of Said and of Ismail as against the fellaheen, we are bound to give them credit for their generosity towards Europe, especially when it is remembered that the canal ruined the railway transit for troops, mails, and passengers, a traffic which brought a large revenue into their treasury. If our commerce has benefited, our thanks are due to Said and Ismail, our pity for the fellaheen, whose taxes paid more than half the cost of the enterprise. If we apply the one weight and the one measure between Egypt

and Europe, the glory of the Suez Canal belongs to the two viceroys, because they made a free gift to their own disadvantage, because they were ever the munificent patrons of De Lesseps, as Mehemet Ali was of the English Waghorn.

And now, having briefly sketched its past history, we may fairly ask what is likely to be the future of the canal? It may safely be answered that it is an instrument on behalf of peace. There is no historic precedent of such another artificial passage at so important a point on the earth's surface. It may be difficult to keep it open during the next naval war between great powers, and it may be very easy to close it by accident or design; the discussion of these alternatives can at present, therefore, be purely academical. On the other hand, as the value of the canal is yearly increasing for all the nations of Europe, anxiety for their commerce must assuredly act as a deterrent from war. This is more particularly the case as between England and France. The French people and the British Government are the chief shareholders, and two-thirds of the tonnage in transit is British. The two chief sufferers in revenue and commerce from the closing of the canal would be ourselves and the French. Thus it is to our mutual interests to make the canal a bond of alliance, the strength of which shall increase with

the steady prosperity of De Lesseps' work. We cannot, however, become real allies if we remain ignorant of the past or shirk the problems of the future. What is most needed by Englishmen as a first step towards the peaceful solution of the "Egyptian Question" is an accurate study of the history of Egypt during the nineteenth century, our victories and defeats and drawn battles, whether in war or diplomacy. Then alone will they acknowledge the force of "accomplished facts," both in favour of England and against her, and fully realize that there is no more powerful argument working for peace in Europe than the commercial safety of the Suez Canal.*

* See Blue Books *passim*. These belong to four periods: the early concessions, the tonnage question, the British occupation, and the reforms introduced in 1884–85. "The Suez Canal," by M. Ferdinand de Lesseps, translated by Mme. D'Anvers: London, H. S. King, 1876. "Egypt under its Khedives," by Edwin de Leon: Sampson Low, 1882. "Egypt under Ismail," by J. C. McCoan: Chapman & Hall, 1889. "Egyptian Campaigns, 1882–85," by Charles Royle: Hurst & Blackett, 1886. "Statistical Story of the Suez Canal," by Rabino: a paper read before the Royal Statistical Society of London, June 14th, 1887.

CHAPTER XXIII.

ISMAIL PASHA, 1863–1879.

AND now we reach the culmination of the dynasty when a son of warrior Ibrahim is to turn stock-broker, and to ruin Egypt by creating a public debt of over eighty millions sterling. Truly had Palmerston said in 1838, "No one can tell what will come when Mehemet Ali goes," for only fifteen years after the Great Pasha's death his grandson begins to surrender the country to the irresponsible tyranny of all the bourses of Europe, to open wide the flood-gates of financial speculation, and to drown native interests in the foreign rush for the spoil. Moreover, this was effected in a brief period, from 1863 to 1875, after which date the bondholders forced their governments to intervene.

The story of Ismail's extravagance would be incredible were it not for certain figures which cannot be

disputed. Taking the average revenue at seven millions sterling, he received at least eighty millions from the peasants in the shape of taxes, besides some fifty out of the nominal eighty millions borrowed from abroad. Thus, in twelve years he spent some 130 millions in cash, and yet left a gigantic debt behind him. Of the total there can be no doubt, but in tracing the annual growth of his expenditure we cannot be sure of details, owing to the complete and incomprehensible chaos of his finances. With this mental reserve it is possible to sketch an outline of his reign.

Left heir to the pashalik by the accidental drowning of his elder brother, Ahmed, Ismail succeeded his uncle Said on January 18th, 1863, and at once found himself confronted by two enemies, M. de Lesseps and the Porte. Of these the latter tried to tighten its hold, while the viceroy endeavoured to loosen it by lavish corruption at Stamboul. The former, confident in the support of Napoleon, practically became independent of both the sultan and the pasha.

Victimized by their demands, Ismail might soon have been bankrupt had not the American War enabled him to find an unlimited market for his cotton. The exports rose from four millions in 1862 to fourteen in 1864, and the imports from one to five; but although the country may have benefited, the extravagance of

the viceroy kept pace with the revenue. He began borrowing in 1864, with a loan from Messrs. Frühling and Göschen for £5,700,000 at 7 per cent. Issued at 93, this might have realized £5,300,000, but the pasha is said to have encashed only some £4,900,000—a wide margin of loss, but most reasonable when compared with some later ventures.*

The American War being over, exports rapidly fell to ten millions in 1866; but Ismail seized the opportunity of buying Suakin and Massowah from the sultan for an increase of £30,000 in the annual tribute. During the cholera of 1865 he had been negotiating at Constantinople for two concessions—a change in the heirship to the pashalik, and a change in his title. Thus, on May 27th, 1866, he obtained a firman altering the one granted to Mehemet Ali in June, 1841, and declaring that the inheritance was no longer to go to the eldest surviving male of the family of Mehemet Ali, but to Ismail's eldest son and to the eldest sons of his successors, in return for an increase in the tribute from £320,000 to £600,000. By this act Abdul-Halim (a son of the Great Pasha, and only a year junior to his nephew Ismail) was suddenly disinherited, together with Mustafa Fazil, the viceroy's younger brother.

* See J. C. McCoan's "Egypt under Ismail: A Romance in History." London, Chapman & Hall, 1889.

In 1865 a second loan had been raised from the Anglo-Egyptian Bank for £3,390,000, on the security of the "Dairas," or private khedivial estates. It was issued at 9 per cent. at 90, but proved a partial failure, only some £2,750,000 being received. In 1867 a third loan was floated by the Imperial Ottoman Bank for two millions at similar prices, and realized about £1,700,000.

These debts were incurred for meeting abnormal expenses, because in June, 1867, he was appointed "Khedive" by imperial firman. He had asked for the title of "Aziz" or "gracious," a name often applied by the natives to Mehemet Ali. But, as the suzerain was called *Abd*-ul-Aziz, or *servant* of the Gracious (God), the Porte refused to admit a play upon words, which might render the sultan the nominal servant of Aziz Ismail. It therefore chose an obscure Persian word, "Khideev," or prince, which the Arabs have altered to "Khedéwy." Disgusted at this failure, Ismail set off on a tour in Europe, and was well received both in Paris and London, although somewhat overshadowed by his sovereign, who followed soon afterwards.

At Cairo his expenditure grew by leaps and bounds, and, in addition to the eleven millions already borrowed, there was a floating debt of nearly thirty millions, while the revenue was under seven. So bad did things

become that treasury bills were sold at 16 per cent. discount, and a small loan of £300,000 was obtained from the banks early in 1868. In April another half-million's worth of 30-month bonds was discounted at 22 per cent., and Raghib Pasha, the minister of finance, was succeeded by the notorious Ismail Sadeek, commonly known as the "Muffetish," or inspector of the khedive's private estates.

As something had to be done on a large scale, Sadeek distinguished himself by raising a fourth loan for £11,890,000 at 7 per cent. from Messrs. Oppenheim. Issued at 75, it represented £8,900,000, but the pasha received only £7,200,000. This sum was not paid in cash, for, it is said, about two millions of Government bonds, then at a heavy discount, were bought in cheap and forced upon the khedive at par; so that out of the original loan of twelve only some five millions reached the treasury. Ismail, however, had to take what he could get, his expenses being further increased by a visit to Constantinople, on his return from which over £250,000 were spent on official rejoicings for his health. Another half million was devoted to Sir Samuel Baker's expedition in the Soudan, where he was commissioned as governor-general to conquer and annex the Equatorial Province.

But the great event of the year was the inauguration

of the Suez Canal on November 17th, 1869. Ismail literally kept "open house" to all European visitors present at the time, and the cost of such indiscriminate hospitality must have exceeded a million sterling. It was then that he boasted that Egypt was henceforth a part of Europe and not of Africa, the fallacy of the epigram lurking in the fact that, while each portion of the former continent belongs to its own people, the Moslem fellaheen were treated as children of Gibeon, serfs bound to the soil for the benefit of Christian adventurers.

It is said that he cherished dreams of quasi-independence under the protection of Napoleon; but, if so, they were cruelly dispelled by the Porte sending an angry ultimatum with a demand for the surrender of some 200,000 rifles and a few ironclads recently ordered. Ismail submitted, and let the Porte buy his expensive ships, but the matter of the rifles was dropped, although he was forbidden to contract new loans without special permission on each occasion.

Being again without money, a fifth venture for seven millions was made through Messrs. Bischoffsheim in May, 1870, for which perhaps he received five millions. Messrs. Oppenheim also advanced four millions on treasury bonds; but, most important of all, Sadeek tried a new device in the form of a "moukabalah" or

"compensation" to landowners, who were invited to pay their taxes for six years in advance in exchange for the freehold of their estates and a promise that the tax would be reduced by one-half in the future. This might have brought in thirty millions; but as only the wealthy farmers could afford to pay a lump sum, barely eight millions were encashed.

With these moneys at his command, Ismail hastened to the Bosphorus, where he effected the greatest *coup* of his reign. He bought two firmans, the one dated September 10th, 1872, confirming previous concessions; the other, September 25th, authorizing him to raise foreign loans without demanding special permission on each occasion, thus rescinding the veto of November, 1869, issued during his quarrel with the Porte. This, however, was obtained at an enormous outlay. Not only did he present the sultan with 50,000 rifles and a jewelled dinner-service of gold, but our ambassador, Sir Henry Elliott, stated that the second firman was bought direct from the sultan unknown to the Porte, for a bribe of £900,000 to his Majesty and some £60,000 more to palace officials.

With this precious document in his possession, Ismail at once negotiated another loan with Messrs. Oppenheim for a nominal sum of thirty-two millions at 8 per cent. It was placed on the market at 84, but

soon dropped even as low as 70. One of the conditions was that old treasury bonds might be paid in at 93, with the result that some nine millions' worth of this paper was bought in at about 70, and restored to Ismail at the higher figure. Indeed, it is said that only some twelve millions in cash were received by the treasury. As a financial operation this was worse than the 1868 loan, where five out of twelve millions reached the borrower.

The drain of gold in bribes to Constantinople still went on, and in June, 1873, the khedive received another firman consolidating all previous privileges, and fixing the tribute at £665,000. About the same time Colonel Gordon succeeded Baker in the Soudan, and somewhat improved the state of affairs in that country during the next three years; but, though for a moment fascinated by Ismail, he soon recorded his belief that the whole expedition was a sham to catch the attention of the British public.

In 1874 another loan of three millions was obtained from the Anglo-Egyptian Bank, and this was followed by a failure to raise a "Rouznameh" loan of five millions from the natives. Nevertheless, Ismail plunged into war with Abyssinia, where his troops were twice defeated, first under Colonel Arendroop, and then under his son Prince Hassan. Things had now reached

a crisis, for the treasury was empty, and the banks refused to lend. In desperation, therefore, the khedive tried a last resource. He possessed some 176,602 original founders' shares in the Suez Canal, subscribed for by Said, but partly paid for by himself. From these, however, the coupons had been detached in 1870 to satisfy some debt due to the company, and the shares would not receive dividend till 1894. Ismail now offered these as security for a loan, and suddenly, on November 26th, 1875, Lord Beaconsfield purchased them for £4,000,000 in cash. As they had originally cost £3,500,000, the khedive reaped an immediate profit of half a million; but they are now worth to the British Government about twenty millions, and bring in a revenue of nearly £700,000.

With this eventful sale the chapter of Ismail's personal rule may fitly close, inasmuch as England, by acquiring a definite stake in the country, was bound to intervene both in the management of the canal, and in the general finances of Egypt. It is true that his deposition did not occur till June, 1879, but during the next three years he was essentially a bankrupt in the hands of a foreign syndicate, whose Commission of Inquiry rendered his withdrawal inevitable. Referring to our former calculations of eighty millions received from the peasants, and fifty

out of eighty borrowed, what had he done with these one hundred and thirty millions sterling? Some thirty-two or forty were repaid in interest and sinking-fund; sixteen were spent on the canal; the Porte may be debited with five; but the remainder was wasted even after the most liberal allowance is made for public works. Comparing 1862 with 1879, we are told that the land under cultivation had risen from four to five and a half millions of acres; that the exports had swelled from four to nearly fourteen, the imports from two to nearly six, and the revenue from five to more than seven millions. The mileage of canals had increased from 44,000 to 52,000, the telegraphs from 350 to 6000, and the railways from 245 to 1200 miles; harbours had also been made at Alexandria and Suez, and encouragement given to European commerce. With honest book-keeping and proper management they need not have cost a quarter of the sums expended on them; and it is no exaggeration to say that Ismail wasted some fifty millions sterling in twelve years, for which nothing can be shown in return. The ordinary expenses of administration, such as the salaries of *employés*, may be disregarded, for during the greater part of his reign few were paid by Government, the vast majority being obliged to levy fees from private suitors, and to pilfer

from any public funds which passed through their hands. Bribery and corruption and embezzlement were rife in every department, the police and tribunals were instruments in the grasp of the wealthy for seizing the lands of the poor, and all the worst vices of the second French empire permeated Egyptian society in the tawdry counterfeit of Parisian fashions; in a word, to quote a Turkish proverb, *Balik bashdan kokar*—"a fish (first) stinks from the head," Ismail's pernicious example had corrupted the rising generation. His sin was twofold, to his country and to his family. He had indulged in the wholesale torture of millions of peasants under the corvée and the lash for the purpose of raising money; and he had injured the dynasty so laboriously won by the Great Pasha.

CHAPTER XXIV.

DUAL CONTROL, 1876–1882.

LORD BEACONSFIELD'S purchase of the canal shares having led to a request from Ismail that an English expert should be sent to report on the state of Egyptian finance, Mr. Cave, and then Mr. Rivers Wilson, arrived in Cairo for that laudable purpose. But as there were no funds in the treasury, and a khedivial decree suspended the payment of interest on the floating debt, a panic ensued, and the bourses of Europe began to force their governments to intervene. The result was, that in October, 1876, Mr. Goschen and M. Joubert went out on behalf of the bondholders, and within a month of their arrival, Ismail Sadeek, the Muffetish, mysteriously disappeared. The Official Journal stated that he had been convicted of treason, and exiled to Dongola; but there remains some doubt whether he was not secretly murdered in Ghezireh Palace, and his

body thrown into the Nile. Sadeek knew too much of the finances of Egypt, and had been got rid of from fear, lest he might betray his master. The unfortunate man's property was confiscated, and some two millions went to the treasury.

On May 7th, a decree had already fixed the Unified Debt at ninety-one millions sterling, with interest at seven per cent. On November 18th, a second decree separated certain loans, and left the Unified at fifty-nine millions. A dual control was also established in the form of two controllers-general, French and English; and four members, English, French, Austrian, and Italian, were appointed commissioners of a Caisse to receive the interest for the bondholders.

Having settled these and other kindred matters, Mr. Goschen returned to England. But great severity had to be employed on the peasants in order to meet the coupons due in January and July, 1877; indeed, out of some nine millions of revenue encashed, seven, it is said, went to the Caisse for that purpose. Taxes were increased, the khedive's agents showed no mercy with the lash, and a low Nile brought famine into the land. So alarming was the state of affairs, that a decree, dated March 30th, 1878, authorized a Commission of Inquiry, with the fullest powers to investigate and

report upon the situation. M. de Lesseps was honorary president, but Sir Rivers Wilson acted as chairman, assisted by Major Baring (now Lord Cromer), M.M. Baravelli, De Blignières, Kremer, and Riaz Pasha. Ismail had only yielded to this extreme measure under threats of deposition; but that issue was merely delayed for a year, because as soon as a committee of independent gentlemen sat down with full powers to elicit evidence, it became obvious that there was no hope of improvement while the khedive remained. A first report was published in August, and a second in April, 1879, and the whole truth was laid bare: the reckless borrowing of some sixty millions, of which perhaps forty had been received; the floating debt of another thirty millions raised on similar terms; the chaos in the accounts; the torture of the fellaheen, who were taxed to the last straw of their crops; the servitude of the officials, who dared not disobey; the wholesale confiscation of lands; the prodigality of palace expenditure during fifteen years;—all this and more came clearly to light.

As a concession, Ismail agreed to recognize the principle of ministerial responsibility, and to pose as a constitutional sovereign. A cabinet was formed under Nubar Pasha, the dual control was suspended, and the two controllers, Wilson and De Blignières,

were given the portfolios of finance and public works. The next step was the surrender by Ismail of 400,000 acres of his estates as security for a new loan from Messrs. Rothschild for £8,500,000, which produced about £6,276,000. This was called the "Domains" loan, and the property mortgaged was put under the charge of two commissioners, French and English.

Apparently shorn of his power, the khedive now prepared a native revolt against foreign domination, ordering his agents to stir up the fanaticism of the people by insinuating that all their troubles arose from the rapacity of the bondholders, the Christian enemies of the Moslems. He went a step further, and, by tampering with the army, sowed the seeds of Aràbi's military insurrection. On February 18th, 1879, while Nubar and Wilson were driving to the Finance, they were dragged out of their carriage and assaulted by a crowd of officers and men, who had been prompted by the khedive to clamour for arrears of pay. Ismail then appeared on the scene, quelled the riot, and, having reasserted his authority, dismissed Nubar Pasha, whom he replaced by his eldest son, Prince Mehemet Tewfik. For a brief moment it appeared as if he could successfully defy Europe, and on April 7th he went so far as to dismiss the controllers, and to make Sherif Pasha his prime minister. In vain

did the French and English Governments protest; and while they were trying to obtain his deposition from the sultan, matters were brought to a crisis by Prince Bismarck declaring, on May 11th, that Germany declined to recognize Ismail's new financial decree of April 22nd, which ignored her acquired rights and violated the international obligations imposed by the judicial reforms. The other Powers followed this good example, and on June 19th the English and French consuls-general told Ismail officially that their governments advised him to abdicate. A week later he was formally deposed by the Porte telegraphing to him as "ex-khedive," and appointing his son Mehemet Tewfik in his stead. On June 30th he quitted the country, and lived in exile till his death, in 1895.

Such was the heritage he left behind him: a bankrupt treasury and a mutinous army. We are back again to the days of 1803, when the Albanian Tahir besieged Khusrev in the citadel, and to the military discontents which more than once nearly overthrew the Great Pasha. No longer have we to deal with the disciplined fellaheen whom Ibrahim led to victory, but with troops who had recently misbehaved both in Abyssinia and on the Danube, an ignorant rabble aping the virtues of a national party.

With the accession of Tewfik Pasha, Sherif resigned in favour of Riaz, and the Dual Control was revived in September, 1879, in the persons of Major Baring and M. de Blignières. The Budget for 1880 was estimated at £8,500,000, administrative expenses amounting to £4,200,000, and the balance being intended for the service of the debt. In March a commission was appointed for the definite settlement of financial troubles, and in July the famous Law of Liquidation was promulgated. By this enactment the Unified Debt was fixed at fifty-eight millions at four per cent., the Privileged Debt at twenty-two millions at five per cent., while the Daira and Domain's loans were kept apart as special mortgages. Again, the Budget for 1881 estimated the interest for the debt at £4,470,000 out of a possible revenue of £8,400,000; but the practical difficulty was to encash enough for home expenditure after the coupons had been provided for. At this moment, unfortunately for Egypt, Sir Evelyn Baring went to India as Financial Member of Council, and did not return as Consul-General till September, 1883. Things rapidly grew worse; there was no strength in the executive, no commercial credit for the carrying on of daily business; the machinery of Government was slackening to a standstill.

In January, 1881, the native or "fellah" officers of

the army, headed by Colonel Ahmed Aràbi and others, petitioned for a redress of grievances, protesting against a reduction of the establishment which had been proposed on grounds of economy, and claiming a share of the higher commands which were a monopoly among a few Turkish and Circassian pashas of the dominant race. In February they followed this up by a mutiny, and imposed their accomplice, Mahmoud Sami, as minister of war. Anarchy ensued under an ignorant military despotism, for on September 9th Aràbi paraded his regiments in the square before Abdin Palace, and obliged the khedive to accept his terms. These were the dismissal of the Riaz Ministry, which, he said, "had sold the country to the English;" the convocation of a native parliament; and the raising of the army to 18,000 men.

It is beyond the scope of this work to give in detail the narrative of events which occurred from September, 1881, till the bombardment of Alexandria, in July, 1882, because that really forms a preface to the history of the British occupation, a subject already done justice to by other writers. Suffice it to add, that on January 8th, 1882, M. Gambetta and Lord Granville sent their "Joint Note" to the khedive, assuring him of their united support. Had this letter been promptly followed by the landing of a small mixed garrison at

Alexandria, it would at least have deserved the credit of enunciating a firm policy. It proved, however, to be an empty threat, which alienated both the sultan and the native population from the khedive, who, for the next six months, was abandoned to his fate. Sherif retired in favour of Mahmoud Sami as president of the council in which Aràbi was now minister for war, a Turkish envoy was sent to Egypt, and a conference of ambassadors was held at Constantinople. Suddenly, on June 11th, a terrible riot broke out at Alexandria, where more than a hundred Christians were killed or wounded by the Arab population. Whatever may have been the origin of this outbreak, whether locally spontaneous or instigated by the National Party, it ceased by order of Aràbi as suddenly as it began, and armed intervention was now inevitable. The banks and houses of business were closed, money and credit had disappeared, there was a general exodus of Europeans, and Egypt relapsed into a state of Moslem barbarism.

Hitherto the amiable Tewfik had borne the burden of the *damnosa hereditas* left by Ismail. He was now relieved of it by the mutiny of Aràbi and his accomplices, who henceforth alone became responsible for the future. Had these rebels been the purest-minded and most enlightened of patriots, they would have failed,

because they had driven European commerce out of the country. Egypt could never become like Morocco or Arabia; by some means it had to be reopened to civilization and trade, and foreign intervention became urgent by reason of the crass ignorance of the National Party. Just as Murad and his Mamelukes despised Napoleon's veterans as a mob of donkey-boys, so did Aràbi imagine that he could succeed against Europe where Mehemet Ali had failed. The result was a foregone conclusion.

The chief difficulty in the Eastern Question is the absence of education among the races of the Levant; the lack of public opinion such as we understand the term among Christian nations. When the British entered Cairo in 1882, for all practical purposes the vast majority of native Egyptians were as ignorant slaves as their ancestors had been at the time of Napoleon's invasion. Whatever apparent improvement existed in the shape of public works was entirely due to the European colonies. Mehemet Ali and his successors had left nothing behind them which can be recorded to their credit as apart from the introduction of Christian civilization; they had wasted the century in futile wars and extravagance, and the barrenness of their ideas, the worthless character of their tyranny, find a just condemnation in the fact that a ridiculous

creature like Aràbi could so easily upset the throne only a generation after the death of the Great Pasha. Moreover, this revolt was one of the most successful recorded in history, for although the native army was defeated at Tell-el-Kebir, and the leaders were banished to Ceylon, yet the attempt had assured the freedom of the fellaheen under the British occupation, and had destroyed the autocracy of the khedive.

CHAPTER XXV.

CONCLUSION.

A GLANCE at the list of chapters in this book will enable the reader to survey the space over which we have travelled, and to follow the main thread of the argument which has now reached its logical conclusion.

Just a hundred years ago Egypt was lying politically and commercially dead under the indolent *régime* of the worthless Mamelukes. In 1798 Napoleon arrived upon the scene, and, brandishing a two-edged sword of offence, threatened both the monopoly of our trade round the Cape and the safety of our Indian empire by his reopening the old route through the Isthmus of Suez. Before long he had to evacuate the Delta owing to the victories of Nelson and Abercrombie; but the discovery, once made, could never be forgotten, and an Egyptian "Question" was created, the progress of which seems to have become a permanent cause of rivalry between the two Western Powers.

Then a new dynasty began, an Albanian revival of the Macedonian Ptolemies. Mehemet Ali, an obscure adventurer, succeeded in possessing himself of the coveted province by a display of energy and statesmanship not often surpassed in Oriental annals. A few years later, without counting the cost, we attempted a second invasion, which ended in our humiliating surrender at El-Hamàd, and in the abandonment of a prize, the full value of which we did not then appreciate.

Established on the throne, Mehemet Ali annihilated his rivals, the Mamelukes, overcame the Wahhàbis, and conquered the Soudan, further consolidating his power by turning Egypt into his private farm, and by setting up a system of commercial monopolies which ensured him a large revenue at the expense of his people.

Until 1824, however, he was still a petty Eastern prince, of whom little was known; but from that date his rapid subjugation of Greece revealed to Europe that a new factor had arisen in the south-eastern corner of the Mediterranean, while the battle of Navarino, won by the combined squadrons of England, France, and Russia, showed the special interest of those three countries in any future settlement of the problem. Nothing daunted by this defeat, Mehemet Ali quietly

recruited his forces, and then suddenly declaring war on the Porte, overran Syria, and threatened the gates of Constantinople. The three Powers now separated, the Czar Nicholas allying himself with the sultan, while England and France, desirous of preventing the permanent occupation of the Bosphorus by the Russians, brought about a compromise which yielded Syria to the rebellious pasha.

This triumph of Mehemet Ali, however, proved the cause of his downfall, inasmuch as he exhausted the strength of Egypt in endeavouring to hold the lands added to his original domain. Exasperated by his failure, he demanded the independence of Egypt, and once more defeated the Turks, in 1839. It was at this crisis that Lord Palmerston definitely intervened, and, with the support of Russia, Austria, and Prussia, obliged Mehemet Ali to submit, and restricted his dominions to Egypt alone as a hereditary principality. From that moment France became our open rival on the banks of the Nile, although she joined us in the Crimean War against the Czar.

In Egypt matters remained quiet for a few years, so far as diplomacy was concerned; but a great revolution had been slowly taking place in commerce and transit between East and West. As early as 1827 Waghorn had taken up the question of an overland route, and

in 1845 he succeeded in bringing the Bombay mail to London in thirty days, while, under Abbas, a railway was constructed from Alexandria to Cairo. These English enterprises were, however, overshadowed by the great scheme of De Lesseps for the piercing of the Isthmus of Suez for a maritime canal. Napoleon was then on the throne, and Lord Palmerston, remembering the invasion of Egypt by the first Bonaparte, and the intrigues of Louis Philippe to establish a French protectorate in the days before the bombardment of Acre, made a long and stout resistance to the specious overtures of De Lesseps. The revolt of Aràbi in 1882 thoroughly exposed any pretensions to consider the canal as a French possession. Egypt had been made bankrupt by the criminal extravagance of Ismail, the dual control failed because it was limited to words without the sanction of force, and our Government, having in vain sought the co-operation of France, found itself driven to act alone.

If, now, we could regard this period of 1798–1882 from a distance—as it were a mediæval century of the Byzantine empire—the minor incidents fully described in the preceding chapters would be lost to view, and we should see merely the chief episodes and actors—Nelson and Napoleon, Mehemet's Ali's massacre of the Mamelukes, Ibrahim's victory at Konia, Napier at Acre,

Waghorn's Overland Route, De Lesseps' Canal, the revolt of Aràbi, and Lord Wolseley's triumph at Tell-el-Kebir. These, again, would cluster into one fact, the long struggle between England and France for the control of the Egyptian route to India. Mehemet Ali, though a great man, was a "hero" but in a limited sphere, because the work of his life will not bear rigid and impartial criticism. England and her commercial policy in the East is the real plot of this Egyptian drama during the nineteenth century, and the Great Pasha has to be fitted into it as one of the leading characters, not English policy into the life of Mehemet Ali. For two generations, and more, Canning, Peel, Palmerston, and Gladstone determined that there should not be an Egyptian Question. As Waghorn asserts, Canning discouraged Englishmen from settling at Alexandria; Palmerston promptly stifled the trouble by bombarding Acre and bringing the pasha to his knees; Beaconsfield, alive to the growing danger of the canal, bought up the shares offered for sale, and Gladstone was forced to intervene. Such is the British occupation—a logical sequence of Napoleon's expedition, dreaded by Mehemet Ali as early as 1814, prophesied by Kinglake in "Eôthen" in 1835, and forced upon us by Waghorn and De Lesseps.

What the future has in store for England in Egypt

no man can tell, for it depends on the power of France, of Russia, and the fate of Constantinople. It is, above all, a naval question; and though at present we possess a certain supremacy in the Mediterranean, that would be modified by the establishment of a new Byzantine empire on the Bosphorus, with hostile arsenals at the Dardanelles, Smyrna, and Alexandretta. On the other hand, it must not be forgotten that the Red Sea is a continuation of the Canal, and that not Suez, but Perim and Aden, form the true strategic entrance from the south under British control. In 1827, at Navarino, England, France, and Russia defeated Turkey and Egypt. In 1833 Egypt invaded Turkey, the czar aided the sultan, while France and England effected a compromise. In 1840 England and Russia supported the sultan against France and Egypt. In 1882 France and Russia held aloof, and England began her military occupation. As early as Navarino Palmerston was on his guard against an alliance between Russia and France. Seventy years have passed, and such an alliance is now become a notorious fact.

In 1807 England was defeated by Mehemet Ali at El-Hamàd. In 1840 Palmerston assured Egypt to the pasha as an hereditary principality. In 1882 we restored the dynasty at Tell-el-Kebir. That our generosity has not been wasted is shown in the acts of

the lamented Tewfik Pasha until his death, in 1892. A great burden had been thrown on that prince—a mad revolt of ignorant Arabs who had some just grievances that cried for reform, and a gigantic debt of nearly a hundred millions sterling due to foreign bondholders, who, as honest buyers in the open market, demanded the payment of their interest. Only England could restore the situation, because she alone possessed the two necessary qualities, supremacy at sea and supremacy in financial credit. No one knew better than Tewfik Pasha the vices of Ismail's Government which had led to the revolt of Aràbi. That *régime*, of course, could never return; but he also bore other facts in mind: he was the descendant of Mehemet Ali, and he owed his dynasty to the British. Loyalty to his ancestor prompted him to save the family name; loyalty to the British, to whom he owed his restoration, led him to cordially support the work of reform. He was like a man succeeding to a mortgaged estate in the hands of administrators; the military force and the financial credit needed for its rehabilitation belonged to England, and not to himself; he was paying the penalty for Ismail and Said, and he did so with a patient equanimity and self-denial deserving of the highest praise. Of Tewfik Pasha it may be said that he was a beloved and popular khedive, who, choosing the path of safety,

succeeded in handing on the heritage to his eldest son.

India has been spoken of as the land of regrets. Egypt, on the other hand, is a land of promise, a country with a great future in the twentieth century. The Nile will have been opened up from Nyanza to the sea. We shall have railroads and steamers through the heart of the Soudan, the canal will revert to the State at the end of the concession in 1969, the public debt will have been reduced to moderate dimensions, and, for its size, the province of Egypt will have become the most valuable domain on the face of the globe. At present we are but on the threshold of this new era, and it behoves us as Englishmen, and the heirs of Nelson, to study its possibilities and to prepare for its development.

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